Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum Deus sit veritas Whether God is truth? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit veritas. Veritas enim consistit in compositione et divisione intellectus. Sed in Deo non est compositio et divisio. Ergo non est ibi veritas. Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth. Praeterea, veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., est similitudo principii. Sed Dei non est similitudo ad principium. Ergo in Deo non est veritas. Obj. 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), is a likeness to the principle. But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth. Praeterea, quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium, sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod patet esse falsum. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being, and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false. Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. On the contrary, Our Lord says, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life (John 14:6). Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas. I answer that, As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is, and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam iudicat de omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu eius est veritas. Reply Obj. 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect. Ad secundum dicendum quod verum intellectus nostri est secundum quod conformatur suo principio, scilicet rebus, a quibus cognitionem accipit. Veritas etiam rerum est secundum quod conformantur suo principio, scilicet intellectui divino. Sed hoc, proprie loquendo, non potest dici in veritate divina, nisi forte secundum quod veritas appropriatur filio, qui habet principium. Sed si de veritate essentialiter dicta loquamur, non potest intelligi, nisi resolvatur affirmativa in negativam, sicut cum dicitur, pater est a se, quia non est ab alio. Et similiter dici potest similitudo principii veritas divina, inquantum esse suum non est suo intellectui dissimile. Reply Obj. 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another. Similarly, the divine truth can be called a likeness to the principle, inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect. Ad tertium dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem apprehensio intellectus a Deo est, unde quidquid est veritatis in hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia accidentis. Reply Obj. 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement—‘that a person commits fornication is true’—is entirely from God. But to argue, Therefore that this person fornicates is from God, is a fallacy of Accident. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana, nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem, et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est alia veritas quam Deus. Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God. Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God. Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera sunt. Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv) that, as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things. But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum. On the contrary, it is written (Ps 11:2), Truths are decayed from among the children of men. Respondeo dicendum quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, illud autem significat sanitatem. I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Dictum est autem quod veritas per prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super illud Psalmi XI, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae. Now we have said (A. 1) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, Truths are decayed from among the children of men, says: As from one man’s face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth. But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata, quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus. Reply Obj. 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God. Ad secundum dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum divinum. Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum veritas creata sit aeterna Whether created truth is eternal? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est aeterna. Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five. But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal. Praeterea, omne quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime universale. Obj. 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal. Praeterea, id quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est aeterna. Obj. 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal. Praeterea, omne quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas est aeterna. Obj. 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal. Sed contra est quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est. On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before (Q. 10, Art. 3). Respondeo dicendum quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus, ut supra ostensum est. I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal, since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already (A. 5). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem in mente divina. Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum, quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus. Reply Obj. 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura. Quae quidem causa solus Deus est. Reply Obj. 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing’s coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino, in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse, inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse eius. Reply Obj. 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum veritas sit immutabilis Whether truth is immutable? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et mens. Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is. Praeterea, id quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis. Obj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable. Praeterea, si veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei. Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo mutatur. Obj. 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), is a certain rightness in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that Socrates sits, receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.