Praeterea, peccato non debetur maior poena ex hoc quod alteri peccato adiungitur, cum utrumque peccatum suam habeat poenam taxatam secundum divinam iustitiam. Sed peccato veniali debetur poena aeterna, si cum mortali peccato inveniatur in aliquo damnato, quia in Inferno nulla potest esse remissio. Ergo peccato veniali simpliciter debetur poena aeterna. Nulli ergo peccato debetur poena temporalis. Obj. 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog., quod quaedam leviores culpae post hanc vitam remittuntur. Non ergo omnia peccata aeterna poena puniuntur. On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished eternally. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum causat reatum poenae aeternae, inquantum irreparabiliter repugnat ordini divinae iustitiae, per hoc scilicet quod contrariatur ipsi principio ordinis, quod est ultimus finis. Manifestum est autem quod in quibusdam peccatis est quidem aliqua inordinatio, non tamen per contrarietatem ad ultimum finem, sed solum circa ea quae sunt ad finem, inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur, salvato tamen ordine ad ultimum finem, puta cum homo, etsi nimis ad aliquam rem temporalem afficiatur, non tamen pro ea vellet Deum offendere, aliquid contra praeceptum eius faciendo. Unde huiusmodi peccatis non debetur aeterna poena, sed temporalis. I answer that, As stated above (A3), a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, insofar as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz., the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, insofar as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccata non differunt in infinitum ex parte conversionis ad bonum commutabile, in qua consistit substantia actus, differunt autem in infinitum ex parte aversionis. Nam quaedam peccata committuntur per aversionem ab ultimo fine, quaedam vero per inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem ultimus ab his quae sunt ad finem, in infinitum differt. Reply Obj. 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are referred to it. Ad secundum dicendum quod peccato originali non debetur poena aeterna ratione suae gravitatis, sed ratione conditionis subiecti, scilicet hominis qui sine gratia invenitur, per quam solam fit remissio poenae. Reply Obj. 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz., a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium, de veniali peccato. Aeternitas enim poenae non respondet quantitati culpae, sed irremissibilitati ipsius, ut dictum est. The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above (A3). Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum reatus poenae remaneat post peccatum Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non remaneat post peccatum. Remota enim causa, removetur effectus. Sed peccatum est causa reatus poenae. Ergo, remoto peccato, cessat reatus poenae. Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. Praeterea, peccatum removetur per hoc quod homo ad virtutem redit. Sed virtuoso non debetur poena, sed magis praemium. Ergo, remoto peccato, non remanet reatus poenae. Obj. 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. Praeterea, poenae sunt medicinae, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed postquam aliquis iam est ab infirmitate curatus, non adhibetur sibi medicina. Ergo, remoto peccato, non remanet debitum poenae. Obj. 3: Further, Punishments are a kind of medicine (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain. Sed contra est quod dicitur II Reg. XII, quod David dixit ad Nathan, peccavi domino. Dixitque Nathan ad David, dominus quoque transtulit peccatum tuum, non morieris. Veruntamen quia blasphemare fecisti inimicos nomen domini, filius qui natus est tibi, morte morietur. Punitur ergo aliquis a Deo etiam postquam ei peccatum dimittitur. Et sic reatus poenae remanet, peccato remoto. On the contrary, It is written (2 Kgs xii, 13,14): David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die. Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed. Respondeo dicendum quod in peccato duo possunt considerari, scilicet actus culpae, et macula sequens. Planum est autem quod, cessante actu peccati, remanet reatus, in omnibus peccatis actualibus. Actus enim peccati facit hominem reum poenae, inquantum transgreditur ordinem divinae iustitiae; ad quem non redit nisi per quandam recompensationem poenae, quae ad aequalitatem iustitiae reducit; ut scilicet qui plus voluntati suae indulsit quam debuit, contra mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, aliquid contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vel invitus patiatur. Quod etiam in iniuriis hominibus factis observatur, ut per recompensationem poenae reintegretur aequalitas iustitiae. Unde patet quod, cessante actu peccati vel iniuriae illatae, adhuc remanet debitum poenae. I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, insofar as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God’s commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one’s fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment. Sed si loquamur de ablatione peccati quantum ad maculam, sic manifestum est quod macula peccati ab anima auferri non potest, nisi per hoc quod anima Deo coniungitur, per cuius distantiam detrimentum proprii nitoris incurrebat, quod est macula, ut supra dictum est. Coniungitur autem homo Deo per voluntatem. Unde macula peccati ab homine tolli non potest nisi voluntas hominis ordinem divinae iustitiae acceptet, ut scilicet vel ipse poenam sibi spontaneus assumat in recompensationem culpae praeteritae, vel etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat, utroque enim modo poena rationem satisfactionis habet. Poena autem satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione poenae. Est enim de ratione poenae quod sit contra voluntatem. Poena autem satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam considerationem sit contra voluntatem, tamen tunc, et pro hoc, est voluntaria. Unde simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria, sicut patet ex his quae supra de voluntario et involuntario dicta sunt. Dicendum est ergo quod, remota macula culpae, potest quidem remanere reatus non poenae simpliciter, sed satisfactoriae. But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated above (Q86, A1). