Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus non sit nomen naturae. Dicit enim Damascenus, in I libro, quod Deus dicitur a theein, quod est currere, et fovere universa; vel ab aethein, idest ardere (Deus enim noster ignis consumens est omnem malitiam); vel a theasthai, quod est considerare, omnia. Haec autem omnia ad operationem pertinent. Ergo hoc nomen Deus operationem significat, et non naturam. Objection 1: It seems that this name, God, is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that God (Theos) is so called from theein which means to take care of, and to cherish all things; or from aithein that is, to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from theasthai, which means to consider all things. But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name God signifies His operation and not His nature. Praeterea, secundum hoc aliquid nominatur a nobis, secundum quod cognoscitur. Sed divina natura est nobis ignota. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non significat naturam divinam. Obj. 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name God does not signify the divine nature. Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro I de fide, quod Deus est nomen naturae. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that God is a name of the nature. Respondeo dicendum quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus, ita substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius operatione vel proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum. I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g., we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone’s substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same. Quia igitur Deus non est notus nobis in sui natura, sed innotescit nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus eius, ex his possumus eum nominare, ut supra dictum est. Unde hoc nomen Deus est nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum. Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali rerum providentia, omnes enim loquentes de Deo, hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet providentiam universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, XII cap. de Div. Nom., quod deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et bonitate perfecta. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam. Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in A. 1; hence this name God is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii), The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness. But taken from this operation, this name God is imposed to signify the divine nature. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia quae posuit Damascenus, pertinent ad providentiam, a qua imponitur hoc nomen Deus ad significandum. Reply Obj. 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name God. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius proprietate possumus cognoscere secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est lapis, hoc nomen lapis ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se est, significat, significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam scimus quid est lapis. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Reply Obj. 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name stone signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Sed ex effectibus divinis divinam naturam non possumus cognoscere secundum quod in se est, ut sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminentiae et causalitatis et negationis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat naturam divinam. Impositum est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et remotum ab omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes Deum. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (Q. 12, A. 12). Thus the name God signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this. Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile Whether this name ‘God’ is communicable? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile. Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II Pet. I, magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc efficiamur divinae consortes naturae. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile. Objection 1: It seems that this name God is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name God signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, He hath given us great and precious promises, that by these we may be made partakers of the divine nature (2 Pet 1:4). Therefore this name God can be communicated to others. Praeterea, sola nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, ego dixi, dii estis. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile. Obj. 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name God is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, I have said, You are gods (Ps 81:6). Therefore this name God is communicable. Praeterea, hoc nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus est communicabile. Obj. 3: Further, this name God comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as good, wise, and the like. Therefore this name God is communicable. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile. On the contrary, It is written: They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones (Wis 14:21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name God is incommunicable. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo, proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones dicuntur. I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to something that is included in the signification of the name. For instance this name lion is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as lion; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest intelligi ut in pluribus existens. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet fortitudinem. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called Achilles metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde, quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any suppositum, but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some suppositum. Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures. Unde, cum hoc nomen Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est; natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, his qui natura non sunt dii, serviebatis; Glossa, non sunt dii natura, sed opinione hominum. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, ego dixi, dii estis. Since, then, this name God is given to signify the divine nature as stated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3), it follows that this name God is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name sun would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: You served them who by nature are not gods, (Gal 4:8), and a gloss adds, Gods not in nature, but in human opinion. Nevertheless this name God is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, I have said, You are gods (Ps 81:6). Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc individuum. But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His suppositum, accordingly as He is considered as this something, that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum similitudinis participationem. Reply Obj. 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis. Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc nomine sol. Reply Obj. 2: This name God is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name sun. Ad tertium dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue, ad significandum divinam naturam. Reply Obj. 3: These names good, wise, and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name God is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem Whether this name ‘God’ is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem; sed Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur. Objection 1: It seems that this name God is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: An idol is not God, contradicts a pagan who says: An idol is God. Therefore God in both senses is spoken of univocally. Praeterea, sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem, ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem. Obj. 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name beatitude is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name God is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion. Praeterea, univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique. Obj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: There is one God, he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: An idol is God. Therefore this name God is applied univocally to both. Sed contra, illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur. On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word animal applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name God applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally. Praeterea, nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem. Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name God is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina; huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et medicina factiva. I answer that, This name God in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, being which is applied to substance is placed in the definition of being as applied to accident; and healthy applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus, secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde manifestum est quod analogice dicitur. The same applies to the question at issue. For this name God, as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo, de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo. Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud. Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum, non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, omnes dii gentium Daemonia. Reply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name man, of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name man we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name man what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name God to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, All the gods of the Gentiles are demons (Ps 95:5). Et similiter dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum diversam significationem. The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations. Ad quartum dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis. Reply Obj. 4: The term animal applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments. Ad quintum dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum significationem ignoramus. Reply Obj. 5 : Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name God in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.