Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum rectores multitudinis possint in legibus humanis dispensare Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectores multitudinis non possint in legibus humanis dispensare. Lex enim statuta est pro communi utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed bonum commune non debet intermitti pro privato commodo alicuius personae, quia, ut dicit philosophus, in I Ethic., bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius hominis. Ergo videtur quod non debeat dispensari cum aliquo ut contra legem communem agat. Objection 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the common weal, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man. Therefore it seems that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general law. Praeterea, illis qui super alios constituuntur, praecipitur Deut. I, ita parvum audietis ut magnum, nec accipietis cuiusquam personam, quia Dei iudicium est. Sed concedere alicui quod communiter denegatur omnibus, videtur esse acceptio personarum. Ergo huiusmodi dispensationes facere rectores multitudinis non possunt, cum hoc sit contra praeceptum legis divinae. Obj. 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows (Deut 1:17): You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man’s person, because it is the judgment of God. But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the Divine law. Praeterea, lex humana, si sit recta, oportet quod consonet legi naturali et legi divinae, aliter enim non congrueret religioni, nec conveniret disciplinae, quod requiritur ad legem, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed in lege divina et naturali nullus homo potest dispensare. Ergo nec etiam in lege humana. Obj. 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not foster religion, nor be helpful to discipline, which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law. Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dispensatio mihi credita est. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 9:17): A dispensation is committed to me. Respondeo dicendum quod dispensatio proprie importat commensurationem alicuius communis ad singula, unde etiam gubernator familiae dicitur dispensator, inquantum unicuique de familia cum pondere et mensura distribuit et operationes et necessaria vitae. Sic igitur et in quacumque multitudine ex eo dicitur aliquis dispensare, quod ordinat qualiter aliquod commune praeceptum sit a singulis adimplendum. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquod praeceptum quod est ad commodum multitudinis ut in pluribus, non est conveniens huic personae, vel in hoc casu, quia vel per hoc impediretur aliquid melius, vel etiam induceretur aliquod malum, sicut ex supradictis patet. Periculosum autem esset ut hoc iudicio cuiuslibet committeretur, nisi forte propter evidens et subitum periculum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ille qui habet regere multitudinem, habet potestatem dispensandi in lege humana quae suae auctoritati innititur, ut scilicet in personis vel casibus in quibus lex deficit, licentiam tribuat ut praeceptum legis non servetur. Si autem absque hac ratione, pro sola voluntate, licentiam tribuat, non erit fidelis in dispensatione, aut erit imprudens, infidelis quidem, si non habeat intentionem ad bonum commune; imprudens autem, si rationem dispensandi ignoret. Propter quod dominus dicit, Lucae XII, quis, putas, est fidelis dispensator et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam? I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some thing common: thus the head of a household is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as explained above (Q96, A6). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above (Q96, A6). Consequently he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If however he grant this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says (Luke 12:42): Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise steward, whom his lord setteth over his family? Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando cum aliquo dispensatur ut legem communem non servet, non debet fieri in praeiudicium boni communis; sed ea intentione ut ad bonum commune proficiat. Reply Obj. 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention of benefiting, the common good. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si non serventur aequalia in personis inaequalibus. Unde quando conditio alicuius personae requirit ut rationabiliter in ea aliquid specialiter observetur, non est personarum acceptio si sibi aliqua specialis gratia fiat. Reply Obj. 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor. Ad tertium dicendum quod lex naturalis inquantum continet praecepta communia, quae nunquam fallunt, dispensationem recipere non potest. In aliis vero praeceptis, quae sunt quasi conclusiones praeceptorum communium, quandoque per hominem dispensatur, puta quod mutuum non reddatur proditori patriae, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ad legem autem divinam ita se habet quilibet homo, sicut persona privata ad legem publicam cui subiicitur. Unde sicut in lege humana publica non potest dispensare nisi ille a quo lex auctoritatem habet, vel is cui ipse commiserit; ita in praeceptis iuris divini, quae sunt a Deo, nullus potest dispensare nisi Deus, vel si cui ipse specialiter committeret. Reply Obj. 