Praeterea, quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse maius eo. Sed spes, ut videtur, se habet ex additione ad caritatem, praesupponit enim spes amorem, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.; addit autem quendam motum protensionis in rem amatam. Ergo spes est maior caritate. Obj. 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. Praeterea, causa est potior effectu. Sed fides et spes sunt causa caritatis, dicitur enim Matth. I, in Glossa, quod fides generat spem, et spes caritatem. Ergo fides et spes sunt maiores caritate. Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Mt. 1:3 says that faith begets hope, and hope charity. Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 13:13): Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Cum autem tres virtutes theologicae respiciant Deum sicut proprium obiectum, non potest una earum dici maior altera ex hoc quod sit circa maius obiectum; sed ex eo quod una se habet propinquius ad obiectum quam alia. Et hoc modo caritas est maior aliis. Nam aliae important in sui ratione quandam distantiam ab obiecto, est enim fides de non visis, spes autem de non habitis. Sed amor caritatis est de eo quod iam habetur, est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam amans per affectum trahitur ad unionem amati; propter quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. I answer that, As stated above (A3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 John 4:16): He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non hoc modo se habent fides et spes ad caritatem, sicut prudentia ad virtutem moralem. Et hoc propter duo. Primo quidem, quia virtutes theologicae habent obiectum quod est supra animam humanam, sed prudentia et virtutes morales sunt circa ea quae sunt infra hominem. In his autem quae sunt supra hominem, nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio, secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente, dilectio vero, secundum quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam. Id autem quod est supra hominem, nobilius est in seipso quam sit in homine, quia unumquodque est in altero per modum eius in quo est. E converso autem est in his quae sunt infra hominem. Secundo, quia prudentia moderatur motus appetitivos ad morales virtutes pertinentes, sed fides non moderatur motum appetitivum tendentem in Deum, qui pertinet ad virtutes theologicas; sed solum ostendit obiectum. Motus autem appetitivus in obiectum, excedit cognitionem humanam; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi. Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Second, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge. Ad secundum dicendum quod spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above (Q62, A4). Ad tertium dicendum quod causa perficiens est potior effectu, non autem causa disponens. Sic enim calor ignis esset potior quam anima, ad quam disponit materiam, quod patet esse falsum. Sic autem fides generat spem, et spes caritatem, secundum scilicet quod una disponit ad alteram. Reply Obj. 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other. Quaestio 67 Question 67 De duratione virtutum post hanc vitam Of the Duration of Virtues after This Life Deinde considerandum est de duratione virtutum post hanc vitam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam. (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? Secundo, utrum virtutes intellectuales. (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain? Tertio, utrum fides. (3) Whether faith remains? Quarto, utrum remaneat spes. (4) Whether hope remains? Quinto, utrum aliquid fidei maneat, vel spei. (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope? Sexto, utrum maneat caritas. (6) Whether charity remains? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc vitam. Homines enim in statu futurae gloriae erunt similes Angelis, ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Sed ridiculum est in Angelis ponere virtutes morales, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo neque in hominibus, post hanc vitam, erunt virtutes morales. Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according to Matthew (22:30). But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels, as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. Praeterea, virtutes morales perficiunt hominem in vita activa. Sed vita activa non manet post hanc vitam, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral., activae vitae opera cum corpore transeunt. Ergo virtutes morales non manent post hanc vitam. Obj. 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says (Moral. iv, 18): The works of the active life pass away from the body. Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life. Praeterea, temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt virtutes morales, sunt irrationalium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Sed irrationales partes animae corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore, eo quod sunt actus organorum corporalium. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc vitam. Obj. 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. I, quod iustitia perpetua est et immortalis. On the contrary, It is written (Wis 1:15) that justice is perpetual and immortal. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., Tullius posuit post hanc vitam quatuor virtutes cardinales non esse; sed in alia vita homines esse beatos sola cognitione naturae, in qua nihil est melius aut amabilius, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem, ea natura quae creavit omnes naturas. Ipse autem postea determinat huiusmodi quatuor virtutes in futura vita existere, tamen alio modo. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others. Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the future life, but after a different manner. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. Materiale quidem est in his virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones vel operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed quia iste modus determinatur a ratione, ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse ordo rationis. In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason. Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi virtutes morales in futura vita non manent, quantum ad id quod est materiale in eis. Non enim habebunt in futura vita locum concupiscentiae et delectationes ciborum et venereorum; neque etiam timores et audaciae circa pericula mortis; neque etiam distributiones et communicationes rerum quae veniunt in usum praesentis vitae. Sed quantum ad id quod est formale, remanebunt in beatis perfectissimae post hanc vitam, inquantum ratio uniuscuiusque rectissima erit circa ea quae ad ipsum pertinent secundum statum illum; et vis appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis, in his quae ad statum illum pertinent. Unde Augustinus ibidem dicit quod prudentia ibi erit sine ullo periculo erroris; fortitudo, sine molestia tolerandorum malorum; temperantia, sine repugnatione libidinum. Ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo defectu noxio delectari. De iustitia vero manifestius est quem actum ibi habebit, scilicet esse subditum Deo, quia etiam in hac vita ad iustitiam pertinet esse subditum superiori. Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one’s reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection. As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its act in that life, viz., to be subject to God: because even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur ibi de huiusmodi virtutibus moralibus, quantum ad id quod materiale est in eis, sicut de iustitia, quantum ad commutationes et depositiones; de fortitudine, quantum ad terribilia et pericula; de temperantia, quantum ad concupiscentias pravas. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards commutations and distributions; of fortitude, as to matters of terror and danger; of temperance, in respect of lewd desires. Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum. Ea enim quae sunt activae vitae, materialiter se habent ad virtutes. The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of the virtues. Ad tertium dicendum quod status post hanc vitam est duplex, unus quidem ante resurrectionem, quando animae erunt a corporibus separatae; alius autem post resurrectionem, quando animae iterato corporibus suis unientur. In illo ergo resurrectionis statu, erunt vires irrationales in organis corporis, sicut et nunc sunt. Unde et poterit in irascibili esse fortitudo, et in concupiscibili temperantia, inquantum utraque vis perfecte erit disposita ad obediendum rationi. Sed in statu ante resurrectionem, partes irrationales non erunt actu in anima, sed solum radicaliter in essentia ipsius, ut in primo dictum est. Unde nec huiusmodi virtutes erunt in actu nisi in radice, scilicet in ratione et voluntate, in quibus sunt seminalia quaedam harum virtutum, ut dictum est. Sed iustitia, quae est in voluntate, etiam actu remanebit. Unde specialiter de ea dictum est quod est perpetua et immortalis, tum ratione subiecti, quia voluntas incorruptibilis est; tum etiam propter similitudinem actus, ut prius dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, insofar as each power will be perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the FP, Q77, A8. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e., in the reason and will, wherein are certain nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q63, A1). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice it is specially said that it is perpetual and immortal; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its act will not change, as stated. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum virtutes intellectuales maneant post hanc vitam Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non maneant post hanc vitam. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, quod scientia destruetur, et ratio est quia ex parte cognoscimus. Sed sicut cognitio scientiae est ex parte, idest imperfecta; ita etiam cognitio aliarum virtutum intellectualium, quandiu haec vita durat. Ergo omnes virtutes intellectuales post hanc vitam cessabunt. Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 13:8,9) that knowledge shall be destroyed, and he states the reason to be because we know in part. Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e., imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod scientia, cum sit habitus, est qualitas difficile mobilis, non enim de facili amittitur, nisi ex aliqua forti transmutatione vel aegritudine. Sed nulla est tanta transmutatio corporis humani sicut per mortem. Ergo scientia et aliae virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc vitam. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. Praeterea, virtutes intellectuales perficiunt intellectum ad bene operandum proprium actum. Sed actus intellectus non videtur esse post hanc vitam, eo quod nihil intelligit anima sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in III de anima; phantasmata autem post hanc vitam non manent, cum non sint nisi in organis corporeis. Ergo virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc vitam. Obj. 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, since the soul understands nothing without a phantasm (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. Sed contra est quod firmior est cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quam particularium et contingentium. Sed in homine remanet post hanc vitam cognitio particularium contingentium, puta eorum quae quis fecit vel passus est; secundum illud Luc. XVI, recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala. Ergo multo magis remanet cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quae pertinent ad scientiam et ad alias virtutes intellectuales. On the contrary, The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to Lk. 16:25: Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things. Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, quidam posuerunt quod species intelligibiles non permanent in intellectu possibili nisi quandiu actu intelligit, nec est aliqua conservatio specierum, cessante consideratione actuali, nisi in viribus sensitivis, quae sunt actus corporalium organorum, scilicet in imaginativa et memorativa. Huiusmodi autem vires corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo secundum hoc, scientia nullo modo post hanc vitam remanebit, corpore corrupto; neque aliqua alia intellectualis virtus. I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q79, A6 some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the potential intellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz., in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted. Sed haec opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui in III de anima dicit quod intellectus possibilis est in actu, cum fit singula, sicut sciens; cum tamen sit in potentia ad considerandum in actu. Est etiam contra rationem, quia species intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter, secundum modum recipientis. Unde et intellectus possibilis dicitur locus specierum, quasi species intelligibiles conservans. But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that the potential intellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually. It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the potential intellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence the potential intellect is called the abode of the species (De Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.