Respondeo dicendum quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt, quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus Deus immediate omnia operaretur; puta quod ignis non calefaceret, sed Deus in igne, et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est impossibile. Primo quidem, quia sic subtraheretur ordo causae et causati a rebus creatis. Quod pertinet ad impotentiam creantis, ex virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi. Secundo, quia virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur, frustra essent rebus attributae, si per eas nihil operarentur. Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si propria operatione destituerentur, cum omnis res sit propter suam operationem. Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius, sicut igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et sic operatio est finis rei creatae. Sic igitur intelligendum est Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operationem. I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Second, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum. Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus. Artifex enim movetur ad agendum a fine, qui est ipsum operatum, puta arca vel lectus; et applicat ad actionem securim quae incidit per suum acumen. In order to make this clear, we must observe that, as there are four kinds of causes, matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp. Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur. Primo quidem, secundum rationem finis. Cum enim omnis operatio sit propter aliquod bonum verum vel apparens; nihil autem est vel apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam similitudinem summi boni, quod est Deus; sequitur quod ipse Deus sit cuiuslibet operationis causa ut finis. Similiter etiam considerandum est quod, si sint multa agentia ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in virtute primi, nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum. Et secundum hoc, omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; et ita ipse est causa actionum omnium agentium. Tertio, considerandum est quod Deus movet non solum res ad operandum, quasi applicando formas et virtutes rerum ad operationem, sicut etiam artifex applicat securim ad scindendum, qui tamen interdum formam securi non tribuit; sed etiam dat formam creaturis agentibus, et eas tenet in esse. Unde non solum est causa actionum inquantum dat formam quae est principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtutes rerum; prout sol dicitur esse causa manifestationis colorum, inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo manifestantur colores. Et quia forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum rebus; sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur. Et propter hoc in sacra Scriptura operationes naturae Deo attribuuntur quasi operanti in natura; secundum illud Iob X, pelle et carnibus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me. Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Third, we must observe that God not only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum agentium. Reply Obj. 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous. Ad secundum dicendum quod una actio non procedit a duobus agentibus unius ordinis, sed nihil prohibet quin una et eadem actio procedat a primo et secundo agente. Reply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum Deus possit facere aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXVI Contra Faustum: Deus, conditor et creator omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam facit. Sed hoc videtur esse contra naturam, quod est praeter ordinem naturaliter rebus inditum. Ergo Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature. But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order. Praeterea, sicut ordo iustitiae est a Deo, ita et ordo naturae. Sed Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem iustitiae, faceret enim tunc aliquid iniustum. Ergo non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem naturae. Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature. Praeterea, ordinem naturae Deus instituit. Si igitur praeter ordinem naturae Deus aliquid faciat, videtur quod ipse sit mutabilis. Quod est inconveniens. Obj. 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore if God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod Deus aliquando aliquid facit contra solitum cursum naturae. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature. Respondeo dicendum quod a qualibet causa derivatur aliquis ordo in suos effectus, cum quaelibet causa habeat rationem principii. Et ideo secundum multiplicationem causarum, multiplicantur et ordines, quorum unus continetur sub altero, sicut et causa continetur sub causa. Unde causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e converso. Cuius exemplum apparet in rebus humanis, nam ex patrefamilias dependet ordo domus, qui continetur sub ordine civitatis, qui procedit a civitatis rectore, cum et hic contineatur sub ordine regis, a quo totum regnum ordinatur. I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered. Si ergo ordo rerum consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem. Si vero consideretur rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum causarum ipse non est subiectus, sed talis ordo ei subiicitur, quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum instituere. Unde et potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere, cum voluerit; puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis, vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se extendunt. Unde et Augustinus dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit. If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquid contingit in rebus naturalibus praeter naturam inditam, hoc potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, per actionem agentis qui inclinationem naturalem non dedit, sicut cum homo movet corpus grave sursum, quod non habet ab eo ut moveatur deorsum, et hoc est contra naturam. Alio modo, per actionem illius agentis a quo dependet actio naturalis. Et hoc non est contra naturam, ut patet in fluxu et refluxu maris, qui non est contra naturam, quamvis sit praeter motum naturalem aquae, quae movetur deorsum; est enim ex impressione caelestis corporis, a quo dependet naturalis inclinatio inferiorum corporum. Cum igitur naturae ordo sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae. Reply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God, if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo iustitiae est secundum relationem ad causam primam, quae est regula omnis iustitiae. Et ideo praeter hunc ordinem, Deus nihil facere potest. Reply Obj. 