Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Deus sit unus Whether God is one? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit unus. Dicitur enim I ad Cor. VIII, siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi. Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written For there be many gods and many lords (1 Cor 8:5). Praeterea, unum quod est principium numeri, non potest praedicari de Deo, cum nulla quantitas de Deo praedicetur. Similiter nec unum quod convertitur cum ente, quia importat privationem, et omnis privatio imperfectio est, quae Deo non competit. Non est igitur dicendum quod Deus sit unus. Obj. 2: Further, One, as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can one which is convertible with being be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus unus est. On the contrary, It is written Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord (Deut 6:4). Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. Primo quidem ex eius simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur esse plures deos. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is this particular thing is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis. Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret eos differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Et si hoc esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus, si autem hoc esset perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures deos. Unde et antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa coacti veritate, ponentes principium infinitum, posuerunt unum tantum principium. Second, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle. Tertio, ab unitate mundi. Omnia enim quae sunt, inveniuntur esse ordinata ad invicem, dum quaedam quibusdam deserviunt. Quae autem diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno ordinarentur. Melius enim multa reducuntur in unum ordinem per unum, quam per multa, quia per se unius unum est causa, et multa non sunt causa unius nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt aliquo modo unum. Cum igitur illud quod est primum, sit perfectissimum et per se, non per accidens, oportet quod primum reducens omnia in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est Deus. Third, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the per se cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so per se and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur dii multi secundum errorem quorundam qui multos deos colebant, existimantes planetas et alias stellas esse deos, vel etiam singulas partes mundi. Unde subdit, nobis autem unus Deus, et cetera. Reply Obj. 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: Our God is one, etc. Ad secundum dicendum quod unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia. Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum; quae habent esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia. Et licet in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum modum apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus. Reply Obj. 2: One which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For one the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But one which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum Deus sit maxime unus Whether God is supremely one? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit maxime unus. Unum enim dicitur secundum privationem divisionis. Sed privatio non recipit magis et minus. Ergo Deus non dicitur magis unus quam alia quae sunt unum. Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely one. For one is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more one than other things which are called one. Praeterea, nihil videtur esse magis indivisibile quam id quod est indivisibile actu et potentia, cuiusmodi est punctus et unitas. Sed intantum dicitur aliquid magis unum, inquantum est indivisibile. Ergo Deus non est magis unum quam unitas et punctus. Obj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more one according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more one than unity is one and a point is one. Praeterea, quod est per essentiam bonum, est maxime bonum, ergo quod est per essentiam suam unum, est maxime unum. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per Philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est maxime unum. Deus igitur non est magis unum quam alia entia. Obj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially one is supremely one. But every being is essentially one, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely one; and therefore God is not one more than any other being is one. Sed contra est quod dicit Bernardus, quod inter omnia quae unum dicuntur, arcem tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis. On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum. Est autem maxime indivisum, inquantum neque dividitur actu neque potentia, secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus est maxime unus. I answer that, Since one is an undivided being, if anything is supremely one it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is one in the supreme degree. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet privatio secundum se non recipiat magis et minus, tamen secundum quod eius oppositum recipit magis et minus, etiam ipsa privativa dicuntur secundum magis et minus. Secundum igitur quod aliquid est magis divisum vel divisibile, vel minus, vel nullo modo, secundum hoc aliquid dicitur magis et minus vel maxime unum. Reply Obj. 1: Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, one. Ad secundum dicendum quod punctus et unitas quae est principium numeri, non sunt maxime entia, cum non habeant esse nisi in subiecto aliquo. Unde neutrum eorum est maxime unum. Sicut enim subiectum non est maxime unum, propter diversitatem accidentis et subiecti, ita nec accidens. Reply Obj. 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely one. For as a subject cannot be supremely one, because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet omne ens sit unum per suam substantiam, non tamen se habet aequaliter substantia cuiuslibet ad causandam unitatem, quia substantia quorundam est ex multis composita, quorundam vero non. Reply Obj. 3: Although every being is one by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple. Quaestio 12 Question 12 Quomodo Deus a nobis cognoscatur How God is Known by Us Quia in superioribus consideravimus qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim. As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: Primo, utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit videre essentiam Dei. (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? Secundo, utrum Dei essentia videatur ab intellectu per aliquam speciem creatam. (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image? Tertio, utrum oculo corporeo Dei essentia possit videri. (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye? Quarto, utrum aliqua substantia intellectualis creata ex suis naturalibus sufficiens sit videre Dei essentiam. (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God? Quinto, utrum intellectus creatus ad videndam Dei essentiam indigeat aliquo lumine creato. (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? Sexto, utrum videntium essentiam Dei unus alio perfectius videat. (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another? Septimo, utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit comprehendere Dei essentiam. (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God? Octavo, utrum intellectus creatus videns Dei essentiam, omnia in ipsa cognoscat. (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it? Nono, utrum ea quae ibi cognoscit, per aliquas similitudines cognoscat. (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes? Decimo, utrum simul cognoscat omnia quae in Deo videt. (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God? Undecimo, utrum in statu huius vitae possit aliquis homo essentiam Dei videre. (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God? Duodecimo, utrum per rationem naturalem Deum in hac vita possimus cognoscere. (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?