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private person to the public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose. Quaestio 98 Question 98 De lege veteri Of the Old Law Consequenter considerandum est de lege veteri. Et primo, de ipsa lege; secundo, de praeceptis eius. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum lex vetus sit bona. (1) Whether the Old Law was good? Secundo, utrum sit a Deo. (2) Whether it was from God? Tertio, utrum sit ab eo mediantibus Angelis. (3) Whether it came from Him through the angels? Quarto, utrum data sit omnibus. (4) Whether it was given to all? Quinto, utrum omnes obliget. (5) Whether it was binding on all? Sexto, utrum congruo tempore fuerit data. (6) Whether it was given at a suitable time? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum lex vetus fuerit bona Whether the Old Law was good? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit bona. Dicitur enim Ezech. XX dedi eis praecepta non bona, et iudicia in quibus non vivent. Sed lex non dicitur bona nisi propter bonitatem praeceptorum quae continet. Ergo lex vetus non fuit bona. Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written (Ezek 20:25): I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live. But a law is not said to be good except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good. Praeterea, ad bonitatem legis pertinet ut communi saluti proficiat sicut Isidorus dicit. Sed lex vetus non fuit salutifera, sed magis mortifera et nociva. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, sine lege peccatum mortuum erat. Ego autem vivebam sine lege aliquando, sed cum venisset mandatum, peccatum revixit, ego autem mortuus sum; et Rom. V, lex subintravit ut abundaret delictum. Ergo lex vetus non fuit bona. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says (Rom 7:8, seqq.): Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; and I died. Again he says (Rom 5:20): Law entered in that sin might abound. Therefore the Old Law was not good. Praeterea, ad bonitatem legis pertinet quod sit possibilis ad observandum et secundum naturam, et secundum humanam consuetudinem. Sed hoc non habuit lex vetus, dicit enim Petrus, Act. XV, quid tentatis imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque patres nostri, portare potuimus? Ergo videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit bona. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts 15:10): Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, itaque lex quidem sancta est, et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 7:12): Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. Respondeo dicendum quod absque omni dubio lex vetus bona fuit. Sicut enim doctrina ostenditur esse vera ex hoc quod consonat rationi rectae, ita etiam lex aliqua ostenditur esse bona ex eo quod consonat rationi. Lex autem vetus rationi consonabat. Quia concupiscentiam reprimebat, quae rationi adversatur; ut patet in illo mandato, non concupisces rem proximi tui, quod ponitur Exod. XX. Ipsa etiam omnia peccata prohibebat, quae sunt contra rationem. Unde manifestum est quod bona erat. Et haec est ratio apostoli, Rom. VII, condelector, inquit, legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; et iterum, consentio legi, quoniam bona est. I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods (Exod 20:17). Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way (Rom 7): I am delighted, says he (verse 22), with the law of God, according to the inward man: and again (verse 16): I consent to the law, that is good. Sed notandum est quod bonum diversos gradus habet, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., est enim aliquod bonum perfectum, et aliquod bonum imperfectum. Perfecta quidem bonitas est, in his quae ad finem ordinantur, quando aliquid est tale quod per se sufficiens est inducere ad finem, imperfectum autem bonum est quod operatur aliquid ad hoc quod perveniatur ad finem, non tamen sufficit ad hoc quod ad finem perducat. Sicut medicina perfecte bona est quae hominem sanat, imperfecta autem est quae hominem adiuvat, sed tamen sanare non potest. Est autem sciendum quod est alius finis legis humanae, et alius legis divinae. Legis enim humanae finis est temporalis tranquillitas civitatis, ad quem finem pervenit lex cohibendo exteriores actus, quantum ad illa mala quae possunt perturbare pacificum statum civitatis. Finis autem legis divinae est perducere hominem ad finem felicitatis aeternae; qui quidem finis impeditur per quodcumque peccatum, et non solum per actus exteriores, sed etiam per interiores. Et ideo illud quod sufficit ad perfectionem legis humanae, ut scilicet peccata prohibeat et poenam apponat, non sufficit ad perfectionem legis divinae, sed oportet quod hominem totaliter faciat idoneum ad participationem felicitatis aeternae. