Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum angelus deputetur homini ad custodiam a sua nativitate Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non deputetur homini ad custodiam a sua nativitate. Angeli enim mittuntur in ministerium, propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, ut apostolus, ad Heb. dicit. Sed homines incipiunt haereditatem capere salutis, quando baptizantur. Ergo angelus deputatur homini ad custodiam a tempore Baptismi, et non a tempore nativitatis. Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, as the Apostle says (Heb 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth. Praeterea, homines ab angelis custodiuntur, inquantum ab eis illuminantur per modum doctrinae. Sed pueri mox nati non sunt capaces doctrinae, quia non habent usum rationis. Ergo pueris mox natis non deputantur angeli custodes. Obj. 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born. Praeterea, pueri in materno utero existentes habent animam rationalem aliquo tempore, sicut et post nativitatem ex utero. Sed cum sunt in materno utero, non deputantur eis angeli ad custodiam, ut videtur, quia neque etiam ministri Ecclesiae eos sacramentis imbuunt. Non ergo statim a nativitate hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Obj. 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, quod unaquaeque anima, ab ortu nativitatis, habet in custodiam sui angelum deputatum. On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A. 4) that each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Origenes dicit super Matthaeum, super hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod angelus ad custodiam homini deputatur a tempore Baptismi, alii vero quod a tempore nativitatis. Et hanc opinionem Hieronymus approbat; et rationabiliter. Beneficia enim quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus, incipiunt a tempore Baptismi; sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi. Sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem naturam accipit. Et tale beneficium est custodia angelorum, ut ex praemissis patet. Unde statim a nativitate habet homo angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum. I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (loc. cit.), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angeli mittuntur in ministerium, efficaciter quidem propter eos solos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, si consideretur ultimus effectus custodiae, qui est perceptio haereditatis. Nihilominus tamen et aliis ministerium angelorum non subtrahitur, quamvis in eis hanc efficaciam non habeat, quod perducantur ad salutem. Efficax tamen est circa eos angelorum ministerium, inquantum a multis malis retrahuntur. Reply Obj. 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn from others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils. Ad secundum dicendum quod officium custodiae ordinatur quidem ad illuminationem doctrinae, sicut ad ultimum et principalem effectum. Nihilominus tamen multos alios effectus habet, qui pueris competunt, scilicet arcere daemones, et alia nocumenta tam corporalia quam spiritualia prohibere. Reply Obj. 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm. Ad tertium dicendum quod puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod angelus qui est in custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, angelus ei ad custodiam deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit. Reply Obj. 3: As long as the child is in the mother’s womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above quoted, says. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum angelus custos quandoque deserat hominem cuius custodiae deputatur Whether a guardian angel ever forsakes a man whom he is appointed to guard? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus custos quandoque deserat hominem cuius custodiae deputatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. li, ex persona angelorum, curavimus Babylonem, et non est curata, derelinquamus ergo eam. Et Isaiae V, auferam sepem eius, et erit in conculcationem; Glossa, idest angelorum custodiam. Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer 51:9) in the person of the angels: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her. And (Isa 5:5) it is written: I will take away the hedge—that is, the guardianship of the angels—and it shall be wasted. Praeterea, principalius custodit Deus quam angelus. Sed Deus aliquando hominem derelinquit; secundum illud Psalmi XXI, Deus, Deus meus, respice in me, quare me dereliquisti? Ergo multo magis angelus custos hominem derelinquit. Obj. 2: Further, God’s guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me? Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man. Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, Angeli, cum sunt hic nobiscum, non sunt in caelo. Sed aliquando sunt in caelo. Ergo aliquando nos derelinquunt. Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven. But sometimes they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us. Sed contra, daemones nos semper impugnant; secundum illud I Petri V, adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret. Ergo multo magis boni angeli semper nos custodiunt. On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pet. 5:8: Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour. Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us. Respondeo dicendum quod custodia angelorum, ut ex supra dictis patet, est quaedam executio divinae providentiae circa homines facta. Manifestum est autem quod nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum subditur universali providentiae entium. Sed intantum Deus, secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere, inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel culpae. Similiter etiam dicendum est quod angelus custos nunquam totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit; prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum iudiciorum. Et secundum hoc Babylon et domus Israel ab angelis derelictae dicuntur, quia angeli earum custodes non impediverunt quin tribulationibus subderentur. I answer that, As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum et secundum. From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus, etsi interdum derelinquat hominem loco, non tamen derelinquit eum quantum ad effectum custodiae, quia etiam cum est in caelo, cognoscit quid circa hominem agatur; nec indiget mora temporis ad motum localem, sed statim potest adesse. Reply Obj. 