Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum animae humanae fuerint creatae simul a principio mundi Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae humanae fuerint creatae simul a principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen. II, requievit Deus ab omni opere quod patrarat. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas animas crearet. Ergo omnes animae sunt simul creatae. Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen 2:2): God rested Him from all His work which He had done. This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time. Praeterea, ad perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si igitur animae simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie innumerabiles spirituales substantiae perfectioni universi adderentur, et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum. Quod est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. II, Deum omne opus suum complesse. Obj. 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gen. 2:2, where it is said that God ended all His work. Praeterea, finis rei respondet eius principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet, destructo corpore. Ergo incoepit esse ante corpus. Obj. 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod simul anima creatur cum corpore. On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that the soul is created together with the body. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod animae intellectivae accidat uniri corpori, ponentes eam esse eiusdem conditionis cum substantiis spiritualibus quae corpori non uniuntur. Et ideo posuerunt animas hominum simul a principio cum angelis creatas. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Primo quidem, quantum ad radicem. Si enim accidentaliter conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum angelis, ipse diversus modus intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad operationem sensitivae partis. Quod de angelo dici non potest. I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. First, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 85, A. 1): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 6, 7; Q. 85, A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel. Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab his quae sunt praeter naturam, non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore. Second, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body. Si vero aliquis dicat quod non est naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sint corporibus unitae. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex eius voluntate; aut ex alia causa. Si ex eius voluntate, videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec voluntas irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri, si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones caeli excedens. Tertio quia videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur, cum ad hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae advenientis, et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter eius naturam; oportet quod hoc sit ex causa violentiam inferente, et sic erit ei poenale et triste. Quod est secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas incorporari propter poenam peccati. Unde cum haec omnia sint inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est quod animae non sunt creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus infunduntur. But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it—this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since nature does not fail in what is necessary. Second, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Third, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur—to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur cessasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni opere, cum dicatur Ioan. V, pater meus usque modo operatur; sed a novis rerum generibus et speciebus condendis, quae in operibus primis non aliquo modo praeextiterint. Sic enim animae quae nunc creantur, praeextiterunt secundum similitudinem speciei in primis operibus, in quibus anima Adae creata fuit. Reply Obj. 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (John 5:17): My Father worketh until now; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam’s soul. Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum individuorum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad numerum specierum. Reply Obj. 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per corporis corruptionem, quae consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera, quia, sicut scriptum est Sap. I, Deus mortem non fecit, sed impii manibus et verbis accersierunt eam. Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wis 1:13, 16): God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them. Quaestio 119 Question 119 De propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus The Propagation of Man as to the Body Deinde considerandum est de propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae. (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature? Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae generationis principium, sit de superfluo alimenti. (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem humanae naturae Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, omne quod in os intrat, in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur. Sed quod emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit. Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Matt 15:17): Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy. But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature. Praeterea, philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem, et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit. Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam, non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the species from flesh belonging to matter; and says that the latter comes and goes. Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. Praeterea, ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae. Obj. 3: Further, the radical humor seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature. Praeterea, si alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri. Obj. 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man’s death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity. Praeterea, si alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Obj. 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Vera Relig., alimenta carnis corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam migrant. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members. But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse. Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being. Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: first, in general according to the species; second, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing’s true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body. Sunt autem quaedam, quorum formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita quod quidquid aliud praeter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature. Sed illa materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the radical humor; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire. Sed haec positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium, omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiae, licet non secundum speciem formae. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem; nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales, esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. But this is unreasonable in many ways. First, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature. Second, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Third, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form. Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourth, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called natural forces, would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible. Unde alii dixerunt quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam, requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec opinio iudicat de materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit aliqua materia formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Second, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. 118, A. 1). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Third, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food. Et ideo, secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de Anima, quod alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro. Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord does not say that the whole of what enters into the mouth, but all—because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod, sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et lapide, ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud secundum materiam. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Reply Obj. 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that just as in things which have their species in matter—for instance, wood or stone—’so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter.’ Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius substituitur. It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis, et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus speciei in radice, quae non tollitur. Reply Obj. 3: The radical humor is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man’s hand or foot is amputated. But the nutritive humor is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed. Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat. Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).