Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Deus comprehendat seipsum Whether God comprehends himself? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non comprehendat seipsum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod id quod comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Sed Deus est omnibus modis infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se. Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself. But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself. Si dicatur quod Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum, quam infinitum. Quod est contra prius determinata. Non ergo Deus comprehendit seipsum. Obj. 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit ibidem, omne quod intelligit se, comprehendit se. Sed Deus intelligit se. Ergo comprehendit se. On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself. But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis ipsius, et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte, sicut cognoscibilis est. Sicut propositio demonstrabilis comprehenditur, quando scitur per demonstrationem, non autem quando cognoscitur per aliquam rationem probabilem. Manifestum est autem quod Deus ita perfecte cognoscit seipsum, sicut perfecte cognoscibilis est. Est enim unumquodque cognoscibile secundum modum sui actus, non enim cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Tanta est autem virtus Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo, quia per hoc quod actu est, et ab omni materia et potentia separatus, Deus cognoscitivus est, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc seipsum perfecte comprehendit. I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality, since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above (AA. 1, 2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod comprehendere, si proprie accipiatur, significat aliquid habens et includens alterum. Et sic oportet quod omne comprehensum sit finitum, sicut omne inclusum. Non sic autem comprehendi dicitur Deus a seipso, ut intellectus suus sit aliud quam ipse, et capiat ipsum et includat. Sed huiusmodi locutiones per negationem sunt exponendae. Sicut enim Deus dicitur esse in seipso, quia a nullo exteriori continetur; ita dicitur comprehendi a seipso, quia nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum; dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum, quod totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem. Reply Obj. 1: The strict meaning of comprehension signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deus finitus est sibi, intelligendum est secundum quandam similitudinem proportionis; quia sic se habet in non excedendo intellectum suum, sicut se habet aliquod finitum in non excedendo intellectum finitum. Non autem sic dicitur Deus sibi finitus, quod ipse intelligat se esse aliquid finitum. Reply Obj. 2: When it is said, God is finite to Himself, this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius substantia Whether the act of God’s intellect is his substance? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ipsum intelligere Dei non sit eius substantia. Intelligere enim est quaedam operatio. Operatio autem aliquid significat procedens ab operante. Ergo ipsum intelligere Dei non est ipsa Dei substantia. Objection 1: It seems that the act of God’s intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His substance. Praeterea, cum aliquis intelligit se intelligere, hoc non est intelligere aliquid magnum vel principale intellectum, sed intelligere quoddam secundarium et accessorium. Si igitur Deus sit ipsum intelligere, intelligere Deum erit sicut cum intelligimus intelligere. Et sic non erit aliquid magnum intelligere Deum. Obj. 2: Further, to understand one’s act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus God’s act of understanding will not be something great. Praeterea, omne intelligere est aliquid intelligere. Cum ergo Deus intelligit se, si ipsemet non est aliud quam suum intelligere, intelligit se intelligere, et intelligere se intelligere se, et sic in infinitum. Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia. Obj. 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His substance. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., Deo hoc est esse, quod sapientem esse. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere. Ergo Deo hoc est esse, quod intelligere. Sed esse Dei est eius substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere Dei est eius substantia. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), In God to be is the same as to be wise. But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God’s existence is His substance, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore the act of God’s intellect is His substance. Respondeo dicendum quod est necesse dicere quod intelligere Dei est eius substantia. Nam si intelligere Dei sit aliud quam eius substantia, oporteret, ut dicit Philosophus in XII Metaphys., quod aliquid aliud esset actus et perfectio substantiae divinae, ad quod se haberet substantia divina sicut potentia ad actum, quod est omnino impossibile, nam intelligere est perfectio et actus intelligentis. I answer that, It must be said that the act of God’s intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Hoc autem qualiter sit, considerandum est. Sicut enim supra dictum est, intelligere non est actio progrediens ad aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in operante sicut actus et perfectio eius, prout esse est perfectio existentis, sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem. In Deo autem non est forma quae sit aliud quam suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde, cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis, ut dictum est, ex necessitate sequitur quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius essentia et eius esse. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above (A. 2), to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above (Q. 3). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. Et sic patet ex omnibus praemissis quod in Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur, et species intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere, sunt omnino unum et idem. Unde patet quod per hoc quod Deus dicitur intelligens, nulla multiplicitas ponitur in eius substantia. Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intelligere non est operatio exiens ab ipso operante, sed manens in ipso. Reply Obj. 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum intelligitur illud intelligere quod non est subsistens, non intelligitur aliquid magnum; sicut cum intelligimus intelligere nostrum. Et ideo non est simile de ipso intelligere divino, quod est subsistens. Reply Obj. 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent. Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium. Nam intelligere divinum, quod est in seipso subsistens, est sui ipsius; et non alicuius alterius, ut sic oporteat procedere in infinitum. Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another’s; hence it need not proceed to infinity. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se Whether God knows things other than himself? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium qu., quod neque quidquam Deus extra seipsum intuetur. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se. Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that God does not behold anything out of Himself. Therefore He does not know things other than Himself. Praeterea, intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod est impossibile. Obj. 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible. Praeterea, ipsum intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius, quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a se. Obj. 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself. Sed contra est quod dicitur Hebr. IV, omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius. On the contrary, It is written: All things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb 4:13). Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod Deus alia a se cognoscat. I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (Q. 2, A. 3), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the very existence of the first effective cause—viz., God—is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. Ad sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri. Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso. So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself, inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in seipso, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God sees nothing outside Himself is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, lapis enim non est in anima, sed species eius, ut dicitur in III De Anima. Ea vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia Dei. Reply Obj. 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For a stone is not in the soul, but its image. Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam. Reply Obj. 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se propria cognitione Whether God knows things other than himself by proper knowledge? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo, sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A. 5), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.