Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae communia sunt, et indigent determinatione. Determinantur autem et per legem humanam, et per legem divinam. Et sicut ipsae determinationes quae fiunt per legem humanam, non dicuntur esse de lege naturae, sed de iure positivo; ita ipsae determinationes praeceptorum legis naturae quae fiunt per legem divinam, distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus, quae pertinent ad legem naturae. Colere ergo Deum, cum sit actus virtutis, pertinet ad praeceptum morale, sed determinatio huius praecepti, ut scilicet colatur talibus hostiis et talibus muneribus, hoc pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia. Et ideo praecepta caeremonialia distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q91, A3), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., divina hominibus manifestari non possunt nisi sub aliquibus similitudinibus sensibilibus. Ipsae autem similitudines magis movent animum quando non solum verbo exprimuntur, sed etiam sensui offeruntur. Et ideo divina traduntur in Scripturis non solum per similitudines verbo expressas, sicut patet in metaphoricis locutionibus; sed etiam per similitudines rerum quae visui proponuntur, quod pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia. Reply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, sint aliqua praecepta iudicialia in veteri lege Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, non sint aliqua praecepta iudicialia in veteri lege. Dicit enim Augustinus, contra Faustum, quod in lege veteri sunt praecepta vitae agendae, et praecepta vitae significandae. Sed praecepta vitae agendae sunt moralia; praecepta autem vitae significandae sunt caeremonialia. Ergo praeter haec duo genera praeceptorum, non sunt ponenda in lege alia praecepta iudicialia. Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed. Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. Praeterea, super illud Psalmi CXVIII, a iudiciis tuis non declinavi, dicit Glossa, idest ab his quae constituisti regulam vivendi. Sed regula vivendi pertinet ad praecepta moralia. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non sunt distinguenda a moralibus. Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, I have not declined from Thy judgments, says, i.e., from the rule of life Thou hast set for me. But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts. Praeterea, iudicium videtur esse actus iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, quoadusque iustitia convertatur in iudicium. Sed actus iustitiae, sicut et actus ceterarum virtutum, pertinet ad praecepta moralia. Ergo praecepta moralia includunt in se iudicialia, et sic non debent ab eis distingui. Obj. 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to Ps. 93:15: Until justice be turned into judgment. But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae atque iudicia. Praecepta autem antonomastice dicuntur moralia. Ergo praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, sunt etiam iudicialia. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 6:1): These are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments: where precepts stands for moral precepts antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem divinam pertinet ut ordinet homines ad invicem et ad Deum. Utrumque autem horum in communi quidem pertinet ad dictamen legis naturae, ad quod referuntur moralia praecepta, sed oportet quod determinetur utrumque per legem divinam vel humanam, quia principia naturaliter nota sunt communia tam in speculativis quam in activis. Sicut igitur determinatio communis praecepti de cultu divino fit per praecepta caeremonialia, sic et determinatio communis praecepti de iustitia observanda inter homines, determinatur per praecepta iudicialia. I answer that, As stated above (AA2,3), it belongs to the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts. Et secundum hoc, oportet tria praecepta legis veteris ponere; scilicet moralia, quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae; caeremonialia, quae sunt determinationes cultus divini; et iudicialia, quae sunt determinationes iustitiae inter homines observandae. Unde cum apostolus, Rom. VII, dixisset quod lex est sancta, subiungit quod mandatum est iustum et sanctum et bonum, iustum quidem, quantum ad iudicialia; sanctum, quantum ad caeremonialia (nam sanctum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum); bonum, idest honestum, quantum ad moralia. We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz., moral precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; ceremonial precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and judicial precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom 7:12) after saying that the Law is holy, adds that the commandment is just, and holy, and good: just, in respect of the judicial precepts; holy, with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word sanctus—holy—is applied to that which is consecrated to God); and good, i.e., conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tam praecepta moralia, quam etiam iudicialia, pertinent ad directionem vitae humanae. Et ideo utraque continentur sub uno membro illorum quae ponit Augustinus, scilicet sub praeceptis vitae agendae. Reply Obj. 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz., under the precepts of the life we have to lead. Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium significat executionem iustitiae, quae quidem est secundum applicationem rationis ad aliqua particularia determinate. Unde praecepta iudicialia communicant in aliquo cum moralibus, inquantum scilicet a ratione derivantur; et in aliquo cum caeremonialibus, inquantum scilicet sunt quaedam determinationes communium praeceptorum. Et ideo quandoque sub iudiciis comprehenduntur praecepta iudicialia et moralia, sicut Deut. V, audi, Israel, caeremonias atque iudicia; quandoque vero iudicialia et caeremonialia, sicut Levit. XVIII, facietis iudicia mea, et praecepta mea servabitis, ubi praecepta ad moralia referuntur, iudicia vero ad iudicialia et caeremonialia. Reply Obj. 