Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum sit dicendum septem esse vitia capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, gula, luxuria Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned: vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, and lust? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum septem esse vitia capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, gula, luxuria. Peccata enim virtutibus opponuntur. Virtutes autem principales sunt quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et vitia principalia, sive capitalia, non sunt nisi quatuor. Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz., vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above (Q61, A2). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. Praeterea, passiones animae sunt quaedam causae peccati, ut supra dictum est. Sed passiones animae principales sunt quatuor. De quarum duabus nulla fit mentio inter praedicta peccata, scilicet de spe et timore. Enumerantur autem aliqua vitia ad quae pertinet delectatio et tristitia, nam delectatio pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, tristitia vero ad acediam et invidiam. Ergo inconvenienter enumerantur principalia peccata. Obj. 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above (Q77). But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz., hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated. Praeterea, ira non est principalis passio. Non ergo debuit poni inter principalia vitia. Obj. 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices. Praeterea, sicut cupiditas, sive avaritia, est radix peccati, ita superbia est peccati initium, ut supra dictum est. Sed avaritia ponitur unum de septem vitiis capitalibus. Ergo superbia inter vitia capitalia enumeranda esset. Obj. 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A2). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. Praeterea, quaedam peccata committuntur quae ex nullo horum causari possunt, sicut cum aliquis errat ex ignorantia; vel cum aliquis ex aliqua bona intentione committit aliquod peccatum, puta cum aliquis furatur ut det eleemosynam. Ergo insufficienter capitalia vitia enumerantur. Obj. 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g., steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated. Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Gregorii sic enumerantis, XXXI Moralium. On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitia capitalia dicuntur ex quibus alia oriuntur, praecipue secundum rationem causae finalis. Huiusmodi autem origo potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum conditionem peccantis, qui sic dispositus est ut maxime afficiatur ad unum finem, ex quo ut plurimum in alia peccata procedat. Sed iste modus originis sub arte cadere non potest, eo quod infinitae sunt particulares hominum dispositiones. Alio modo, secundum naturalem habitudinem ipsorum finium ad invicem. Et secundum hoc, ut in pluribus unum vitium ex alio oritur. Unde iste modus originis sub arte cadere potest. I answer that, As stated above (A3), the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man’s particular dispositions are infinite in number. Second, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art. Secundum hoc ergo, illa vitia capitalia dicuntur, quorum fines habent quasdam primarias rationes movendi appetitum, et secundum harum rationum distinctionem, distinguuntur capitalia vitia. Movet autem aliquid appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud, sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. Second, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil. Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria. Aliud est bonum corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula; aut ad conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria. Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur avaritia. Et eadem quatuor vitia inordinate fugiunt mala contraria. Again, man’s good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz., the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately by vainglory. Second, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g., meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by gluttony, or the preservation of the species, e.g., sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by lust. Third, there is external good, viz., riches, to which covetousness is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. Vel aliter, bonum praecipue movet appetitum ex hoc quod participat aliquid de proprietate felicitatis, quam naturaliter omnes appetunt. De cuius ratione est quidem primo quaedam perfectio, nam felicitas est perfectum bonum, ad quod pertinet excellentia vel claritas, quam appetit superbia vel inanis gloria. Secundo de ratione eius est sufficientia, quam appetit avaritia in divitiis eam promittentibus. Tertio est de conditione eius delectatio, sine qua felicitas esse non potest, ut dicitur in I et X Ethic., et hanc appetunt gula et luxuria. Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by pride or vainglory. Second, it implies satiety, which covetousness seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Third, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, 6,7,8 and this gluttony and lust pursue. Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet prosecutio mali oppositi. On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one’s own good, and thus we have sloth, which is sadness about one’s spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in respect of another’s good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to envy, which is sadness about another’s good as being a hindrance to one’s own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is anger. Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est eadem ratio originis in virtutibus et vitiis, nam virtutes causantur per ordinem appetitus ad rationem, vel etiam ad bonum incommutabile, quod est Deus; vitia autem oriuntur ex appetitu boni commutabilis. Unde non oportet quod principalia vitia opponantur principalibus virtutibus. Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. Ad secundum dicendum quod timor et spes sunt passiones irascibilis. Omnes autem passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, quae etiam omnes ordinantur quodammodo ad delectationem et tristitiam. Et ideo delectatio et tristitia principaliter connumerantur in peccatis capitalibus, tanquam principalissimae passiones, ut supra habitum est. Reply Obj. 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above (Q25, A4). Ad tertium dicendum quod ira, licet non sit principalis passio, quia tamen habet specialem rationem appetitivi motus, prout aliquis impugnat bonum alterius sub ratione honesti, idest iusti vindicativi; ideo distinguitur ab aliis capitalibus vitiis. Reply Obj. 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite, insofar as recrimination against another’s good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e., of the right to vengeance. Ad quartum dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse initium omnis peccati secundum rationem finis, ut dictum est. Et secundum eandem rationem accipitur principalitas vitiorum capitalium. Et ideo superbia, quasi universale vitium, non connumeratur, sed magis ponitur velut regina quaedam omnium vitiorum, sicut Gregorius dicit. Avaritia autem dicitur radix secundum aliam rationem, sicut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above (A2): and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the queen of them all, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above (AA1,2). Ad quintum dicendum quod ista vitia dicuntur capitalia, quia ex eis ut frequentius alia oriuntur. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua peccata interdum ex aliis causis oriri. Potest tamen dici quod omnia peccata quae ex ignorantia proveniunt, possunt reduci ad acediam, ad quam pertinet negligentia qua aliquis recusat bona spiritualia acquirere propter laborem, ignorantia enim quae potest esse causa peccati, ex negligentia provenit, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem aliquis committat aliquod peccatum ex bona intentione, videtur ad ignorantiam pertinere, inquantum scilicet ignorat quod non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona. Reply Obj. 5: These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (Q76, A2). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, insofar as he knows not that evil should not be done that good may come of it. Quaestio 85 Question 85 De effectibus peccati Of the Effects of Sin Deinde considerandum est de effectibus peccati. Et primo quidem, de corruptione boni naturae; secundo, de macula animae; tertio, de reatu poenae. We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum bonum naturae diminuatur per peccatum. (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin? Secundo, utrum totaliter tolli possit. (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether? Tertio, de quatuor vulneribus quae Beda ponit, quibus natura humana vulnerata est propter peccatum. (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin. Quarto, utrum privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, sit effectus peccati. (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin? Quinto, utrum mors et alii defectus corporales sint effectus peccati. (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin? Sexto, utrum sint aliquo modo homini naturales. (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum peccatum diminuat bonum naturae Whether sin diminishes the good of nature? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non diminuat bonum naturae. Peccatum enim hominis non est gravius quam peccatum Daemonis. Sed bona naturalia in Daemonibus manent integra post peccatum, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum etiam bonum naturae humanae non diminuit. Objection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man’s sin is no worse than the devil’s. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature. Praeterea, transmutato posteriori, non transmutatur prius, manet enim substantia eadem, transmutatis accidentibus. Sed natura praeexistit actioni voluntariae. Ergo, facta deordinatione circa actionem voluntariam per peccatum, non transmutatur propter hoc natura, ita quod bonum naturae diminuatur. Obj. 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. Praeterea, peccatum est actus quidam, diminutio autem passio. Nullum autem agens, ex hoc ipso quod agit, patitur, potest autem contingere quod in unum agat, et ab alio patiatur. Ergo ille qui peccat, per peccatum non diminuit bonum suae naturae. Obj. 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his nature. Praeterea, nullum accidens agit in suum subiectum, quia quod patitur, est potentia ens; quod autem subiicitur accidenti, iam est actu ens secundum accidens illud. Sed peccatum est in bono naturae sicut accidens in subiecto. Ergo peccatum non diminuit bonum naturae, diminuere enim quoddam agere est. Obj. 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. Sed contra est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. X, homo descendens a Ierusalem in Iericho, idest in defectum peccati, expoliatur gratuitis et vulneratur in naturalibus, ut Beda exponit. Ergo peccatum diminuit bonum naturae. On the contrary, A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho (Luke 10:30), i.e., to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature, as Bede expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature. Respondeo dicendum quod bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici. Primo, ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae et alia huiusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad virtutem, ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclinatio ad virtutem est quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae donum originalis iustitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti humanae naturae. I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Second, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above (Q60, A1; Q63, A1), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Third, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.