Utrum Deus aliquod hominem reprobet
Whether God reprobates any man?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. Nullus enim reprobat quem diligit. Sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum illud Sap. XI, diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat.
Objection 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis 11:25): Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made. Therefore God reprobates no man.
Praeterea, si Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat reprobatio ad reprobatos, sicut praedestinatio ad praedestinatos. Sed praedestinatio est causa salutis praedestinatorum. Ergo reprobatio erit causa perditionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum, dicitur enim Osee XIII, perditio tua, Israel, ex te est; tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.
Obj. 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (Hos 13:9): Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me. God does not, then, reprobate any man.
Praeterea, nulli debet imputari quod vitare non potest. Sed si Deus aliquem reprobat, non potest vitare quin ipse pereat, dicitur enim Eccle. VII, considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ipse despexerit. Ergo non esset hominibus imputandum quod pereunt. Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.
Obj. 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Eccl 7:14): Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised. Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Malach. I, Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui.
On the contrary, It is said (Mal 1:2,3): I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.
Respondeo dicendum quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra quod praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Ad providentiam autem pertinet permittere aliquem defectum in rebus quae providentiae subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum per divinam providentiam homines in vitam aeternam ordinentur, pertinet etiam ad divinam providentiam, ut permittat aliquos ab isto fine deficere. Et hoc dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut praedestinatio est pars providentiae respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in aeternam salutem; ita reprobatio est pars providentiae respectu illorum qui ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat praescientiam tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, ut supra dictum est. Sicut enim praedestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpa.
I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A. 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diligit, et etiam omnes creaturas, inquantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum, non tamen quodcumque bonum vult omnibus. Inquantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare.
Reply Obj. 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.
Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter se habet reprobatio in causando, quam praedestinatio. Nam praedestinatio est causa et eius quod expectatur in futura vita a praedestinatis, scilicet gloriae; et eius quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae. Reprobatio vero non est causa eius quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpae; sed est causa derelictionis a Deo. Est tamen causa eius quod redditur in futuro, scilicet poenae aeternae. Sed culpa provenit ex libero arbitrio eius qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et secundum hoc verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, perditio tua, Israel, ex te.
Reply Obj. 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true—namely, Destruction is thy own, O Israel.
Ad tertium dicendum quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati. Unde, cum dicitur quod reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem absolutam, sed secundum impossibilitatem conditionatam, sicut supra dictum est quod praedestinatum necesse est salvari, necessitate conditionata, quae non tollit libertatem arbitrii. Unde, licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex eius libero arbitrio contingit. Unde et merito sibi imputatur in culpam.
Reply Obj. 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
Utrum praedestinati eligantur a Deo
Whether the predestined are chosen by God?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinati non eligantur a Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod, sicut sol corporeus non eligendo omnibus corporibus lumen immittit, ita et Deus suam bonitatem. Sed bonitas divina communicatur praecipue aliquibus secundum participationem gratiae et gloriae. Ergo Deus absque electione gratiam et gloriam communicat. Quod ad praedestinationem pertinet.
Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.
Praeterea, electio est eorum quae sunt. Sed praedestinatio ab aeterno est etiam eorum quae non sunt. Ergo praedestinantur aliqui absque electione.
Obj. 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.
Praeterea, electio quandam discretionem importat. Sed Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, ut dicitur I Tim. II. Ergo praedestinatio, quae praeordinat homines in salutem, est absque electione.
Obj. 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God wills all men to be saved (1 Tim 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem.
On the contrary, It is said (Eph 1:4): He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.
Respondeo dicendum quod praedestinatio, secundum rationem, praesupponit electionem; et electio dilectionem. Cuius ratio est, quia praedestinatio, ut dictum est, est pars providentiae. Providentia autem, sicut et prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens, praeceptiva ordinationis aliquorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem praecipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi praeexistente voluntate finis. Unde praedestinatio aliquorum in salutem aeternam, praesupponit, secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem. Ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio. Dilectio quidem, inquantum vult eis hoc bonum salutis aeternae, nam diligere est velle alicui bonum, ut supra dictum est. Electio autem, inquantum hoc bonum aliquibus prae aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobet, ut supra dictum est.
I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (A. 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Q. 22, A. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:—love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (Q. 20, AA. 2, 3):—election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (A. 3).
Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in Deo, eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum; sed ex bono praeexistente incitamur ad diligendum. Et ideo eligimus aliquem, quem diligamus, et sic electio dilectionem praecedit in nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas eius, qua vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illud bonum ab eo prae aliis habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni, secundum rationem; et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti.
Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinae in communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum scilicet nihil est, quod non participet aliquid de bonitate eius, ut supra dictum est. Sed si consideretur communicatio istius vel illius boni, non absque electione tribuit, quia quaedam bona dat aliquibus, quae non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et gloriae attenditur electio.
Reply Obj. 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Q. 6, A. 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a bono in re praeexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quae sunt; sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut dictum est. Et ideo, sicut dicit Augustinus, eliguntur a Deo qui non sunt, neque tamen errat qui eligit.
Reply Obj. 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q. 20, A. 2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri antecedenter, quod non est simpliciter velle, sed secundum quid, non autem consequenter, quod est simpliciter velle.
Reply Obj. 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.
Utrum praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis
Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?
Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis. Dicit enim Apostolus, Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit. Et Glossa Ambrosii, super illud Rom. IX, miserebor cui miserebor etc., dicit, misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio toto corde reversurum ad me. Ergo videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis.
Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom 8:29): Whom He foreknew, He also predestined. Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy says: I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart. Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
Praeterea, praedestinatio divina includit divinam voluntatem, quae irrationabilis esse non potest, cum praedestinatio sit propositum miserendi, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed nulla alia ratio potest esse praedestinationis nisi praescientia meritorum. Ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis.
Obj. 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is the purpose to have mercy, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.
Praeterea, non est iniquitas apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom. IX. Iniquum autem esse videtur, ut aequalibus inaequalia dentur. Omnes autem homines sunt aequales et secundum naturam, et secundum peccatum originale, attenditur autem in eis inaequalitas secundum merita vel demerita propriorum actuum. Non igitur inaequalia praeparat Deus hominibus, praedestinando et reprobando, nisi propter differentium meritorum praescientiam.
Obj. 3: Further, There is no injustice in God (Rom 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.
Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus, ad Tit. III, non ex operibus iustitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita et praedestinavit nos salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us. But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
Respondeo dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod non est assignare causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi; sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, inquantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. Nullus ergo fuit ita insanae mentis, qui diceret merita esse causam divinae praedestinationis, ex parte actus praedestinantis. Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus, praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam. Et hoc est quaerere, utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui, propter merita aliqua.
I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above (A. 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (Q. 19, A. 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
Fuerunt igitur quidam, qui dixerunt quod effectus praedestinationis praeordinatur alicui propter merita praeexistentia in alia vita. Et haec fuit positio Origenis, qui posuit animas humanas ab initio creatas, et secundum diversitatem suorum operum, diversos status eas sortiri in hoc mundo corporibus unitas. Sed hanc opinionem excludit Apostolus, Rom. IX, dicens, cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni vel mali, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quia maior serviet minori.
Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Rom 9:11,12): For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger.
Fuerunt ergo alii, qui dixerunt quod merita praeexistentia in hac vita sunt ratio et causa effectus praedestinationis. Posuerunt enim Pelagiani quod initium benefaciendi sit ex nobis, consummatio autem a Deo. Et sic, ex hoc contingit quod alicui datur praedestinationis effectus, et non alteri, quia unus initium dedit se praeparando, et non alius. Sed contra hoc est quod dicit Apostolus, II Cor. III, quod non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Nullum autem anterius principium inveniri potest quam cogitatio. Unde non potest dici quod aliquod in nobis initium existat, quod sit ratio effectus praedestinationis.
Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor 3:5), that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves. Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.
Unde fuerunt alii, qui dixerunt quod merita sequentia praedestinationis effectum, sunt ratio praedestinationis, ut intelligatur quod ideo Deus dat gratiam alicui, et praeordinavit se ei daturum, quia praescivit eum bene usurum gratia; sicut si rex det alicui militi equum, quem scit eo bene usurum. Sed isti videntur distinxisse inter id quod est ex gratia, et id quod est ex libero arbitrio, quasi non possit esse idem ex utroque. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est gratiae, est praedestinationis effectus, et hoc non potest poni ut ratio praedestinationis, cum hoc sub praedestinatione concludatur. Si igitur aliquid aliud ex parte nostra sit ratio praedestinationis, hoc erit praeter effectum praedestinationis. Non est autem distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et ex praedestinatione; sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda, et causa prima, divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes causarum secundarum, ut supra dictum est. Unde et id quod est per liberum arbitrium, est ex praedestinatione.
And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will be outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (Q. 22, A. 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination.
Dicendum est ergo quod effectum praedestinationis considerare possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, in particulari. Et sic nihil prohibet aliquem effectum praedestinationis esse causam et rationem alterius, posteriorem quidem prioris, secundum rationem causae finalis; priorem vero posterioris, secundum rationem causae meritoriae, quae reducitur ad dispositionem materiae. Sicut si dicamus quod Deus praeordinavit se daturum alicui gloriam ex meritis; et quod praeordinavit se daturum alicui gratiam, ut mereretur gloriam.
We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory.
Alio modo potest considerari praedestinationis effectus in communi. Et sic impossibile est quod totus praedestinationis effectus in communi habeat aliquam causam ex parte nostra. Quia quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu praedestinationis, etiam ipsa praeparatio ad gratiam, neque enim hoc fit nisi per auxilium divinum, secundum illud Thren. ultimi, converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur. Habet tamen hoc modo praedestinatio, ex parte effectus, pro ratione divinam bonitatem; ad quam totus effectus praedestinationis ordinatur ut in finem, et ex qua procedit sicut ex principio primo movente.
In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam 5:21): convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted. Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod usus gratiae praescitus, non est ratio collationis gratiae, nisi secundum rationem causae finalis, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod praedestinatio habet rationem ex parte effectus, in communi, ipsam divinam bonitatem. In particulari autem, unus effectus est ratio alterius, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest praedestinationis aliquorum, et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim Deus dicitur omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus divina bonitas repraesentetur. Necesse est autem quod divina bonitas, quae in se est una et simplex, multiformiter repraesentetur in rebus; propter hoc quod res creatae ad simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Et inde est quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum quaedam altum, et quaedam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua mala fieri, ne multa bona impediantur, ut supra dictum est.
Reply Obj. 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2).