Utrum sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi
Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia. Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae voluntatis.
Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
Praeterea, omne signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant, superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa voluntatem divinam assignanda.
Obj. 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
Sed contra est quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius. Ergo oportet quod aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.
On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps. 110:2: Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills. Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.
Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra. Sed hoc distat inter voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas dicitur.
I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Q. 13, A. 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven (Matt 6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur voluntati.
Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.
Ad secundum dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.
Reply Obj. 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.
Utrum convenienter circa divinam voluntatem ponantur quinque signa
Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio, praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito dividi.
Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will—namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission—are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
Praeterea, nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.
Obj. 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (Wis 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.
Praeterea, operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit. Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.
Obj. 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.
Praeterea, malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio; respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et praeceptum.
Obj. 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways, as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil—namely, prohibition—and two—namely, counsel and precept—in the case of good.
Respondeo dicendum quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem, inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle, inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad consilium.
I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel.
Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid, propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur Matth. VI fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra. Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., nihil fit, nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo. Vel potest dici quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens, permissio quidem ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio, respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu vero superabundantis boni, consilium.
Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of Matt. 6:10: Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it. Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.
Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem per alium, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
Ad tertium dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur, inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et permissio.
Reply Obj. 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.
Ad quartum dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat, tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt, sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam de minoribus malis vitandis.
Reply Obj. 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.
De amore Dei
Deinde considerandum est de his quae absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent.
We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God.
In parte autem appetitiva inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutum, ut iustitia, fortitudo, et huiusmodi. Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius.
In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and second His justice and mercy.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.
About the first there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum in Deo sit amor.
(1) Whether love exists in God?
Secundo, utrum amet omnia.
(2) Whether He loves all things?
Tertio, utrum magis amet unum quam aliud.
(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?
Quarto, utrum meliora magis amet.
(4) Whether He loves more the better things?
Utrum amor sit in Deo
Whether love exists in God?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo.
Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.
Praeterea, amor, ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor.
Obj. 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor est vis unitiva et concretiva. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.
Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): Love is a uniting and binding force. But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.
Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, Deus caritas est.
On the contrary, It is written: God is love (1 John 4:16).
Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud.
I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another.