Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum totum bonum humanae naturae possit per peccatum auferri Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod totum bonum humanae naturae possit per peccatum auferri. Bonum enim naturae humanae finitum est, cum et ipsa natura humana sit finita. Sed quodlibet finitum totaliter consumitur, facta continua ablatione. Cum ergo bonum naturae continue per peccatum diminui possit, videtur quod possit quandoque totaliter consumi. Objection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. Praeterea, eorum quae sunt unius naturae, similis est ratio de toto et de partibus, sicut patet in aere et in aqua et carne, et omnibus corporibus similium partium. Sed bonum naturae est totaliter uniforme. Cum igitur pars eius possit auferri per peccatum, totum etiam per peccatum auferri posse videtur. Obj. 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin. Praeterea, bonum naturae quod per peccatum minuitur, est habilitas ad virtutem. Sed in quibusdam propter peccatum habilitas praedicta totaliter tollitur, ut patet in damnatis, qui reparari ad virtutem non possunt, sicut nec caecus ad visum. Ergo peccatum potest totaliter tollere bonum naturae. Obj. 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in bono. Sed malum culpae non potest esse in bono virtutis vel gratiae, quia est ei contrarium. Ergo oportet quod sit in bono naturae. Non ergo totaliter tollit ipsum. On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that evil does not exist except in some good. But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum naturae quod per peccatum diminuitur, est naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem. Quae quidem convenit homini ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est, ex hoc enim habet quod secundum rationem operetur, quod est agere secundum virtutem. Per peccatum autem non potest totaliter ab homine tolli quod sit rationalis, quia iam non esset capax peccati. Unde non est possibile quod praedictum naturae bonum totaliter tollatur. I answer that, As stated above (A1), the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely. Cum autem inveniatur huiusmodi bonum continue diminui per peccatum, quidam ad huius manifestationem usi sunt quodam exemplo, in quo invenitur aliquod finitum in infinitum diminui, nunquam tamen totaliter consumi. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Physic., quod si ab aliqua magnitudine finita continue auferatur aliquid secundum eandem quantitatem, totaliter tandem consumetur, puta si a quacumque quantitate finita semper subtraxero mensuram palmi. Si vero fiat subtractio semper secundum eandem proportionem, et non secundum eandem quantitatem, poterit in infinitum subtrahi, puta, si quantitas dividatur in duas partes, et a dimidio subtrahatur dimidium, ita in infinitum poterit procedi; ita tamen quod semper quod posterius subtrahitur, erit minus eo quod prius subtrahebatur. Sed hoc in proposito non habet locum, non enim sequens peccatum minus diminuit bonum naturae quam praecedens, sed forte magis, si sit gravius. Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin. Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod praedicta inclinatio intelligitur ut media inter duo, fundatur enim sicut in radice in natura rationali, et tendit in bonum virtutis sicut in terminum et finem. Dupliciter igitur potest intelligi eius diminutio, uno modo, ex parte radicis; alio modo, ex parte termini. Primo quidem modo non diminuitur per peccatum, eo quod peccatum non diminuit ipsam naturam, ut supra dictum est. Sed diminuitur secundo modo, inquantum scilicet ponitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum. Si autem primo modo diminueretur, oporteret quod quandoque totaliter consumeretur, natura rationali totaliter consumpta. Sed quia diminuitur ex parte impedimenti quod apponitur ne pertingat ad terminum, manifestum est quod diminui quidem potest in infinitum, quia in infinitum possunt impedimenta apponi, secundum quod homo potest in infinitum addere peccatum peccato, non tamen potest totaliter consumi, quia semper manet radix talis inclinationis. Sicut patet in diaphano corpore, quod quidem habet inclinationem ad susceptionem lucis ex hoc ipso quod est diaphanum, diminuitur autem haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium, cum tamen semper maneat in radice naturae. We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its root, second, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above (A1). But it is diminished in the second way, insofar as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando fit diminutio per subtractionem. Hic autem fit diminutio per appositionem impedimenti, quod neque tollit neque diminuit radicem inclinationis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod inclinatio naturalis est quidem tota uniformis, sed tamen habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum, secundum quam diversitatem quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non diminuitur. Reply Obj. 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in damnatis manet naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, alioquin non esset in eis remorsus conscientiae. Sed quod non reducatur in actum, contingit quia deest gratia, secundum divinam iustitiam. Sicut etiam in caeco remanet aptitudo ad videndum in ipsa radice naturae, inquantum est animal naturaliter habens visum, sed non reducitur in actum, quia deest causa quae reducere possit formando organum quod requiritur ad videndum. Reply Obj. 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum inconvenienter ponantur vulnera naturae esse, ex peccato consequentia, infirmitas, ignorantia, malitia et concupiscentia Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur vulnera naturae esse, ex peccato consequentia, infirmitas, ignorantia, malitia et concupiscentia. Non enim idem est effectus et causa eiusdem. Sed ista ponuntur causae peccatorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo non debent poni effectus peccati. Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above (Q76, A1; Q77, AA3,5; Q78, A1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin. Praeterea, malitia nominat quoddam peccatum. Non ergo debet poni inter effectus peccati. Obj. 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin. Praeterea, concupiscentia est quiddam naturale, cum sit actus virtutis concupiscibilis. Sed illud quod est naturale, non debet poni vulnus naturae. Ergo concupiscentia non debet poni vulnus naturae. Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Praeterea, dictum est quod idem est peccare ex infirmitate, et ex passione. Sed concupiscentia passio quaedam est. Ergo non debet contra infirmitatem dividi. Obj. 4: Further, it has been stated (Q77, A3) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness. Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro de natura et gratia, ponit duo poenalia animae peccanti, scilicet ignorantiam et difficultatem, ex quibus oritur error et cruciatus, quae quidem quatuor non concordant istis quatuor. Ergo videtur quod alterum eorum insufficienter ponatur. Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz., ignorance and difficulty, from which arise error and vexation, which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. In contrarium est auctoritas Bedae. On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices. Respondeo dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis, sicut iam dictum est. Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae dicitur. I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (Q81, A2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse subiecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio, in qua est prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae. Again, there are four of the soul’s powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above (Q61, A2), viz., the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore insofar as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and insofar as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. Sic igitur ita quatuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis. Sed quia inclinatio ad bonum virtutis in unoquoque diminuitur per peccatum actuale, ut ex dictis patet, et ista sunt quatuor vulnera ex aliis peccatis consequentia, inquantum scilicet per peccatum et ratio hebetatur, praecipue in agendis; et voluntas induratur ad bonum; et maior difficultas bene agendi accrescit; et concupiscentia magis exardescit. Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent’s sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (AA1, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, insofar as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est effectus unius peccati, esse causam peccati alterius. Ex hoc enim quod anima deordinatur per peccatum praecedens, facilius inclinatur ad peccandum. Reply Obj. 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sin again. Ad secundum dicendum quod malitia non sumitur hic pro peccato, sed pro quadam pronitate voluntatis ad malum; secundum quod dicitur Gen. VIII, proni sunt sensus hominis ad malum ab adolescentia sua. Reply Obj. 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gn. 8:21: Man’s senses are prone to evil from his youth. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia intantum est naturalis homini, inquantum subditur rationi. Quod autem excedat limites rationis, hoc est homini contra naturam. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q82, A3, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, insofar as it is subject to reason: whereas, insofar as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. Ad quartum dicendum quod infirmitas communiter potest dici omnis passio, inquantum debilitat robur animae et impedit rationem. Sed Beda accepit infirmitatem stricte, secundum quod opponitur fortitudini, quae pertinet ad irascibilem. Reply Obj. 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, insofar as it weakens the soul’s strength and clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible. Ad quintum dicendum quod difficultas quae ponitur in libro Augustini, includit ista tria quae pertinent ad appetitivas potentias, scilicet malitiam, infirmitatem et concupiscentiam, ex his enim tribus contingit quod aliquis non facile tendit in bonum. Error autem et dolor sunt vulnera consequentia, ex hoc enim aliquis dolet, quod infirmatur circa ea quae concupiscit. Reply Obj. 5: The difficulty which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz., malice, weakness and concupiscence, for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. Error and vexation are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, sit effectus peccati Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non sit effectus peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, quod ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi parva, parvum; ubi nulla, nullum. Sed peccatum non annullat bonum naturae. Ergo non privat modum, speciem et ordinem. Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all. But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. Praeterea, nihil est causa sui ipsius. Sed ipsum peccatum est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni. Ergo privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non est effectus peccati. Obj. 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the privation of mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. Praeterea, diversa peccata diversos habent effectus. Sed modus, species et ordo, cum sint quaedam diversa, diversas privationes habere videntur. Ergo per diversa peccata privantur. Non ergo est effectus cuiuslibet peccati privatio modi, speciei et ordinis. Obj. 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each sin. Sed contra est quod peccatum est in anima sicut infirmitas in corpore; secundum illud Psalmi VI, miserere mei, domine, quoniam infirmus sum. Sed infirmitas privat modum, speciem et ordinem ipsius corporis. Ergo peccatum privat modum, speciem et ordinem animae. On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to Ps. 6:3, Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak. Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, modus, species et ordo consequuntur unumquodque bonum creatum inquantum huiusmodi, et etiam unumquodque ens. Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per aliquam formam, secundum quam sumitur species. Forma autem uniuscuiusque rei, qualiscumque sit, sive substantialis sive accidentalis, est secundum aliquam mensuram, unde et in VIII Metaphys. dicitur quod formae rerum sunt sicut numeri. Et ex hoc habet modum quendam, qui mensuram respicit. Ex forma vero sua unumquodque ordinatur ad aliud. I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q5, A5, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its species. Again, any kind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that the forms of things are like numbers, so that a form has a certain mode corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of order to something else. Sic igitur secundum diversos gradus bonorum, sunt diversi gradus modi, speciei et ordinis. Est ergo quoddam bonum pertinens ad ipsam substantiam naturae, quod habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et illud nec privatur nec diminuitur per peccatum. Est etiam quoddam bonum naturalis inclinationis, et hoc etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc diminuitur per peccatum, ut dictum est, sed non totaliter tollitur. Est etiam quoddam bonum virtutis et gratiae, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc totaliter tollitur per peccatum mortale. Est etiam quoddam bonum quod est ipse actus ordinatus, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et huius privatio est essentialiter ipsum peccatum. Et sic patet qualiter peccatum et est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis; et privat vel diminuit modum, speciem et ordinem. Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (AA1,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order.