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing against such order. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur. Reply Obj. 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum omnia quae Deus facit praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sint miracula Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quae Deus facit praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sint miracula. Creatio enim mundi, et etiam animarum, et iustificatio impii fiunt a Deo praeter ordinem naturalem, non enim fiunt per actionem alicuius causae naturalis. Et tamen haec miracula non dicuntur. Ergo non omnia quae facit Deus praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sunt miracula. Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle. Praeterea, miraculum dicitur aliquid arduum et insolitum supra facultatem naturae et spem admirantis proveniens. Sed quaedam fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, quae tamen non sunt ardua, sunt enim in minimis rebus, sicut in restauratione gemmarum, vel sanatione aegrorum. Nec etiam sunt insolita, cum frequenter eveniant, sicut cum infirmi in plateis ponebantur ut ad umbram Petri sanarentur. Nec etiam sunt supra facultatem naturae, ut cum aliqui sanantur a febribus. Nec etiam supra spem, sicut resurrectionem mortuorum omnes speramus, quae tamen fiet praeter ordinem naturae. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, sunt miracula. Obj. 2: Further, a miracle is something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment. But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous. Praeterea, miraculi nomen ab admiratione sumitur. Sed admiratio est de rebus sensui manifestis. Sed quandoque aliqua accidunt praeter ordinem naturalem in rebus sensui non manifestis, sicut cum apostoli facti sunt scientes, neque invenientes neque discentes. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt praeter ordinem naturae, sunt miracula. Obj. 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem consurgit, cum effectus sunt manifesti et causa occulta; sicut aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Potest autem causa effectus alicuius apparentis alicui esse nota, quae tamen est aliis incognita. Unde aliquid est mirum uni, quod non est mirum aliis; sicut eclipsim solis miratur rusticus, non autem astrologus. Miraculum autem dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam. Haec autem est Deus. Unde illa quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur. I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder, as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant. Reply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order. Ad secundum dicendum quod arduum dicitur miraculum, non propter dignitatem rei in qua fit; sed quia excedit facultatem naturae. Similiter etiam insolitum dicitur, non quia frequenter non eveniat sed quia est praeter naturalem consuetudinem. Supra facultatem autem naturae dicitur aliquid, non solum propter substantiam facti sed etiam propter modum et ordinem faciendi. Supra spem etiam naturae miraculum esse dicitur; non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram. Reply Obj. 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope of nature, not above the hope of grace, which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection. Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia apostolorum, quamvis secundum se non fuerit manifesta, manifestabatur tamen in effectibus, ex quibus mirabilis apparebat. Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum unum miraculum sit maius alio Whether one miracle is greater than another? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unum miraculum non sit maius alio. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Epistola ad Volusianum: In rebus mirabiliter factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Sed eadem potentia, scilicet Dei, fiunt omnia miracula. Ergo unum non est maius alio. Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer. But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. Praeterea, potentia Dei est infinita. Sed infinitum improportionabiliter excedit omne finitum. Ergo non magis est mirandum quod faciat hunc effectum, quam illum. Ergo unum miraculum non est maius altero. Obj. 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, de operibus miraculosis loquens, opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum faciet. On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John 14:12): The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae, quia quodcumque factum, divinae potentiae comparatum, est minimum; secundum illud Isaiae XL, ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae, et quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt. Sed dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Et ideo secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc maius miraculum dicitur. Excedit autem aliquid facultatem naturae tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo corpora sint simul, vel quod sol retrocedat, aut quod corpus humanum glorificetur; quod nullo modo natura facere potest. Et ista tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit facultatem naturae, non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum, et illuminatio caecorum, et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et potest praestare visum, sed non caeco. Et haec tenent secundum locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae, quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi, sicut cum aliquis subito per virtutem divinam a febre curatur absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus, et cum statim aer divina virtute in pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad preces Samuelis et Eliae. Et huiusmodi tenent infimum locum in miraculis. Quaelibet tamen horum habent diversos gradus, secundum quod diversimode excedunt facultatem naturae. I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Isa. 40:15: Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance. But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: first, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Second, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Third, a thing surpasses nature’s power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta, quae procedunt ex parte divinae potentiae. From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power. Quaestio 106 Question 106 Quomodo una creatura moveat aliam How One Creature Moves Another