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be with man in an instant. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum angeli doleant de malis eorum quos custodiunt Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli doleant de malis eorum quos custodiunt. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXXIII, Angeli pacis amare flebunt. Sed fletus est signum doloris et tristitiae. Ergo angeli tristantur de malis hominum quos custodiunt. Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Isa 33:7): The angels of peace shall weep bitterly. But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. Praeterea, tristitia est, ut Augustinus dicit, de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. Sed perditio hominis custoditi est contra voluntatem angeli custodis. Ergo tristantur angeli de perditione hominum. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), sorrow is for those things that happen against our will. But the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel’s will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men. Praeterea, sicut gaudio contrariatur tristitia, ita poenitentiae contrariatur peccatum. Sed angeli gaudent de peccatore poenitentiam agente, ut habetur Lucae XV. Ergo tristantur de iusto in peccatum cadente. Obj. 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, Luke 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. Praeterea, super illud Num. XVIII; quidquid offerunt primitiarum etc., dicit Glossa Origenis; trahuntur angeli in iudicium, utrum ex ipsorum negligentia, an hominum ignavia lapsi sint. Sed quilibet rationabiliter dolet de malis propter quae in iudicium tractus est. Ergo angeli dolent de peccatis hominum. Obj. 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: Whatsoever first-fruits they offer, etc. the gloss of Origen says: The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault. But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men’s sins. Sed contra, ubi est tristitia et dolor, non est perfecta felicitas, unde dicitur Apoc. XXI, mors ultra non erit, neque luctus, neque clamor, neque ullus dolor. Sed angeli sunt perfecte beati. Ergo de nullo dolent. On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Rev 21:4): Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow. But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum. Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit contrarium voluntati angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae; nihil autem fit in mundo, nisi quod per divinam iustitiam fit aut permittitur. Et ideo, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem beatorum. Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant, quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem dicitur. Sic igitur angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur, et peccare permittuntur. I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Isaiae potest intelligi de angelis, idest nuntiis, Ezechiae, qui fleverunt propter verba Rabsacis; de quibus habetur Isaiae XXXVII. Et hoc secundum litteralem sensum. Secundum vero allegoricum, angeli pacis sunt apostoli et alii praedicatores, qui flent pro peccatis hominum. Si vero secundum sensum anagogicum exponatur de angelis beatis, tunc metaphorica erit locutio, ad designandum quod angeli volunt in universali hominum salutem. Sic enim Deo et angelis huiusmodi passiones attribuuntur. Reply Obj. 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e., the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related Isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the angels of peace are the apostles and preachers who weep for men’s sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God and the angels. Ad secundum patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt. The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said. Ad tertium dicendum quod tam in poenitentia hominum, quam in peccato, manet una ratio gaudii angelis, scilicet impletio ordinis divinae providentiae. Reply Obj. 3: Both in man’s repentance and in man’s sin there is one reason for the angel’s joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence. Ad quartum dicendum quod angeli ducuntur in iudicium pro peccatis hominum, non quasi rei, sed quasi testes, ad convincendum homines de eorum ignavia. Reply Obj. 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum inter angelos possit esse pugna seu discordia Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inter angelos non possit esse pugna seu discordia. Dicitur enim Iob XXV, qui facit concordiam in sublimibus. Sed pugna opponitur concordiae. Ergo in sublimibus angelis non est pugna. Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): Who maketh peace in His high places. But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife. Praeterea, ubi est perfecta caritas et iusta praelatio, non potest esse pugna. Sed hoc totum est in angelis. Ergo in angelis non est pugna. Obj. 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels. Praeterea, si angeli dicuntur pugnare pro eis quos custodiunt, necesse est quod unus angelus foveat unam partem, et alius aliam. Sed si una pars habet iustitiam, e contra alia pars habet iniustitiam. Ergo sequitur quod angelus bonus sit fautor iniustitiae, quod est inconveniens. Ergo inter bonos angelos non est pugna. Obj. 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.