Articulus 13 Article 13 Utrum scientia Dei sit futurorum contingentium Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium. Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. Praeterea, omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute, consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster. probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum. Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo, est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium. Obj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, If God knew that this thing will be, it will be, for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. Praeterea, omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum contingens futurum est scitum a Deo. Obj. 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, qui finxit singillatim corda eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum, scilicet hominum. Sed opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta. Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 32:15), He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works, i.e., of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus contingentia futura cognoscat. I answer that, Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creatures; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus, sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem cognitionem. In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis comparata. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do; but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit necessaria. Reply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia, licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur quandoque. Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, God knew this contingent to be future, is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est. Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens, contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, Socrates is a white man. But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, God knew this contingent to be future, contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nec tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem, si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, if the sun moves, the grass will grow. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae, consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid, illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso. Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit, consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae, scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est, sicut et antecedens, quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est esse, ut dicitur in I Periherm. Therefore we must reply otherwise, that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, What the soul understands is immaterial, this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, If God knew anything, it will be, the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e., as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute, secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit, est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est necessarium. Reply Obj. 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, Everything known by God must necessarily be, is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, Everything which God knows is necessary. If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, This proposition, ‘that which is known by God is’ is necessary. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album, quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur, potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est intelligibile. Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, It is possible for a white thing to be black, it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, a white thing is black, can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, A black crow can be white; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be not known. This objection, however, would hold if these words that which is known implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known. Articulus 14 Article 14 Utrum Deus cognoscat enuntiabilia Whether God knows enunciable things? Ad decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia. Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. Praeterea, omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia. Obj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, dominus scit cogitationes hominum. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia. On the contrary, It is written: The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men (Ps 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri; Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia quae formari possunt. I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis accidere possunt. Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is God’s essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium. Reply Obj. 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things. Ad secundum dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei, et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur. Reply Obj. 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation. Articulus 15 Article 15 Utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis Whether the knowledge of God is variable? Ad decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum. Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures. Praeterea, quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et diminutionem. Obj. 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution. Praeterea, Deus scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum, quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit, scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis. Obj. 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. I, quod apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque vicissitudinis obumbratio. On the contrary, It is said, that in God there is no change nor shadow of alteration (Jas 1:17). Respondeo dicendum quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet; sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse. I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 4), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo, quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in seipsis autem variabiliter. Reply Obj. 1: Lord, Creator and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner, while they exist variably in themselves. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de Deo. We may also say that Lord, Creator and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But knowledge and love, and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit. Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret, esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea sciat. Reply Obj. 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew. Ad tertium dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile, Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera, quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Reply Obj. 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say Christ is born and will be born and was born; because the same thing is signified by these three—viz., the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, Socrates sits, is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up.