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi per gratiam spiritus sancti, per quam diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, quae legem adimplet, gratia enim Dei vita aeterna, ut dicitur Rom. VI. Hanc autem gratiam lex vetus conferre non potuit, reservabatur enim hoc Christo, quia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, lex per Moysen data est; gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Et inde est quod lex vetus bona quidem est, sed imperfecta; secundum illud Heb. VII, nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex. But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that the end of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of human law, viz., the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the grace of the Holy Spirit, whereby charity which fulfilleth the law . . . is spread abroad in our hearts (Rom 5:5): since the grace of God is life everlasting (Rom 6:23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (John 1:17), the law was given by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: The law brought nothing to perfection. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus loquitur ibi de praeceptis caeremonialibus; quae quidem dicuntur non bona, quia gratiam non conferebant, per quam homines a peccato mundarentur, cum tamen per huiusmodi se peccatores ostenderent. Unde signanter dicitur, et iudicia in quibus non vivent, idest per quae vitam gratiae obtinere non possunt; et postea subditur, et pollui eos in muneribus suis, idest pollutos ostendi, cum offerrent omne quod aperit vulvam, propter delicta sua. Reply Obj. 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, and judgments in which they shall not live; i.e., whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: And I polluted them, i.e., showed them to be polluted, in their own gifts, when they offered all that opened the womb, for their offenses. Ad secundum dicendum quod lex dicitur occidisse, non quidem effective, sed occasionaliter, ex sua imperfectione, inquantum scilicet gratiam non conferebat, per quam homines implere possent quod mandabat, vel vitare quod vetabat. Et sic occasio ista non erat data, sed sumpta ab hominibus. Unde et apostolus ibidem dicit, occasione accepta peccatum per mandatum seduxit me, et per illud occidit. Et ex hac etiam ratione dicitur quod lex subintravit ut abundaret delictum, ut ly ut teneatur consecutive, non causaliter, inquantum scilicet homines, accipientes occasionem a lege, abundantius peccaverunt; tum quia gravius fuit peccatum post legis prohibitionem; tum etiam quia concupiscentia crevit, magis enim concupiscimus quod nobis prohibetur. Reply Obj. 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: insofar as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfill what is prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom 5:11): Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me. In the same sense when it is said that the law entered in that sin might abound, the conjunction that must be taken as consecutive and not final: insofar as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden. Ad tertium dicendum quod iugum legis servari non poterat sine gratia adiuvante, quam lex non dabat, dicitur enim Rom. IX, non est volentis neque currentis, scilicet velle et currere in praeceptis Dei, sed miserentis Dei. Unde et in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, viam mandatorum tuorum cucurri, cum dilatasti cor meum, scilicet per donum gratiae et caritatis. Reply Obj. 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (Rom 9:16): It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, viz., that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, but of God that showeth mercy. Wherefore it is written (Ps 118:32): I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart, i.e., by giving me grace and charity. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum lex vetus fuerit a Deo Whether the Old Law was from God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit a Deo. Dicitur enim Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Sed lex fuit imperfecta, ut supra dictum est. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo. Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written (Deut 32:4): The works of God are perfect. But the Law was imperfect, as stated above (A1). Therefore the Old Law was not from God. Praeterea, Eccle. III dicitur, didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverent in aeternum. Sed lex vetus non perseverat in aeternum, dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, reprobatio fit quidem praecedentis mandati, propter infirmitatem eius et inutilitatem. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Eccl 3:14): I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever. But the Old Law does not continue for ever: since the Apostle says (Heb 7:18): There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. Praeterea, ad sapientem legislatorem pertinet non solum mala auferre, sed etiam occasiones malorum. Sed vetus lex fuit occasio peccati, ut supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum, cui nullus est similis in legislatoribus, ut dicitur Iob XXXVI, non pertinebat legem talem dare. Obj. 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of sin, as stated above (A1, ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, to Whom none is like among the lawgivers (Job 36:22). Praeterea, I ad Tim. II, dicitur quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Sed lex vetus non sufficiebat ad salutem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum non pertinebat talem legem dare. Lex ergo vetus non est a Deo. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (1 Tim 2:4) that God will have all men to be saved. But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated above (A1). Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.