Utrum omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae in ipso
Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo, quia sequeretur malum esse in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae.
Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
Praeterea, Deus cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed horum non sunt ideae, quia dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod exemplaria sunt divinae voluntates, determinativae et effectivae rerum. Ergo non omnium quae a Deo cognoscuntur, sunt ideae in ipso.
Obj. 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things. Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Praeterea, Deus cognoscit materiam primam, quae non potest habere ideam, cum nullam habeat formam. Ergo idem quod prius.
Obj. 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Praeterea, constat quod Deus scit non solum species, sed etiam genera et singularia et accidentia. Sed horum non sunt ideae, secundum positionem Platonis, qui primus ideas introduxit, ut dicit Augustinus. Non ergo omnium cognitorum a Deo sunt ideae in ipso.
Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato’s teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
Sed contra, ideae sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet. Sed omnium quae cognoscit, Deus habet proprias rationes. Ergo omnium quae cognoscit, habet ideam.
On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.
Respondeo dicendum quod, cum ideae a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et generationis ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea, prout in mente divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium factionis rerum, exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet. Secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur ratio; et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativam pertinere. Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus. Secundum vero quod principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscuntur a Deo, etiam si nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quae a Deo cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et secundum quod cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis.
I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an exemplar, and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a type, and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem, sed per rationem boni. Et ideo malum non habet in Deo ideam, neque secundum quod idea est exemplar, neque secundum quod est ratio.
Reply Obj. 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an exemplar nor as a type.
Ad secundum dicendum quod eorum quae neque sunt neque erunt neque fuerunt, Deus non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu eorum non est idea in Deo, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, sed solum secundum quod significat rationem.
Reply Obj. 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an exemplar but only in so far as it denotes a type.
Ad tertium dicendum quod Plato, secundum quosdam, posuit materiam non creatam, et ideo non posuit ideam esse materiae, sed materiae concausam. Sed quia nos ponimus materiam creatam a Deo, non tamen sine forma, habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea compositi. Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est.
Reply Obj. 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.
Ad quartum dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae inseparabiliter concomitantur subiectum, quia haec simul fiunt cum subiecto. Accidentia autem quae superveniunt subiecto, specialem ideam habent. Artifex enim per formam domus facit omnia accidentia quae a principio concomitantur domum, sed ea quae superveniunt domui iam factae, ut picturae vel aliquid aliud, facit per aliquam aliam formam. Individua vero, secundum Platonem, non habebant aliam ideam quam ideam speciei, tum quia singularia individuantur per materiam, quam ponebat esse increatam, ut quidam dicunt, et concausam ideae; tum quia intentio naturae consistit in speciebus, nec particularia producit, nisi ut in eis species salventur. Sed providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species, sed ad singularia, ut infra dicetur.
Reply Obj. 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an exemplar; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species, but to individuals as will be shown later (Q. 22, A. 3).
Quoniam autem scientia verorum est, post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est.
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth.
Circa quam quaeruntur octo.
About this there are eight points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel tantum in intellectu.
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu componente et dividente.
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens.
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
Quinto, utrum Deus sit veritas.
(5) Whether God is truth?
Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus.
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis.
(7) On the eternity of truth.
Octavo, de incommutabilitate ipsius.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
Utrum veritas sit tantum in intellectu
Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc, lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere, quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, That is true which is seen, since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know, for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: That is true which is. It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.
Praeterea, quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur, quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.
Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, ut patet I Poster. Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera vel falsa, secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis. Ergo veritas magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.
Obj. 3: Further, that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so, as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili, sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu. Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni, ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum.
I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.
Res autem intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se, vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad intellectum a quo non dependet.
Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
Iudicium autem de re non sumitur secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium.
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect’s mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle.
Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus, in libro De Vera Relig., dicit quod veritas est, qua ostenditur id quod est. Et Hilarius dicit quod verum est declarativum aut manifestativum esse. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig., veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis; nam rectum est, quod principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, veritas uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.
Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is; and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that Truth makes being clear and evident and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine’s definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle: also Anselm’s definition (De Verit. xii), Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna’s definition (Metaph. viii, 6), The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it. The definition that Truth is the equation of thought and thing is applicable to it under either aspect.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Ad secundum dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu, et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae Philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione ad intellectum divinum.
Reply Obj. 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.