Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum Deus habeat scientiam non entium Whether God has knowledge of things that are not? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium. Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium. Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But truth and being are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not. Praeterea, scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum, qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a Deo. Obj. 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God. Praeterea, scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet scientiam de non entibus. Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not. Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt. On the contrary, The Apostle says: Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are (Rom 4:17). Respondeo dicendum quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. Sed horum quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum extra videntem. Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God’s act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God’s power, or the creature’s, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic sciuntur a Deo. Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est, inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a Deo. Reply Obj. 2: Since God is very being, everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God, as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act. Ad tertium dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta. Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse possint. Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will, is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that whatever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum Deus cognoscat mala Whether God knows evil things? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III De Anima, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni, ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But evil is the privation of good, as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that God does not know evil things. Praeterea, omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum. Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things. Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo Deus non cognoscit mala. Obj. 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. Praeterea, quod cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur. Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente. Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum. Obj. 4: Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things. Sed contra est quod dicitur Proverb. XV, Infernus et perditio coram Deo. On the contrary, It is written (Prov 15:11), Hell and destruction are before God. Respondeo dicendum quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus per semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras quam a lumine. I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum oppositum. Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good. Ad secundum dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, per quod cognoscitur malum. Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei; quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita cognoscit. Reply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil, it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils. Ad quartum dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per bonum. Reply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good. Articulus 11 Article 11 Utrum Deus cognoscat singularia Whether God knows singular things? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia. Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem, non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II De Anima, ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium. Ergo Deus non cognoscit singularia. Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things. Therefore God does not know singular things. Praeterea, illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus non cognoscit singularia. Obj. 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things. Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo, quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus. Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia. Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things. Sed contra est quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, omnes viae hominum patent oculis eius. On the contrary, It is written (Prov 16:2), All the ways of a man are open to His eyes. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia cognoscat. Nam et Philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra Empedoclem arguit, in I De Anima et in III Metaphys., quod accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia; Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect. Sed qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae, quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur, non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate. Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in their singularity. Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est. Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit. On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold, forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence this application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei, inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur; necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. 44, A. 2), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia, non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia. Reply Obj. 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et materialia, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things. Ad tertium dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet, similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse. Reply Obj. 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.