Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem Whether this name ‘God’ is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem; sed Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur. Objection 1: It seems that this name God is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: An idol is not God, contradicts a pagan who says: An idol is God. Therefore God in both senses is spoken of univocally. Praeterea, sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem, ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem. Obj. 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name beatitude is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name God is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion. Praeterea, univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique. Obj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: There is one God, he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: An idol is God. Therefore this name God is applied univocally to both. Sed contra, illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur. On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word animal applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name God applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally. Praeterea, nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem. Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name God is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina; huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et medicina factiva. I answer that, This name God in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, being which is applied to substance is placed in the definition of being as applied to accident; and healthy applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus, secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde manifestum est quod analogice dicitur. The same applies to the question at issue. For this name God, as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo, de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo. Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud. Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum, non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, omnes dii gentium Daemonia. Reply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name man, of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name man we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name man what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name God to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, All the gods of the Gentiles are demons (Ps 95:5). Et similiter dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum diversam significationem. The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations. Ad quartum dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis. Reply Obj. 4: The term animal applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments. Ad quintum dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum significationem ignoramus. Reply Obj. 5 : Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name God in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not. Articulus 11 Article 11 Utrum hoc nomen qui est sit maxime proprium nomen Dei Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile, ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile. Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei. Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name God is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod boni nominatio est manifestativa omnium Dei processionum. Sed hoc maxime Deo convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God. But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name good is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS. Praeterea, omne nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei. Obj. 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God. Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, si dixerint mihi, quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis? Et respondit ei dominus, sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos. Ergo hoc nomen qui est est maxime proprium nomen Dei. On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them? The Lord answered him, Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you (Exod 3:13, 14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei. I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons: Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. 3, A. 4), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. Secundo, propter eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum. Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae infinitum. Second, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance. Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the infinite ocean of substance. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione. Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit Augustinus in V de Trin. Third, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton, quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem. Reply Obj. 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name God, as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name God is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute praeintelligitur causae. Reply Obj. 2: This name good is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est. Reply Obj. 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS. Articulus 12 Article 12 Utrum propositiones affirmativae possunt formari de Deo Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem incompactae. Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod forma simplex subiectum esse non potest. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that a simple form cannot be a subject. But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God. Praeterea, omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo formari non possit. Obj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made. Sed contra est quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus, et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. Respondeo dicendum quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. Et hoc patet tam in propositionibusquae sunt de praedicato accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et differunt ratione, alia enim et ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico animal, illud enim ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, sed diversa ratione. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that man and white are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, man is an animal, since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same suppositum there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to suppositum, but different as to idea. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum intelectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam forma in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluritas praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the suppositum what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the suppositum; according to the saying that predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially. To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per compositionem. God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.