Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum Deus sit aeternus Whether God is eternal? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit aeternus. Nihil enim factum potest dici de Deo. Sed aeternitas est aliquid factum, dicit enim Boetius quod nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit aeternitatem; et Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est aeternus. Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity; and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) that God is the author of eternity. Therefore God is not eternal. Praeterea, quod est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem, non mensuratur aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem, ut dicitur in libro de causis, et post aeternitatem; dicitur enim Exod. XV, quod dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra. Ergo esse aeternum non convenit Deo. Obj. 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), God is before eternity and He is after eternity: for it is written that the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond (Exod 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God. Praeterea, aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aeternum. Obj. 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal. Praeterea, in aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum cum sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba praesentis temporis, praeteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est aeternus. Obj. 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal. Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius, aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus Spiritus Sanctus. On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum est aeternus, sed est sua aeternitas, cum tamen nulla alia res sit sua duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse uniforme, unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas. I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur facere aeternitatem, secundum nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim causatur in nobis apprehensio temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in nobis apprehensio aeternitatis, inquantum apprehendimus nunc stans. Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis, intelligitur de aeternitate participata, eo enim modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam immutabilitatem. Reply Obj. 1: The now that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the now, so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the now standing still. When Augustine says that God is the author of eternity, this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aeternitatem, prout participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur, quod intelligentia parificatur aeternitati. Quod autem dicitur in Exodo, dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra sciendum quod aeternum accipitur ibi pro saeculo, sicut habet alia translatio. Sic igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aeternum, quia durat ultra quodcumque saeculum, idest ultra quamcumque durationem datam, nihil est enim aliud saeculum quam periodus cuiuslibet rei, ut dicitur in libro I de caelo. Reply Obj. 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that intelligence is equal to eternity. In the words of Exodus, The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond, eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e., beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Vel dicitur etiam ultra aeternum regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset (ut motus caeli secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen Deus ultra regnat, inquantum eius regnum est totum simul. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole. Ad tertium dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus, sed accipitur ibi ratio mensurae secundum apprehensionem nostram tantum. Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone. Ad quartum dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, inquantum eius aeternitas omnia tempora includit, non quod ipse varietur per praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Reply Obj. 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum esse aeternum sit soli Deo proprium Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit soli Deo proprium. Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod qui ad iustitiam erudiunt plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates. Non autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus Deus esset aeternus. Non igitur solus Deus est aeternus. Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that those who instruct many to justice, shall be as stars unto perpetual eternities (Dan 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. Praeterea, Matth. XXV dicitur, ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum. Non igitur solus Deus est aeternus. Obj. 2: Further, it is written Depart, ye cursed into eternal fire (Matt 25:41). Therefore God is not the only eternal. Praeterea, omne necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria; sicut omnia principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativae. Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus. Obj. 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal. Sed contra est quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, Deus solus est qui exordium non habet. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum. Solus ergo Deus est aeternus. On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum, xv) that God is the only one who has no beginning. Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal. Respondeo dicendum quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est. Quia aeternitas immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (Q. 9, A. 1). Secundum tamen quod aliqua ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua eius aeternitatem participant. Quaedam ergo quantum ad hoc immutabilitatem sortiuntur a Deo, quod nunquam esse desinunt, et secundum hoc dicitur Eccle. I de terra, quod in aeternum stat. Quaedam etiam aeterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem durationis, licet corruptibilia sint, sicut in Psalmo dicuntur montes aeterni; et Deuter. XXXIII etiam dicitur, de pomis collium aeternorum. Quaedam autem amplius participant de ratione aeternitatis, inquantum habent intransmutabilitatem vel secundum esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem, sicut Angeli et beati, qui verbo fruuntur, quia quantum ad illam visionem verbi, non sunt in sanctis volubiles cogitationes, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin. Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum illud Ioann. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant et cetera. Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, it standeth for ever (Eccl. 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps 75:5) the hills are called eternal and we read of the fruits of the eternal hills. (Deut 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God, etc. (John 17:3). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur multae aeternitates, secundum quod sunt multi participantes aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione. Reply Obj. 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod ignis Inferni dicitur aeternus propter interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis eorum transmutatio, secundum illud Iob XXIV, ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis nivium. Unde in Inferno non est vera aeternitas, sed magis tempus; secundum illud Psalmi, erit tempus eorum in saecula. Reply Obj. 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm Their time will be for ever (Ps 80:16). Ad tertium dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum autem, secundum Philosophum, VI Metaphys., est in intellectu. Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum. Reply Obj. 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum aeternitas sit aliud a tempore Whether eternity differs from time? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore. Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed aeternitas et tempus sunt simul, quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate. Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis, quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis. Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the now of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the now of time. But the now of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time. Praeterea, sicut mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum. Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas, vel aliquid aeternitatis. Obj. 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being—that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity. Sed contra est quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem. On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a before and an after. Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing. Respondeo dicendum quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed haec est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut dicit Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, quod tempori non convenit, quia aeternitas est mensura esse permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Si tamen praedicta differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem, quia solum illud mensuratur tempore, quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet principium et finem in tempore. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time. Potest tamen et aliam rationem habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et principium in potentia. Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret, tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem, accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aeternitate. Sed tamen istae differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo, differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem tempus. Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est tempus et aeternitas mensura. Reply Obj. 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity. Ad secundum dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi. Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc, secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem quod nunc temporis. Reply Obj. 2: The now of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its now corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect as being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the now as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the now of time. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse, ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est moveri, et non movetur. Reply Obj. 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.