Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum unum miraculum sit maius alio Whether one miracle is greater than another? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unum miraculum non sit maius alio. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Epistola ad Volusianum: In rebus mirabiliter factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Sed eadem potentia, scilicet Dei, fiunt omnia miracula. Ergo unum non est maius alio. Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer. But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. Praeterea, potentia Dei est infinita. Sed infinitum improportionabiliter excedit omne finitum. Ergo non magis est mirandum quod faciat hunc effectum, quam illum. Ergo unum miraculum non est maius altero. Obj. 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, de operibus miraculosis loquens, opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum faciet. On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John 14:12): The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae, quia quodcumque factum, divinae potentiae comparatum, est minimum; secundum illud Isaiae XL, ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae, et quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt. Sed dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Et ideo secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc maius miraculum dicitur. Excedit autem aliquid facultatem naturae tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo corpora sint simul, vel quod sol retrocedat, aut quod corpus humanum glorificetur; quod nullo modo natura facere potest. Et ista tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit facultatem naturae, non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum, et illuminatio caecorum, et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et potest praestare visum, sed non caeco. Et haec tenent secundum locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae, quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi, sicut cum aliquis subito per virtutem divinam a febre curatur absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus, et cum statim aer divina virtute in pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad preces Samuelis et Eliae. Et huiusmodi tenent infimum locum in miraculis. Quaelibet tamen horum habent diversos gradus, secundum quod diversimode excedunt facultatem naturae. I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Isa. 40:15: Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance. But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: first, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Second, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Third, a thing surpasses nature’s power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta, quae procedunt ex parte divinae potentiae. From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power. Quaestio 106 Question 106 Quomodo una creatura moveat aliam How One Creature Moves Another Deinde considerandum est quomodo una creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideremus quomodo angeli moveant, qui sunt creaturae pure spirituales; secundo, quomodo corpora moveant; tertio, quomodo homines, qui sunt ex spirituali et corporali natura compositi. We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo, quomodo angelus agat in angelum; secundo, quomodo in creaturam corporalem; tertio, quomodo in homines. Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man. Circa primum, considerare oportet de illuminatione, et locutione angelorum, et ordinatione eorum ad invicem, tam bonorum, quam malorum. The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of the bad angels. Circa illuminationem quaeruntur quatuor. Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum unus angelus moveat intellectum alterius illuminando. (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment? Secundo, utrum unus moveat voluntatem alterius. (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another? Tertio, utrum inferior angelus possit illuminare superiorem. (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? Quarto, utrum superior angelus illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae cognoscit. (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum unus angelus illuminet alium Whether one angel enlightens another? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus angelus non illuminet alium. Angeli enim eandem beatitudinem possident nunc, quam nos in futuro expectamus. Sed tunc unus homo non illuminabit alium; secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, et vir fratrem suum. Ergo etiam neque nunc unus angelus illuminat alium. Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother. Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now. Praeterea, triplex est lumen in angelis, naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Sed angelus illuminatur lumine naturae, a creante; lumine gratiae, a iustificante; lumine gloriae, a beatificante; quod totum Dei est. Ergo unus angelus non illuminat alium. Obj. 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another. Praeterea, lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed mens rationalis a solo Deo formatur, nulla interposita creatura, ut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest. Ergo unus angelus non illuminat mentem alterius. Obj. 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is informed by God alone, without created intervention, as Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod angeli secundae hierarchiae purgantur et illuminantur et perficiuntur per angelos primae hierarchiae. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy. Respondeo dicendum quod unus angelus illuminat alium. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod lumen, secundum quod ad intellectum pertinet, nihil est aliud quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis; secundum illud ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem cognitae veritatis alteri tradere; secundum quem modum apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. III, mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Sic igitur unus angelus dicitur illuminare alium, inquantum ei manifestat veritatem quam ipse cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod theologi plane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ornatus a supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias. I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: All that is made manifest is light. Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according to the Apostle (Eph 3:8): To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds. Cum autem ad intelligendum duo concurrant, ut supra diximus, scilicet virtus intellectiva, et similitudo rei intellectae; secundum haec duo unus angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest. Primo quidem, fortificando virtutem intellectivam eius. Sicut enim virtus imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situali propinquitate perfectioris corporis, ut minus calidum crescit in calore ex praesentia magis calidi; ita virtus intellectiva inferioris angeli confortatur ex conversione superioris angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim facit in spiritualibus ordo conversionis, quod facit in corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis. Secundo autem unus angelus alteri manifestat veritatem, ex parte similitudinis intellectae. Superior enim angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris angeli intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit. Sicut etiam apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier.: Unaquaeque substantia intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum ductricem analogiam. Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (Q. 105, A. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body—for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Second, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel’s intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes angeli, tam superiores quam inferiores, immediate vident Dei essentiam; et quantum ad hoc, unus non docet alium. De hac enim doctrina propheta loquitur, unde dicit non docebit vir fratrem suum, dicens, cognosce dominum. Omnes enim cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum. Sed rationes divinorum operum, quae in Deo cognoscuntur sicut in causa, omnes quidem Deus in seipso cognoscit, quia seipsum comprehendit, aliorum vero Deum videntium tanto unusquisque in Deo plures rationes cognoscit, quanto eum perfectius videt. Unde superior angelus plura in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod angeli existentium illuminantur rationibus. Reply Obj. 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: ‘Know the Lord’: for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest. But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels are enlightened by the types of existing things. Ad secundum dicendum quod unus angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above. Ad tertium dicendum quod rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo, vel sicut imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper mens creata reputatur informis, nisi ipsi primae veritati inhaereat. Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam. Reply Obj. 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum unus angelus possit movere voluntatem alterius Whether one angel moves another angel’s will? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus angelus possit movere voluntatem alterius. Quia secundum Dionysium, sicut unus angelus illuminat alium, ita purgat et perficit; ut patet ex auctoritate supra inducta. Sed purgatio et perfectio videntur pertinere ad voluntatem, nam purgatio videtur esse a sordibus culpae, quae pertinet ad voluntatem; perfectio autem videtur esse per consecutionem finis, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo unus angelus potest movere voluntatem alterius. Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel’s will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel’s will. Praeterea, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier., nomina angelorum designant eorum proprietates. Seraphim autem incendentes dicuntur, aut calefacientes, quod est per amorem, qui ad voluntatem pertinet. Unus ergo angelus movet voluntatem alterius. Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): The names of the angels designate their properties. Now the Seraphim are so called because they kindle or give heat: and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel’s will. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem. Sed sicut intellectus angeli superioris superior est, ita etiam appetitus. Ergo videtur quod superior angelus possit immutare voluntatem alterius. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel. Sed contra, eius est immutare voluntatem, cuius est iustificare, cum iustitia sit rectitudo voluntatis. Sed solus Deus est qui iustificat. Ergo unus angelus non potest mutare voluntatem alterius. On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel’s will. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas immutatur dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte ipsius potentiae. Ex parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant voluntatem; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi, ostende mihi gloriam tuam, respondit, ego ostendam tibi omne bonum, ut habetur Exod. XXXIII. Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet voluntatem, neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed inclinat eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis. I answer that, As was said above (Q. 105, A. 4), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Q. 105, A. 4), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: Show me Thy glory, answered: I will show thee all good (Exod 33:18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God’s goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion. Ex parte vero ipsius potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo. Operatio enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem volendi creaturae contulit, sicut et naturalem inclinationem solum illud agens potest mutare, quod potest dare virtutem quam consequitur inclinatio naturalis. Solus autem Deus est qui potentiam volendi tribuit creaturae, quia ipse solus est auctor intellectualis naturae. Unde unus angelus voluntatem alterius movere non potest. But on the part of the power, the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel’s will.