Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo antequam fiat. Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, Whom He called, them He also justified, etc.: A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists. Praeterea, posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae sint ab aeterno. Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal. Praeterea, scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum. Obj. 3: Further, The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., universas creaturas, et spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo sunt, quia novit. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are. Respondeo dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis, inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action, as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari scientia approbationis. Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the knowledge of approbation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae, cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus sciat. But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause of why God knows them. Ad secundum dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen quod creaturae sint ab aeterno. Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. Ad tertium dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam facta capit. Reply Obj. 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built. Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum Deus habeat scientiam non entium Whether God has knowledge of things that are not? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium. Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium. Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But truth and being are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not. Praeterea, scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum, qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a Deo. Obj. 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God. Praeterea, scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet scientiam de non entibus. Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not. Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt. On the contrary, The Apostle says: Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are (Rom 4:17). Respondeo dicendum quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. Sed horum quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum extra videntem. Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God’s act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God’s power, or the creature’s, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic sciuntur a Deo. Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est, inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a Deo. Reply Obj. 2: Since God is very being, everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God, as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act. Ad tertium dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta. Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse possint. Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will, is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that whatever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum Deus cognoscat mala Whether God knows evil things? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III De Anima, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni, ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But evil is the privation of good, as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that God does not know evil things. Praeterea, omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum. Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things. Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo Deus non cognoscit mala. Obj. 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. Praeterea, quod cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur. Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente. Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum. Obj. 4: Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things. Sed contra est quod dicitur Proverb. XV, Infernus et perditio coram Deo. On the contrary, It is written (Prov 15:11), Hell and destruction are before God. Respondeo dicendum quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus per semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras quam a lumine. I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum oppositum. Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good. Ad secundum dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, per quod cognoscitur malum. Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei; quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita cognoscit. Reply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil, it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils. Ad quartum dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per bonum. Reply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good. 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