Ad tertium dicendum quod principia communia legis naturae non possunt eodem modo applicari omnibus, propter multam varietatem rerum humanarum. Et exinde provenit diversitas legis positivae apud diversos. Reply Obj. 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people. Ad quartum dicendum quod verbum illud iurisperiti intelligendum est in his quae sunt introducta a maioribus circa particulares determinationes legis naturalis; ad quas quidem determinationes se habet expertorum et prudentum iudicium sicut ad quaedam principia; inquantum scilicet statim vident quid congruentius sit particulariter determinari. Reply Obj. 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod in talibus oportet attendere expertorum et seniorum vel prudentum indemonstrabilibus enuntiationibus et opinionibus, non minus quam demonstrationibus. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Isidorus inconvenienter qualitatem legis positivae describat Whether Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is appropriate? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Isidorus inconvenienter qualitatem legis positivae describat, dicens, erit lex honesta, iusta, possibilis secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis; manifesta quoque, ne aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat; nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium scripta. Supra enim in tribus conditionibus qualitatem legis explicaverat, dicens, lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni congruat, quod disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat. Ergo superflue postmodum conditiones legis multiplicat. Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common good. Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying that law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal. Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these. Praeterea, iustitia pars est honestatis; ut Tullius dicit, in I de Offic. Ergo postquam dixerat honesta, superflue additur iusta. Obj. 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying honest it was superfluous to add just. Praeterea, lex scripta, secundum Isidorum, contra consuetudinem dividitur. Non ergo debuit in definitione legis poni quod esset secundum consuetudinem patriae. Obj. 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is according to the custom of the country. Praeterea, necessarium dupliciter dicitur. Scilicet id quod est necessarium simpliciter, quod impossibile est aliter se habere, et huiusmodi necessarium non subiacet humano iudicio, unde talis necessitas ad legem humanam non pertinet. Est etiam aliquid necessarium propter finem, et talis necessitas idem est quod utilitas. Ergo superflue utrumque ponitur, necessaria et utilis. Obj. 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both necessary and useful. Sed contra est auctoritas ipsius Isidori. On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore. Respondeo dicendum quod uniuscuiusque rei quae est propter finem, necesse est quod forma determinetur secundum proportionem ad finem; sicut forma serrae talis est qualis convenit sectioni; ut patet in II Physic. Quaelibet etiam res recta et mensurata oportet quod habeat formam proportionalem suae regulae et mensurae. Lex autem humana utrumque habet, quia et est aliquid ordinatum ad finem; et est quaedam regula vel mensura regulata vel mensurata quadam superiori mensura; quae quidem est duplex, scilicet lex divina et lex naturae, ut ex supradictis patet. Finis autem humanae legis est utilitas hominum; sicut etiam iurisperitus dicit. Et ideo Isidorus in conditione legis, primo quidem tria posuit, scilicet quod religioni congruat, inquantum scilicet est proportionata legi divinae; quod disciplinae conveniat, inquantum est proportionata legi naturae; quod saluti proficiat, inquantum est proportionata utilitati humanae. I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz., the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above (A2; Q93, A3). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz., that it foster religion, inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be helpful to discipline, inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it further the common weal, inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind. Et ad haec tria omnes aliae conditiones quas postea ponit, reducuntur. Nam quod dicitur honesta, refertur ad hoc quod religioni congruat. Quod autem subditur, iusta, possibilis secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco temporique conveniens, additur ad hoc quod conveniat disciplinae. Attenditur enim humana disciplina primum quidem quantum ad ordinem rationis, qui importatur in hoc quod dicitur iusta. Secundo, quantum ad facultatem agentium. Debet enim esse disciplina conveniens unicuique secundum suam possibilitatem, observata etiam possibilitate naturae (non enim eadem sunt imponenda pueris, quae imponuntur viris perfectis); et secundum humanam consuetudinem; non enim potest homo solus in societate vivere, aliis morem non gerens. Tertio, quantum ad debitas circumstantias, dicit, loco temporique conveniens. Quod vero subditur, necessaria, utilis, etc., refertur ad hoc quod expediat saluti, ut necessitas referatur ad remotionem malorum; utilitas, ad consecutionem bonorum; manifestatio vero, ad cavendum nocumentum quod ex ipsa lege posset provenire. Et quia, sicut supra dictum est, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, hoc ipsum in ultima parte determinationis ostenditur. All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should be just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time, he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying just: second, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: third, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, adapted to place and time. The remaining words, necessary, useful, etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that necessity refers to the removal of evils; usefulness to the attainment of good; clearness of expression, to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above (Q90, A2), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum inconvenienter Isidorus divisionem legum humanarum ponat Whether Isidore’s division of human laws is appropriate? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Isidorus divisionem legum humanarum ponat, sive iuris humani. Sub hoc enim iure comprehendit ius gentium, quod ideo sic nominatur, ut ipse dicit, quia eo omnes fere gentes utuntur. Sed sicut ipse dicit, ius naturale est quod est commune omnium nationum. Ergo ius gentium non continetur sub iure positivo humano, sed magis sub iure naturali. Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the law of nations, so called, because, as he says, nearly all nations use it. But as he says, natural law is that which is common to all nations. Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law. Praeterea, ea quae habent eandem vim, non videntur formaliter differre, sed solum materialiter. Sed leges, plebiscita, senatusconsulta, et alia huiusmodi quae ponit, omnia habent eandem vim. Ergo videtur quod non differant nisi materialiter. Sed talis distinctio in arte non est curanda, cum possit esse in infinitum. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi divisio humanarum legum introducitur. Obj. 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees, and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate. Praeterea, sicut in civitate sunt principes et sacerdotes et milites, ita etiam sunt et alia hominum officia. Ergo videtur quod, sicut ponitur quoddam ius militare, et ius publicum, quod consistit in sacerdotibus et magistratibus; ita etiam debeant poni alia iura, ad alia officia civitatis pertinentia. Obj. 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems that, as this division includes military law, and public law, referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state. Praeterea, ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt praetermittenda. Sed accidit legi ut ab hoc vel illo homine feratur. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur divisio legum humanarum ex nominibus legislatorum, ut scilicet quaedam dicatur Cornelia, quaedam Falcidia, et cetera. Obj. 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the Cornelian law, another the Falcidian law, etc. In contrarium auctoritas Isidori sufficiat. On the contrary, The authority of Isidore suffices. Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque potest per se dividi secundum id quod in eius ratione continetur. Sicut in ratione animalis continetur anima, quae est rationalis vel irrationalis, et ideo animal proprie et per se dividitur secundum rationale et irrationale; non autem secundum album et nigrum, quae sunt omnino praeter rationem eius. Sunt autem multa de ratione legis humanae, secundum quorum quodlibet lex humana proprie et per se dividi potest. Est enim primo de ratione legis humanae quod sit derivata a lege naturae, ut ex dictis patet. Et secundum hoc dividitur ius positivum in ius gentium et ius civile, secundum duos modos quibus aliquid derivatur a lege naturae, ut supra dictum est. Nam ad ius gentium pertinent ea quae derivantur ex lege naturae sicut conclusiones ex principiis, ut iustae emptiones, venditiones, et alia huiusmodi, sine quibus homines ad invicem convivere non possent; quod est de lege naturae, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, ut probatur in I Polit. Quae vero derivantur a lege naturae per modum particularis determinationis, pertinent ad ius civile, secundum quod quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accommodum determinat. I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained above (A2). In this respect positive law is divided into the law of nations and civil law, according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above (A2). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g., just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself. Secundo est de ratione legis humanae quod ordinetur ad bonum commune civitatis. Et secundum hoc lex humana dividi potest secundum diversitatem eorum qui specialiter dant operam ad bonum commune, sicut sacerdotes, pro populo Deum orantes; principes, populum gubernantes; et milites, pro salute populi pugnantes. Et ideo istis hominibus specialia quaedam iura aptantur. Second, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g., priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men. Tertio est de ratione legis humanae ut instituatur a gubernante communitatem civitatis, sicut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc distinguuntur leges humanae secundum diversa regimina civitatum. Quorum unum, secundum philosophum, in III Polit., est regnum, quando scilicet civitas gubernatur ab uno, et secundum hoc accipiuntur constitutiones principum. Aliud vero regimen est aristocratia, idest principatus optimorum, vel optimatum, et secundum hoc sumuntur responsa prudentum, et etiam senatusconsulta. Aliud regimen est oligarchia, idest principatus paucorum divitum et potentum, et secundum hoc sumitur ius praetorium, quod etiam honorarium dicitur. Aliud autem regimen est populi, quod nominatur democratia, et secundum hoc sumuntur plebiscita. Aliud autem est tyrannicum, quod est omnino corruptum, unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex. Est etiam aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est optimum, et secundum hoc sumitur lex, quam maiores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt, ut Isidorus dicit. Third, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state, as shown above (Q90, A3). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is monarchy, i.e., when the state is governed by one; and then we have Royal Ordinances. Another form is aristocracy, i.e., government by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the Authoritative legal opinions and Decrees of the Senate. Another form is oligarchy, i.e., government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have Praetorian, also called Honorary, law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called democracy, and there we have Decrees of the commonalty. There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the Lords and Commons, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). Quarto vero de ratione legis humanae est quod sit directiva humanorum actuum. Et secundum hoc, secundum diversa de quibus leges feruntur, distinguuntur leges, quae interdum ab auctoribus nominantur, sicut distinguitur lex Iulia de adulteriis, lex Cornelia de sicariis, et sic de aliis, non propter auctores, sed propter res de quibus sunt. Fourth, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the Lex Julia about adultery, the Lex Cornelia concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ius gentium est quidem aliquo modo naturale homini, secundum quod est rationalis, inquantum derivatur a lege naturali per modum conclusionis quae non est multum remota a principiis. Unde de facili in huiusmodi homines consenserunt. Distinguitur tamen a lege naturali, maxime ab eo quod est omnibus animalibus communis. Reply Obj. 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, insofar as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from that which is common to all animals. Ad alia patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said. Quaestio 96 Question 96 De potestate legis humanae Of the Power of Human Law Deinde considerandum est de potestate legis humanae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum lex humana debeat poni in communi. (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community? Secundo, utrum lex humana debeat omnia vitia cohibere. (2) Whether human law should repress all vices? Tertio, utrum omnium virtutum actus habeat ordinare. (3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue? Quarto, utrum imponat homini necessitatem quantum ad forum conscientiae. (4) Whether it binds man in conscience? Quinto, utrum omnes homines legi humanae subdantur. (5) Whether all men are subject to human law? Sexto, utrum his qui sunt sub lege, liceat agere praeter verba legis. (6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law? Articulus 1 Article 1