Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in praedicationibus oporteat aequivoca ad univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus agens non univocum ex necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non univocum est causa universalis totius speciei, ut sol est causa generationis omnium hominum. Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis totius speciei (alioquin esset causa sui ipsius, cum sub specie contineatur), sed est causa particularis respectu huius individui, quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis totius speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est prior particulari. Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens. Reply Obj. 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. 4, A. 3). Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non est mensura proportionata mensuratis. Unde non oportet quod Deus et creaturae sub uno genere contineantur. Reply Obj. 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus. Ea vero quae sunt in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce. The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc illud nominamus; cum nomina, secundum philosophum, sint signa intellectuum. Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo nomina a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam Deo. Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since names, as the Philosopher says, are signs of ideas. But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom., Deum ex creaturis nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in Deum, per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi. Ergo omnia nomina quae de Deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius de creaturis quam de Deo dicuntur. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): We name God from creatures. But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as lion, stone, and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God. Praeterea, omnia nomina quae communiter de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed quod dicitur de aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur, per prius enim dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo. Obj. 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for healthy is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. III, flecto genua mea ad patrem domini nostri Iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius de Deo quam de creaturis dicuntur. On the contrary, It is written, I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named (Eph 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures. Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis. I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of healthy which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal’s health. Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo, nihil aliud significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de Deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet quod, secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as smiling applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of lion applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. De aliis autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset etiam eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam posuerunt. Sic enim. Cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset quam Deus est causa bonitatis creaturae, et sic hoc nomen bonum, dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae. Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, God is good, it would then only mean God is the cause of the creature’s goodness; thus the term good applied to God would include in its meaning the creature’s goodness. Hence good would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. Sed supra ostensum est quod huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi habent qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est. But as was shown above (A. 2), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, God is good, or wise, signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem nominis. Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above. Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si huiusmodi nomina solum de Deo causaliter dicerentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de medicina. Reply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as healthy is applied to medicine. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, dicantur de Deo ex tempore Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, non dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Omnia enim huiusmodi nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. Unde et Ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis, quae est divina substantia, et creator significat Dei actionem, quae est eius essentia. Sed divina substantia non est temporalis, sed aeterna. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sed ab aeterno. Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De Fide i) that this name Lord is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and Creator signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally. Praeterea, cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest dici factum, quod enim ex tempore est album, fit album. Sed Deo non convenit esse factum. Ergo de Deo nihil praedicatur ex tempore. Obj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to be made does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally. Praeterea, si aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore propter hoc quod important relationem ad creaturas, eadem ratio videtur de omnibus quae relationem ad creaturas important. Sed quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturas, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, ab aeterno enim scivit creaturam et dilexit, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, in caritate perpetua dilexi te. Ergo et alia nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, ut dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno. Obj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: I have loved thee with an everlasting love (Jer 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as Lord and Creator, are applied to God from eternity. Praeterea, huiusmodi nomina relationem significant. Oportet igitur quod relatio illa vel sit aliquid in Deo, vel in creatura tantum. Sed non potest esse quod sit in creatura tantum, quia sic Deus denominaretur dominus a relatione opposita, quae est in creaturis; nihil autem denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod relatio est etiam aliquid in Deo. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse ex tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi nomina non dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Obj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called Lord from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally. Praeterea, secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative, puta secundum dominium dominus, sicut secundum albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio dominii non est in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter dominus, quod patet esse falsum. Obj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false. Praeterea, in relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse, altero non existente, sicut scibile existit, non existente scientia, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed relativa quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, non sunt simul natura. Ergo potest aliquid dici relative de Deo ad creaturam, etiam creatura non existente. Et sic huiusmodi nomina, dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et non ex tempore. Obj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names Lord and Creator are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, V de Trin., quod haec relativa appellatio dominus Deo convenit ex tempore. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation Lord is applied to God temporally. Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore de Deo dicuntur, et non ab aeterno. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed rationis tantum. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem. Veruntamen sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity. To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens; quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing is the same as itself. For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between being and non-being formed by reason, apprehending non-being as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like. Quaedam vero relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque extremum, res naturae, quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique. Sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia. Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like. Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis, et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa. Et similiter dextrum non dicitur de columna, nisi inquantum ponitur animali ad dextram, unde huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali. Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, on the right is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Et sic nihil prohibet huiusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, praedicari de Deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem ipsius, sed propter creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali translato. Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur et circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. Nam quaedam significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut dominus. Et huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. Quaedam vero significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant actionem Dei, quae est eius essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex tempore de Deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte. Reply Obj. 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as master and servant, father, and son, and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as Lord, and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as Savior, Creator, and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporally so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut relationes quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, non sunt in Deo nisi secundum rationem, ita nec fieri nec factum esse dicitur de Deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa ipsum existente, sicut est id, domine refugium factus es nobis. Reply Obj. 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, to become or to be made are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, Lord, Thou art become our refuge (Ps 89:1). Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante, et ideo nomina quae significant relationes consequentes actionem intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno. Quae vero consequuntur actiones procedentes, secundum modum intelligendi, ad exteriores effectus, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi. Reply Obj. 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator; therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as Savior, Creator, and the like. Ad quartum dicendum quod relationes significatae per huiusmodi nomina quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum, oppositae autem relationes in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est inconveniens quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re, Deus denominetur, tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per intellectum nostrum oppositae relationes in Deo. Ut sic Deus dicatur relative ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia refertur ad ipsum. Reply Obj. 4: Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it. Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam, qua creatura refertur ad ipsum; cum relatio subiectionis realiter sit in creatura, sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed realiter sit dominus. Eo enim modo dicitur dominus, quo creatura ei subiecta est. Reply Obj. 5: Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.