Articulus 12 Article 12 Utrum propositiones affirmativae possunt formari de Deo Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem incompactae. Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod forma simplex subiectum esse non potest. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that a simple form cannot be a subject. But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God. Praeterea, omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo formari non possit. Obj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made. Sed contra est quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus, et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. Respondeo dicendum quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. Et hoc patet tam in propositionibusquae sunt de praedicato accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et differunt ratione, alia enim et ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico animal, illud enim ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, sed diversa ratione. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that man and white are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, man is an animal, since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same suppositum there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to suppositum, but different as to idea. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum intelectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam forma in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluritas praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the suppositum what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the suppositum; according to the saying that predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially. To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per compositionem. God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem, inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, incongruous, inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid. Reply Obj. 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it. Ad tertium dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito, quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis, sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans compositionem de Deo. Reply Obj. 3: This proposition, The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false, can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb otherwise determines the word understanding on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God. De operationibus Divinis The Divine Operations Quaestio 14 Question 14 De scientia Dei God’s Knowledge Post considerationem eorum quae ad divinam substantiam pertinent, restat considerandum de his quae pertinent ad operationem ipsius. Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God’s operation. Et quia operatio quaedam est quae manet in operante, quaedam vero quae procedit in exteriorem effectum, primo agemus de scientia et voluntate (nam intelligere in intelligente est, et velle in volente); et postmodum de potentia Dei, quae consideratur ut principium operationis divinae in effectum exteriorem procedentis. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Quia vero intelligere quoddam vivere est, post considerationem divinae scientiae, considerandum erit de vita divina. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider the divine life. Et quia scientia verorum est, erit etiam considerandum de veritate et falsitate. And as knowledge concerns truth, we consider truth and falsehood. Rursum, quia omne cognitum in cognoscente est, rationes autem rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente, ideae vocantur, cum consideratione scientiae erit etiam adiungenda consideratio de ideis. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas. Circa scientiam vero quaeruntur sexdecim. Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry: Primo, utrum in Deo sit scientia. (1) Whether there is knowledge in God? Secundo, utrum Deus intelligat seipsum. (2) Whether God understands Himself? Tertio, utrum comprehendat se. (3) Whether He comprehends Himself? Quarto, utrum suum intelligere sit sua substantia. (4) Whether His understanding is His substance? Quinto, utrum intelligat alia a se. (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself? Sexto, utrum habeat de eis propriam cognitionem. (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them? Septimo, utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva. (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? Octavo, utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum. (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? Nono, utrum scientia Dei sit eorum quae non sunt. (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things? Decimo, utrum sit malorum. (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil? Undecimo, utrum sit singularium. (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things? Duodecimo, utrum sit infinitorum. (12) Whether He knows the infinite? Decimotertio, utrum sit contingentium futurorum. (13) Whether He knows future contingent things? Decimoquarto, utrum sit enuntiabilium. (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?