Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum verum et ens convertantur Whether the true and being are convertible terms? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in rebus. Ergo non convertuntur. Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated (A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. Praeterea, id quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse, et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur. Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible. Praeterea, quae se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia. Obj. 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible. Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III De Anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum. I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that the soul is in some manner all things, through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione. Reply Obj. 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (A. 1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde verum fundatur in ente , inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis, apprehensum scilicet a ratione. Reply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason. Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens, intelligitur verum. Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also, since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum Whether good is logically prior to the true? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est secundum rationem quam verum. Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true. Praeterea, bonum est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum. Obj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true is in the intellect composing and dividing as said above (A. 2). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. Praeterea, veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum. Obj. 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true. Sed contra, quod est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo verum est prius quam bonum. On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good. Respondeo dicendum quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum secundum rationem. I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Second, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non autem quod sit prius simpliciter. Reply Obj. 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely. Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus. Reply Obj. 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; second, it apprehends that it understands being; and third, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things. Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem communem. Reply Obj. 3: The virtue which is called truth is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to life is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things (A. 1). Whereas the truth of justice is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum Deus sit veritas Whether God is truth? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit veritas. Veritas enim consistit in compositione et divisione intellectus. Sed in Deo non est compositio et divisio. Ergo non est ibi veritas. Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth. Praeterea, veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., est similitudo principii. Sed Dei non est similitudo ad principium. Ergo in Deo non est veritas. Obj. 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), is a likeness to the principle. But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth. Praeterea, quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium, sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod patet esse falsum. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being, and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false. Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. On the contrary, Our Lord says, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life (John 14:6). Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas. I answer that, As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is, and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam iudicat de omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu eius est veritas. Reply Obj. 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect. Ad secundum dicendum quod verum intellectus nostri est secundum quod conformatur suo principio, scilicet rebus, a quibus cognitionem accipit. Veritas etiam rerum est secundum quod conformantur suo principio, scilicet intellectui divino. Sed hoc, proprie loquendo, non potest dici in veritate divina, nisi forte secundum quod veritas appropriatur filio, qui habet principium. Sed si de veritate essentialiter dicta loquamur, non potest intelligi, nisi resolvatur affirmativa in negativam, sicut cum dicitur, pater est a se, quia non est ab alio. Et similiter dici potest similitudo principii veritas divina, inquantum esse suum non est suo intellectui dissimile. Reply Obj. 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another. Similarly, the divine truth can be called a likeness to the principle, inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect. Ad tertium dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem apprehensio intellectus a Deo est, unde quidquid est veritatis in hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia accidentis. Reply Obj. 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement—‘that a person commits fornication is true’—is entirely from God. But to argue, Therefore that this person fornicates is from God, is a fallacy of Accident. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana, nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem, et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est alia veritas quam Deus. Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God. Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God. Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera sunt. Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv) that, as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things. But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum. On the contrary, it is written (Ps 11:2), Truths are decayed from among the children of men. Respondeo dicendum quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, illud autem significat sanitatem. I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health.