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This explains why sometimes judgments comprise both judicial and moral precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts, where precepts denotes moral precepts, while judgments refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts. Ad tertium dicendum quod actus iustitiae in generali pertinet ad praecepta moralia, sed determinatio eius in speciali pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia. Reply Obj. 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum aliqua alia praecepta contineantur in lege veteri praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial Precepts? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia praecepta contineantur in lege veteri praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia. Iudicialia enim praecepta pertinent ad actum iustitiae, quae est hominis ad hominem; caeremonialia vero pertinent ad actum religionis, qua Deus colitur. Sed praeter has sunt multae aliae virtutes, scilicet temperantia, fortitudo, liberalitas, et aliae plures, ut supra dictum est. Ergo praeter praedicta oportet plura alia in lege veteri contineri. Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz., temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above (Q60, A5). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others. Praeterea, Deut. XI dicitur, ama dominum Deum tuum, et observa eius praecepta et caeremonias et iudicia atque mandata. Sed praecepta pertinent ad moralia, ut dictum est. Ergo praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia, adhuc alia continentur in lege, quae dicuntur mandata. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Deut 11:1): Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments. Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above (A4). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called commandments. Praeterea, Deut. VI dicitur, custodi praecepta domini Dei tui, ac testimonia et caeremonias quas tibi praecepi. Ergo praeter omnia praedicta adhuc in lege testimonia continentur. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Deut 6:17): Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have commanded thee. Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises testimonies. Praeterea, in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, in aeternum non obliviscar iustificationes tuas, Glossa, idest legem. Ergo praecepta legis veteris non solum sunt moralia, caeremonialia et iudicialia, sed etiam iustificationes. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps 118:93): Thy justifications (i.e., the Law, according to a gloss) I will never forget. Therefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called justifications. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae atque iudicia quae mandavit dominus Deus vobis. Et haec ponuntur in principio legis. Ergo omnia praecepta legis sub his comprehenduntur. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 6:1): These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you. And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. Respondeo dicendum quod in lege ponuntur aliqua tanquam praecepta; aliqua vero tanquam ad praeceptorum adimpletionem ordinata. Praecepta quidem sunt de his quae sunt agenda. Ad quorum impletionem ex duobus homo inducitur, scilicet ex auctoritate praecipientis; et ex utilitate impletionis, quae quidem est consecutio alicuius boni utilis, delectabilis vel honesti, aut fuga alicuius mali contrarii. Oportuit igitur in veteri lege proponi quaedam quae auctoritatem Dei praecipientis indicarent, sicut illud Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est; et illud Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Et huiusmodi dicuntur testimonia. Oportuit etiam quod in lege proponerentur quaedam praemia observantium legem, et poenae transgredientium, ut patet Deut. XXVIII, si audieris vocem domini Dei tui, faciet te excelsiorem cunctis gentibus, et cetera. Et huiusmodi dicuntur iustificationes, secundum quod Deus aliquos iuste punit vel praemiat. I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz., the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g., Dt. 6:4: Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord; and Gn. 1:1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth: and these are called testimonies. Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations, etc.: and these are called justifications, according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly. Ipsa autem agenda sub praecepto non cadunt nisi inquantum habent aliquam debiti rationem. Est autem duplex debitum, unum quidem secundum regulam rationis, aliud autem secundum regulam legis determinantis; sicut philosophus, in V Ethic., distinguit duplex iustum, scilicet morale et legale. The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except insofar as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just—moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7). Debitum autem morale est duplex, dictat enim ratio aliquid faciendum vel tanquam necessarium, sine quo non potest esse ordo virtutis; vel tanquam utile ad hoc quod ordo virtutis melius conservetur. Et secundum hoc, quaedam moralium praecise praecipiuntur vel prohibentur in lege, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Et haec proprie dicuntur praecepta. Quaedam vero praecipiuntur vel prohibentur, non quasi praecise debita, sed propter melius. Et ista possunt dici mandata, quia quandam inductionem habent et persuasionem. Sicut illud Exod. XXII, si pignus acceperis vestimentum a proximo tuo, ante solis occasum reddas ei; et aliqua similia. Unde Hieronymus dicit quod in praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis vero caritas. Debitum autem ex determinatione legis, in rebus quidem humanis pertinet ad iudicialia; in rebus autem divinis, ad caeremonialia. Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal: and these are properly called precepts. Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called commandments; because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset; and in other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments. Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; to the ceremonial precepts, as regards Divine matters. Quamvis etiam ea quae pertinent ad poenam vel praemia, dici possint testimonia, inquantum sunt protestationes quaedam divinae iustitiae. Omnia vero praecepta legis possunt dici iustificationes, inquantum sunt quaedam executiones legalis iustitiae. Possunt etiam aliter mandata a praeceptis distingui, ut praecepta dicantur quae Deus per seipsum iussit; mandata autem, quae per alios mandavit, ut ipsum nomen sonare videtur. Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called testimonies, insofar as they testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled justifications, as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called precepts which God Himself prescribed; and those things commandments which He enjoined through others, as the very word seems to denote. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub moralibus, caeremonialibus et iudicialibus, alia vero non habent rationem praeceptorum, sed ordinantur ad praeceptorum observationem, ut dictum est. From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sola iustitia, inter alias virtutes, importat rationem debiti. Et ideo moralia intantum sunt lege determinabilia, inquantum pertinent ad iustitiam, cuius etiam quaedam pars est religio, ut Tullius dicit. Unde iustum legale non potest esse aliquod praeter caeremonialia et iudicialia praecepta. Reply Obj. 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law insofar as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts. Ad alia patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum lex vetus debuerit inducere ad observantiam praeceptorum per temporales promissiones et comminationes Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts by means of temporal promises and threats? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit inducere ad observantiam praeceptorum per temporales promissiones et comminationes. Intentio enim legis divinae est ut homines Deo subdat per timorem et amorem, unde dicitur Deut. X, et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum, et ambules in viis eius, et diligas eum? Sed cupiditas rerum temporalium abducit a Deo, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod venenum caritatis est cupiditas. Ergo promissiones et comminationes temporales videntur contrariari intentioni legislatoris, quod facit legem reprobabilem, ut patet per philosophum, in II Polit. Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written (Deut 10:12): And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him? But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that covetousness is the bane of charity. Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6). Praeterea, lex divina est excellentior quam lex humana. Videmus autem in scientiis quod quanto aliqua est altior, tanto per altiora media procedit. Ergo cum lex humana procedat ad inducendum homines per temporales comminationes et promissiones, lex divina non debuit ex his procedere, sed per aliqua maiora. Obj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means. Praeterea, illud non potest esse praemium iustitiae vel poena culpae, quod aequaliter evenit et bonis et malis. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. IX, universa, temporalia, aeque eveniunt iusto et impio, bono et malo, mundo et immundo, immolanti victimas et sacrificia contemnenti. Ergo temporalia bona vel mala non convenienter ponuntur ut poenae vel praemia mandatorum legis divinae. Obj. 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Eccles. 9:2, all temporal things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices. Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae I, si volueritis, et audieritis me, bona terrae comedetis. Quod si nolueritis, et me ad iracundiam provocaveritis, gladius devorabit vos. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 1:19,20): If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in scientiis speculativis inducuntur homines ad assentiendum conclusionibus per media syllogistica, ita etiam in quibuslibet legibus homines inducuntur ad observantias praeceptorum per poenas et praemia. Videmus autem in scientiis speculativis quod media proponuntur auditori secundum eius conditionem, unde oportet ordinate in scientiis procedere, ut ex notioribus disciplina incipiat. Ita etiam oportet eum qui vult inducere hominem ad observantiam praeceptorum, ut ex illis eum movere incipiat quae sunt in eius affectu, sicut pueri provocantur ad aliquid faciendum aliquibus puerilibus munusculis. Dictum est autem supra quod lex vetus disponebat ad Christum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, unde dabatur populo adhuc imperfecto in comparatione ad perfectionem quae erat futura per Christum, et ideo populus ille comparatur puero sub paedagogo existenti, ut patet Galat. III. Perfectio autem hominis est ut, contemptis temporalibus, spiritualibus inhaereat, ut patet per illud quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. III, quae quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea quae priora sunt me extendo. Quicumque ergo perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus. Imperfectorum autem est quod temporalia bona desiderent, in ordine tamen ad Deum. Perversorum autem est quod in temporalibus bonis finem constituant. Unde legi veteri conveniebat ut per temporalia, quae erant in affectu hominum imperfectorum, manuduceret homines ad Deum. I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said above (Q98, AA1,2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ’s coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still under a pedagogue (Gal 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle (Phil 3:13,15): Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth myself to those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded. Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cupiditas, qua homo constituit finem in temporalibus bonis, est caritatis venenum. Sed consecutio temporalium bonorum quae homo desiderat in ordine ad Deum, est quaedam via inducens imperfectos ad Dei amorem; secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, confitebitur tibi cum benefeceris illi. Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him. Ad secundum dicendum quod lex humana inducit homines ex temporalibus praemiis vel poenis per homines inducendis, lex vero divina ex praemiis vel poenis exhibendis per Deum. Et in hoc procedit per media altiora. Reply Obj. 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades men by means of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means.