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (Q6, A6). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut, cessante actu peccati, remanet macula, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam potest remanere reatus. Cessante vero macula, non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above (Q86, A2), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtuoso non debetur poena simpliciter, potest tamen sibi deberi poena ut satisfactoria, quia hoc ipsum ad virtutem pertinet, ut satisfaciat pro his in quibus offendit vel Deum vel hominem. Reply Obj. 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. Ad tertium dicendum quod, remota macula, sanatum est vulnus peccati quantum ad voluntatem. Requiritur autem adhuc poena ad sanationem aliarum virium animae, quae per peccatum praecedens deordinatae fuerunt, ut scilicet per contraria curentur. Requiritur etiam ad restituendum aequalitatem iustitiae; et ad amovendum scandalum aliorum, ut aedificentur in poena qui sunt scandalizati in culpa; ut patet ex exemplo de David inducto. Reply Obj. 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin may be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum omnis poena sit propter aliquam culpam Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis poena sit propter aliquam culpam. Dicitur enim Ioan. IX, de caeco nato, neque hic peccavit, neque parentes eius, ut nasceretur caecus. Et similiter videmus quod multi pueri, etiam baptizati, graves poenas patiuntur, ut puta febres, Daemonum oppressiones, et multa huiusmodi, cum tamen in eis non sit peccatum, postquam sunt baptizati. Et antequam sint baptizati, non est in eis plus de peccato quam in aliis pueris, qui haec non patiuntur. Non ergo omnis poena est pro peccato. Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (John 9:3,2) about the man born blind: Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind. In like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. Praeterea, eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod peccatores prosperentur, et quod aliqui innocentes puniantur. Utrumque autem in rebus humanis frequenter invenimus, dicitur enim de iniquis in Psalmo LXXII, in labore hominum non sunt, et cum hominibus non flagellabuntur; et Iob XXI, impii vivunt, sublevati sunt, confortatique divitiis; et Habacuc I, dicitur, quare respicis contemptores et taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se? Non ergo omnis poena infligitur pro culpa. Obj. 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (Ps 72:5): They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men; and (Job 21:7): the wicked live, are advanced, and strengthened with riches; and (Hab. 1:13): Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous, and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth, the man that is more just than himself? Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. Praeterea, de Christo dicitur I Pet. II, quod peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius. Et tamen ibidem dicitur quod passus est pro nobis. Ergo non semper poena a Deo dispensatur pro culpa. Obj. 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet 2:22) that He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth. And yet it is said (1 Pet 2:21) that He suffered for us. Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob IV, quis unquam innocens periit? Aut quando recti deleti sunt? Quin potius vidi eos qui operantur iniquitatem, flante Deo, periisse. Et Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., quod omnis poena iusta est, et pro peccato aliquo impenditur. On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that all punishment is just, and is inflicted for a sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, poena potest dupliciter considerari, simpliciter, et inquantum est satisfactoria. Poena quidem satisfactoria est quodammodo voluntaria. Et quia contingit eos qui differunt in reatu poenae, esse unum secundum voluntatem unione amoris, inde est quod interdum aliquis qui non peccavit, poenam voluntarius pro alio portat, sicut etiam in rebus humanis videmus quod aliquis in se transfert alterius debitum. Si vero loquamur de poena simpliciter, secundum quod habet rationem poenae, sic semper habet ordinem ad culpam propriam, sed quandoque quidem ad culpam actualem, puta quando aliquis vel a Deo vel ab homine pro peccato commisso punitur; quandoque vero ad culpam originalem. Et hoc quidem vel principaliter, vel consequenter. Principaliter quidem poena originalis peccati est quod natura humana sibi relinquitur, destituta auxilio originalis iustitiae, sed ad hoc consequuntur omnes poenalitates quae ex defectu naturae in hominibus contingunt. I answer that, As already stated (A6), punishment can be considered in two ways—simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently—principally, the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this defect in human nature. Sciendum tamen est quod quandoque aliquid videtur esse poenale, quod tamen non habet simpliciter rationem poenae. Poena enim est species mali, ut in primo dictum est. Malum autem est privatio boni. Cum autem sint plura hominis bona, scilicet animae, corporis, et exteriorum rerum; contingit interdum quod homo patiatur detrimentum in minori bono, ut augeatur in maiori, sicut cum patitur detrimentum pecuniae propter sanitatem corporis, vel in utroque horum propter salutem animae et propter gloriam Dei. Et tunc tale detrimentum non est simpliciter malum hominis, sed secundum quid. Unde non dicit simpliciter rationem poenae, sed medicinae, nam et medici austeras potiones propinant infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem. Et quia huiusmodi non proprie habent rationem poenae, non reducuntur ad culpam sicut ad causam, nisi pro tanto, quia hoc ipsum quod oportet humanae naturae medicinas poenales exhibere, est ex corruptione naturae, quae est poena originalis peccati. In statu enim innocentiae non oportuisset aliquem ad profectum virtutis inducere per poenalia exercitia. Unde hoc ipsum quod est poenale in talibus reducitur ad originalem culpam sicut ad causam. Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in the FP, Q48, A5. Now evil is privation of good. And since man’s good is manifold, viz., good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul’s health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi defectus eorum qui nascuntur, vel etiam puerorum, sunt effectus et poenae originalis peccati, ut dictum est. Et manent etiam post Baptismum, propter causam superius dictam. Et quod non sint aequaliter in omnibus, contingit propter naturae diversitatem, quae sibi relinquitur, ut supra dictum est. Ordinantur tamen huiusmodi defectus, secundum divinam providentiam, ad salutem hominum, vel eorum qui patiuntur, vel aliorum, qui poenis admonentur; et etiam ad gloriam Dei. Reply Obj. 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original sin, as stated above (Q85, A5); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above (Q85, A5, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above (Q85, A5, ad 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means—and also to the glory of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod bona temporalia et corporalia sunt quidem aliqua bona hominis, sed parva, bona vero spiritualia sunt magna hominis bona. Pertinet igitur ad divinam iustitiam ut virtuosis det spiritualia bona; et de temporalibus bonis vel malis tantum det eis, quantum sufficit ad virtutem, ut enim Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. Nom., divinae iustitiae est non emollire optimorum fortitudinem materialium donationibus. Aliis vero hoc ipsum quod temporalia dantur, in malum spiritualium cedit. Unde in Psalmo LXXII concluditur, ideo tenuit eos superbia. Reply Obj. 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man’s chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts. The very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): Therefore pride hath held them fast. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus poenam sustinuit satisfactoriam non pro suis, sed pro nostris peccatis. Reply Obj. 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum aliquis puniatur pro peccato alterius Whether anyone is punished for another’s sin? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis puniatur pro peccato alterius. Dicitur enim Exodi XX, ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem, his qui oderunt me. Et Matth. XXIII dicitur, ut veniat super vos omnis sanguis iustus qui effusus est super terram. Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another’s sin. For it is written (Exod 20:5): I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me; and (Matt 23:35): That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth. Praeterea, iustitia humana derivatur a iustitia divina. Sed secundum iustitiam humanam aliquando filii puniuntur pro parentibus, sicut patet in crimine laesae maiestatis. Ergo etiam secundum divinam iustitiam, unus punitur pro peccato alterius. Obj. 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another’s sin. Praeterea, si dicatur filius non puniri pro peccato patris, sed pro peccato proprio, inquantum imitatur malitiam paternam, non magis hoc diceretur de filiis quam de extraneis, qui simili poena puniuntur his quorum peccata imitantur. Non ergo videtur quod filii pro peccatis propriis puniantur, sed pro peccatis parentum. Obj. 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father’s sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father’s wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their parents. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, filius non portabit iniquitatem patris. On the contrary, It is written (Ezek 18:20): The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father. Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de poena satisfactoria, quae voluntarie assumitur, contingit quod unus portet poenam alterius inquantum sunt quodammodo unum, sicut iam dictum est. Si autem loquamur de poena pro peccato inflicta, inquantum habet rationem poenae, sic solum unusquisque pro peccato suo punitur, quia actus peccati aliquid personale est. Si autem loquamur de poena quae habet rationem medicinae, sic contingit quod unus punitur pro peccato alterius. Dictum est enim quod detrimenta corporalium rerum, vel etiam ipsius corporis, sunt quaedam poenales medicinae ordinatae ad salutem animae. Unde nihil prohibet talibus poenis aliquem puniri pro peccato alterius, vel a Deo vel ab homine, utpote filios pro patribus, et subditos pro dominis, inquantum sunt quaedam res eorum. Ita tamen quod, si filius vel subditus est particeps culpae, huiusmodi poenalis defectus habet rationem poenae quantum ad utrumque, scilicet eum qui punitur, et eum pro quo punitur. Si vero non sit particeps culpae, habet rationem poenae quantum ad eum pro quo punitur, quantum vero ad eum qui punitur, rationem medicinae tantum, nisi per accidens, inquantum peccato alterius consentit; ordinatur enim ei ad bonum animae, si patienter sustineat. I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another’s punishment, insofar as they are, in some way, one, as stated above (A7). If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another’s sin. For it has been stated (A7) that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another’s sin, either by God or by man; e.g., on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other’s sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it patiently. Poenae vero spirituales non sunt medicinales tantum, quia bonum animae non ordinatur ad aliud melius bonum. Unde in bonis animae nullus patitur detrimentum sine culpa propria. Et propter hoc etiam talibus poenis, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad avitum, unus non punitur pro alio, quia quantum ad animam, filius non est res patris. Unde et huius causam dominus assignans, dicit, Ezech. XVIII, omnes animae meae sunt. With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.), such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another’s sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father’s property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying (Ezek 18:4): All souls are Mine.