Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum intellectus creatus ad videndum essentiam Dei aliquo lumine creato indigeat Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus creatus ad videndum essentiam Dei aliquo lumine creato non indigeat. Illud enim quod est per se lucidum in rebus sensibilibus, alio lumine non indiget ut videatur, ergo nec in intelligibilibus. Sed Deus est lux intelligibilis. Ergo non videtur per aliquod lumen creatum. Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light. Praeterea, cum Deus videtur per medium, non videtur per suam essentiam. Sed cum videtur per aliquod lumen creatum, videtur per medium. Ergo non videtur per suam essentiam. Obj. 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence. Praeterea, illud quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui creaturae esse naturale. Si ergo per aliquod lumen creatum Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud lumen esse naturale alicui creaturae. Et ita illa creatura non indigebit aliquo alio lumine ad videndum Deum, quod est impossibile. Non est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad videndum Dei essentiam lumen superadditum requirat. Obj. 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. On the contrary, It is written: In Thy light we shall see light (Ps 35:10). Respondeo dicendum quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam naturam, sicut, si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur, ad hoc quod elevetur in tantam sublimitatem. I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Cum igitur virtus naturalis intellectus creati non sufficiat ad Dei essentiam videndam, ut ostensum est, oportet quod ex divina gratia superaccrescat ei virtus intelligendi. Et hoc augmentum virtutis intellectivae illuminationem intellectus vocamus; sicut et ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux. Et istud est lumen de quo dicitur Apoc. XXI, quod claritas Dei illuminabit eam, scilicet societatem beatorum Deum videntium. Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes; secundum illud I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (Rev 21:23): The glory of God hath enlightened it—viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made deiform—i.e., like to God, according to the saying: When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is (1 John 3:2). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei essentiam, non quod per hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat, quae secundum se intelligibilis est, sed ad hoc quod intellectus fiat potens ad intelligendum, per modum quo potentia fit potentior ad operandum per habitum, sicut etiam et lumen corporale necessarium est in visu exteriori, inquantum facit medium transparens in actu, ut possit moveri a colore. Reply Obj. 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color. Ad secundum dicendum quod lumen istud non requiritur ad videndum Dei essentiam quasi similitudo in qua Deus videatur, sed quasi perfectio quaedam intellectus, confortans ipsum ad videndum Deum. Et ideo potest dici quod non est medium in quo Deus videatur, sed sub quo videtur. Et hoc non tollit immediatam visionem Dei. Reply Obj. 2: This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God. Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this article. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum videntium essentiam Dei unus alio perfectius videat Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod videntium essentiam Dei unus alio perfectius non videat. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, videbimus eum sicuti est. Sed ipse uno modo est. Ergo uno modo videbitur ab omnibus. Non ergo perfectius et minus perfecte. Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 John 3:2): We shall see Him as He is. But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium qq., quod unam rem non potest unus alio plus intelligere. Sed omnes videntes Deum per essentiam, intelligunt Dei essentiam, intellectu enim videtur Deus, non sensu, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videntium divinam essentiam unus alio non clarius videt. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another. But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was shown above (A. 3). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another. Praeterea, quod aliquid altero perfectius videatur, ex duobus contingere potest, vel ex parte obiecti visibilis; vel ex parte potentiae visivae videntis. Ex parte autem obiecti, per hoc quod obiectum perfectius in vidente recipitur, scilicet secundum perfectiorem similitudinem. Quod in proposito locum non habet, Deus enim non per aliquam similitudinem, sed per eius essentiam praesens est intellectui essentiam eius videnti. Relinquitur ergo quod, si unus alio perfectius eum videat, quod hoc sit secundum differentiam potentiae intellectivae. Et ita sequitur quod cuius potentia intellectiva naturaliter est sublimior, clarius eum videat. Quod est inconveniens, cum hominibus promittatur in beatitudine aequalitas Angelorum. Obj. 3: Further, that anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude. Sed contra est quod vita aeterna in visione Dei consistit, secundum illud Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, et cetera. Ergo, si omnes aequaliter Dei essentiam vident, in vita aeterna omnes erunt aequales. Cuius contrarium dicit Apostolus, I Cor. XV, stella differt a stella in claritate. On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to John 17:3: This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God, etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: Star differs from star in glory (1 Cor 15:41). Respondeo dicendum quod videntium Deum per essentiam unus alio perfectius eum videbit. Quod quidem non erit per aliquam Dei similitudinem perfectiorem in uno quam in alio, cum illa visio non sit futura per aliquam similitudinem, ut ostensum est. Sed hoc erit per hoc, quod intellectus unius habebit maiorem virtutem seu facultatem ad videndum Deum, quam alterius. Facultas autem videndi Deum non competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam, sed per lumen gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate constituit, ut ex superioribus patet. I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of deiformity, as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article. Unde intellectus plus participans de lumine gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem participabit de lumine gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate, quia ubi est maior caritas, ibi est maius desiderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior erit. Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur videbimus eum sicuti est, hoc adverbium sicuti determinat modum visionis ex parte rei visae, ut sit sensus, videbimus eum ita esse sicuti est, quia ipsum esse eius videbimus, quod est eius essentia. Non autem determinat modum visionis ex parte videntis, ut sit sensus, quod ita erit perfectus modus videndi, sicut est in Deo perfectus modus essendi. Reply Obj. 1: In the words, We shall see Him as He is, the conjunction as determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God’s existence. Et per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum. Cum enim dicitur quod rem unam unus alio melius non intelligit, hoc habet veritatem si referatur ad modum rei intellectae, quia quicumque intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit, non vere intelligit. Non autem si referatur ad modum intelligendi, quia intelligere unius est perfectius quam intelligere alterius. Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another. Ad tertium dicendum quod diversitas videndi non erit ex parte obiecti, quia idem obiectum omnibus praesentabitur, scilicet Dei essentia, nec ex diversa participatione obiecti per differentes similitudines, sed erit per diversam facultatem intellectus, non quidem naturalem, sed gloriosam, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all—viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum videntes Deum per essentiam ipsum comprehendant Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend him? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam ipsum comprehendant. Dicit enim Apostolus, Philipp. III, sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam. Non autem frustra sequebatur, dicit enim ipse, I Cor. IX, sic curro, non quasi in incertum. Ergo ipse comprehendit, et eadem ratione alii, quos ad hoc invitat, dicens, sic currite, ut comprehendatis. Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend. But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor 9:26): I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty. Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: So run that you may comprehend. Praeterea, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, illud comprehenditur, quod ita totum videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem. Sed si Deus per essentiam videtur, totus videtur, et nihil eius latet videntem; cum Deus sit simplex. Ergo a quocumque videtur per essentiam, comprehenditur. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer. But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. Si dicatur quod videtur totus, sed non totaliter, contra, totaliter vel dicit modum videntis, vel modum rei visae. Sed ille qui videt Deum per essentiam, videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus rei visae, quia videt eum sicuti est, ut dictum est. Similiter videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus videntis, quia tota virtute sua intellectus Dei essentiam videbit. Quilibet ergo videns Deum per essentiam, totaliter eum videbit. Ergo eum comprehendet. Obj. 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a whole, but not wholly, it may be contrarily urged that wholly refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXXII, fortissime, magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi; magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis cogitatu. Ergo comprehendi non potest. On the contrary, It is written: O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought (Jer 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended. Respondeo dicendum quod comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellectui creato, attingere vero mente Deum qualitercumque, magna est beatitudo, ut dicit Augustinus. I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude, as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxxviii). Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod illud comprehenditur, quod perfecte cognoscitur. Perfecte autem cognoscitur, quod tantum cognoscitur, quantum est cognoscibile. Unde si id quod est cognoscibile per scientiam demonstrativam, opinione teneatur ex aliqua ratione probabili concepta, non comprehenditur. Puta, si hoc quod est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, aliquis sciat per demonstrationem, comprehendit illud, si vero aliquis eius opinionem accipiat probabiliter, per hoc quod a sapientibus vel pluribus ita dicitur, non comprehendet ipsum, quia non pertingit ad illum perfectum modum cognitionis, quo cognoscibilis est. In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probable proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. Nullus autem intellectus creatus pertingere potest ad illum perfectum modum cognitionis divinae essentiae, quo cognoscibilis est. Quod sic patet. Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens actu. Deus igitur, cuius esse est infinitum, ut supra ostensum est, infinite cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest Deum infinite cognoscere. Intantum enim intellectus creatus divinam essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, inquantum maiori vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur. Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum comprehendat. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears—Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7), is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, stricte et proprie, secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehendente. Et sic nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nec intellectu nec aliquo alio, quia, cum sit infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid finitum eum infinite capiat, sicut ipse infinite est. Et sic de comprehensione nunc quaeritur. Reply Obj. 1: Comprehension is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take comprehension. Alio modo comprehensio largius sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Qui enim attingit aliquem, quando iam tenet ipsum, comprehendere eum dicitur. Et sic Deus comprehenditur a beatis, secundum illud Cant. III, tenui eum, nec dimittam. Et sic intelliguntur auctoritates Apostoli de comprehensione. Et hoc modo comprehensio est una de tribus dotibus animae, quae respondet spei; sicut visio fidei, et fruitio caritati. Non enim, apud nos, omne quod videtur, iam tenetur vel habetur, quia videntur interdum distantia, vel quae non sunt in potestate nostra. Neque iterum omnibus quae habemus, fruimur, vel quia non delectamur in eis; vel quia non sunt ultimus finis desiderii nostri, ut desiderium nostrum impleant et quietent. Sed haec tria habent beati in Deo, quia et vident ipsum; et videndo, tenent sibi praesentem, in potestate habentes semper eum videre; et tenentes, fruuntur sicut ultimo fine desiderium implente. But in another sense comprehension is taken more largely as opposed to non-attainment; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, I held him, and I will not let him go (Cant. 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way comprehension is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire. Ad secundum dicendum quod non propter hoc Deus incomprehensibilis dicitur, quasi aliquid eius sit quod non videatur, sed quia non ita perfecte videtur, sicut visibilis est. Sicut cum aliqua demonstrabilis propositio per aliquam probabilem rationem cognoscitur, non est aliquid eius quod non cognoscatur, nec subiectum, nec praedicatum, nec compositio, sed tota non ita perfecte cognoscitur, sicut cognoscibilis est. Unde Augustinus, definiendo comprehensionem, dicit quod totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem; aut cuius fines circumspici possunt, tunc enim fines alicuius circumspiciuntur, quando ad finem in modo cognoscendi illam rem pervenitur. Reply Obj. 2: God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained. Ad tertium dicendum quod totaliter dicit modum obiecti, non quidem ita quod totus modus obiecti non cadat sub cognitione; sed quia modus obiecti non est modus cognoscentis. Qui igitur videt Deum per essentiam, videt hoc in eo, quod infinite existit, et infinite cognoscibilis est; sed hic infinitus modus non competit ei, ut scilicet ipse infinite cognoscat, sicut aliquis probabiliter scire potest aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, licet ipse eam demonstrative non cognoscat. Reply Obj. 3: The word wholly denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God’s essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated. Articulus 8 Article 8