Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum per essentiam videre Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit Deum per essentiam videre. Chrysostomus enim, super Ioannem, exponens illud quod dicitur Ioan. I, Deum nemo vidit unquam, sic dicit, ipsum quod est Deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec Angeli viderunt nec Archangeli, quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter videre poterit quod increabile est? Dionysius etiam, I cap. de Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, neque sensus est eius, neque phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia. Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, No man hath seen God at any time, says: Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable? Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him. Praeterea, omne infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus. Obj. 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. Praeterea, intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi existentium, primum enim quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens. Sed Deus non est existens, sed supra existentia, ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo non est intelligibilis; sed est supra omnem intellectum. Obj. 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect. Praeterea, cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam proportionem, cum cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio intellectus creati ad Deum, quia in infinitum distant. Ergo intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam Dei. Obj. 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, videbimus eum sicuti est. On the contrary, It is written: We shall see Him as He is (1 John 3:2). Respondeo dicendum quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum, sicut sol, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione, propter excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes, quidam posuerunt quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. Sed hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo consistet quam in Deo. Quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quia est ei principium essendi, intantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum ad suum principium attingit. Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. Unde simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant. Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione comprehensionis. Unde praemittit Dionysius immediate ante verba proposita, dicens, omnibus ipse est universaliter incomprehensibilis, et nec sensus est, et cetera. Et Chrysostomus parum post verba praedicta subdit, visionem hic dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam quantam pater habet de filio. Reply Obj. 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, He is universally to all incomprehensible, etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son. Ad secundum dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem Deus est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus patet. Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above (Q. 7, A. 1). Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, inquantum est suum esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci, sed quod omnem cognitionem excedat, quod est ipsum non comprehendi. Reply Obj. 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is not comprehended. Ad quartum dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum. Reply Obj. 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, scimus quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est. Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is (1 John 3:2). Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua Dei similitudo in nobis. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix): When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us. Praeterea, intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu, sicut sensus in actu est sensibile in actu. Hoc autem non est nisi inquantum informatur sensus similitudine rei sensibilis, et intellectus similitudine rei intellectae. Ergo, si Deus ab intellectu creato videtur in actu, oportet quod per aliquam similitudinem videatur. Obj. 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod cum apostolus dicit videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, speculi et aenigmatis nomine, quaecumque similitudines ab ipso significatae intelligi possunt, quae accommodatae sunt ad intelligendum Deum. Sed videre Deum per essentiam non est visio aenigmatica vel specularis, sed contra eam dividitur. Ergo divina essentia non videtur per similitudines. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, We see through a glass and in an enigma, by the terms ‘glass’ and ‘enigma’ certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God. But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude. Respondeo dicendum quod ad visionem, tam sensibilem quam intellectualem, duo requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu; non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus, apparet quod res visa non potest esse in vidente per suam essentiam, sed solum per suam similitudinem, sicut similitudo lapidis est in oculo, per quam fit visio in actu, non autem ipsa substantia lapidis. I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision—viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. Si autem esset una et eadem res, quae esset principium visivae virtutis, et quae esset res visa, oporteret videntem ab illa re et virtutem visivam habere, et formam per quam videret. Manifestum est autem quod Deus et est auctor intellectivae virtutis, et ab intellectu videri potest. Et cum ipsa intellectiva virtus creaturae non sit Dei essentia, relinquitur quod sit aliqua participata similitudo ipsius, qui est primus intellectus. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing. Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum, sive hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de aliqua perfectione superaddita gratiae vel gloriae. Requiritur ergo ad videndum Deum aliqua Dei similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, qua scilicet intellectus sit efficax ad videndum Deum. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. Sed ex parte visae rei, quam necesse est aliquo modo uniri videnti, per nullam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest. Primo quidem, quia, sicut dicit Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., per similitudines inferioris ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci, sicut per speciem corporis non potest cognosci essentia rei incorporeae. Multo igitur minus per speciem creatam quamcumque potest essentia Dei videri. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known; as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secundo, quia essentia Dei est ipsum esse eius, ut supra ostensum est, quod nulli formae creatae competere potest. Non potest igitur aliqua forma creata esse similitudo repraesentans videnti Dei essentiam. Second, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer. Tertio, quia divina essentia est aliquod incircumscriptum, continens in se supereminenter quidquid potest significari vel intelligi ab intellectu creato. Et hoc nullo modo per aliquam speciem creatam repraesentari potest, quia omnis forma creata est determinata secundum aliquam rationem vel sapientiae, vel virtutis, vel ipsius esse, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Unde dicere Deum per similitudinem videri, est dicere divinam essentiam non videri, quod est erroneum. Third, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false. Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen gloriae, confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum, de quo dicitur in Psalmo, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Non autem per aliquam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsam divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est. Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm (35:10), In Thy light we shall see light. The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de similitudine quae est per participationem luminis gloriae. Reply Obj. 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cognitione Dei quae habetur in via. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth. Ad tertium dicendum quod divina essentia est ipsum esse. Unde, sicut aliae formae intelligibiles quae non sunt suum esse, uniuntur intellectui secundum aliquod esse quo informant ipsum intellectum et faciunt ipsum in actu; ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut intellectum in actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu. Reply Obj. 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum essentia Dei videri possit oculo corporali Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei videri possit oculo corporali. Dicitur enim Iob XIX, in carne mea videbo Deum, etc.; et XLII, auditu auris audivi te, nunc autem oculus meus videt te. Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): In my flesh I shall see . . . God, and (Job 42:5), With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, ultimo de civitate Dei, cap. XXIX, vis itaque praepollentior oculorum erit illorum (scilicet glorificatorum), non ut acutius videant quam quidam perhibentur videre serpentes vel aquilae (quantalibet enim acrimonia cernendi eadem animalia vigeant, nihil aliud possunt videre quam corpora), sed ut videant et incorporalia. Quicumque autem potest videre incorporalia, potest elevari ad videndum Deum. Ergo oculus glorificatus potest videre Deum. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29): Those eyes (namely the glorified) will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things. Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God. Praeterea, Deus potest videri ab homine visione imaginaria, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, vidi dominum sedentem super solium, et cetera. Sed visio imaginaria a sensu originem habet, phantasia enim est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo Deus sensibili visione videri potest. Obj. 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, etc. (Isa 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.