Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Deus sit omnipotens Whether God is omnipotent? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnipotens. Moveri enim et pati aliquid omnium est. Sed hoc Deus non potest, est enim immobilis, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur est omnipotens. Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent. Praeterea, peccare aliquid agere est. Sed Deus non potest peccare, neque seipsum negare, ut dicitur II Tim. II. Ergo Deus non est omnipotens. Obj. 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor deny Himself as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent. Praeterea, de Deo dicitur quod omnipotentiam suam parcendo maxime et miserando manifestat. Ultimum igitur quod potest divina potentia, est parcere et misereri. Aliquid autem est multo maius quam parcere et misereri; sicut creare alium mundum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo Deus non est omnipotens. Obj. 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence especially by sparing and having mercy. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent. Praeterea, super illud I Cor. I, stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi, dicit Glossa, sapientiam huius mundi fecit Deus stultam, ostendendo possibile, quod illa impossibile iudicabat. Unde videtur quod non sit aliquid iudicandum possibile vel impossibile secundum inferiores causas, prout sapientia huius mundi iudicat; sed secundum potentiam divinam. Si igitur Deus sit omnipotens, omnia erunt possibilia. Nihil ergo impossibile. Sublato autem impossibili, tollitur necessarium, nam quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse. Nihil ergo erit necessarium in rebus, si Deus est omnipotens. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo Deus non est omnipotens. Obj. 4: Further, upon the text, God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world (1 Cor 1:20), a gloss says: God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible. Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. I, non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. On the contrary, It is said: No word shall be impossible with God (Luke 1:37). Respondeo dicendum quod communiter confitentur omnes Deum esse omnipotentem. Sed rationem omnipotentiae assignare videtur difficile. Dubium enim potest esse quid comprehendatur sub ista distributione, cum dicitur omnia posse Deum. Sed si quis recte consideret, cum potentia dicatur ad possibilia, cum Deus omnia posse dicitur, nihil rectius intelligitur quam quod possit omnia possibilia, et ob hoc omnipotens dicatur. I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word ‘all’ when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Possibile autem dicitur dupliciter, secundum Philosophum, in V Metaphys. Uno modo, per respectum ad aliquam potentiam, sicut quod subditur humanae potentiae, dicitur esse possibile homini. Non autem potest dici quod Deus dicatur omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia naturae creatae, quia divina potentia in plura extenditur. Si autem dicatur quod Deus sit omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia suae potentiae, erit circulatio in manifestatione omnipotentiae, hoc enim non erit aliud quam dicere quod Deus est omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae potest. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Second absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus dicatur omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia absolute, quod est alter modus dicendi possibile. Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel impossibile absolute, ex habitudine terminorum, possibile quidem, quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, ut Socratem sedere; impossibile vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut hominem esse asinum. It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey. Est autem considerandum quod, cum unumquodque agens agat sibi simile, unicuique potentiae activae correspondet possibile ut obiectum proprium, secundum rationem illius actus in quo fundatur potentia activa, sicut potentia calefactiva refertur, ut ad proprium obiectum, ad esse calefactibile. Esse autem divinum, super quod ratio divinae potentiae fundatur, est esse infinitum, non limitatum ad aliquod genus entis, sed praehabens in se totius esse perfectionem. Unde quidquid potest habere rationem entis, continetur sub possibilibus absolutis, respectu quorum Deus dicitur omnipotens. Nihil autem opponitur rationi entis, nisi non ens. Hoc igitur repugnat rationi possibilis absoluti, quod subditur divinae omnipotentiae, quod implicat in se esse et non esse simul. Hoc enim omnipotentiae non subditur, non propter defectum divinae potentiae; sed quia non potest habere rationem factibilis neque possibilis. It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Quaecumque igitur contradictionem non implicant, sub illis possibilibus continentur, respectu quorum dicitur Deus omnipotens. Ea vero quae contradictionem implicant, sub divina omnipotentia non continentur, quia non possunt habere possibilium rationem. Unde convenientius dicitur quod non possunt fieri, quam quod Deus non potest ea facere. Neque hoc est contra verbum angeli dicentis, non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Id enim quod contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, quia nullus intellectus potest illud concipere. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered among those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: No word shall be impossible with God. For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur omnipotens secundum potentiam activam, non secundum potentiam passivam, ut dictum est. Unde, quod non potest moveri et pati, non repugnat omnipotentiae. Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. Ad secundum dicendum quod peccare est deficere a perfecta actione, unde posse peccare est posse deficere in agendo, quod repugnat omnipotentiae. Et propter hoc, Deus peccare non potest, qui est omnipotens. Quamvis Philosophus dicat, in IV Topic., quod potest Deus et studiosus prava agere. Sed hoc intelligitur vel sub conditione cuius antecedens sit impossibile, ut puta si dicamus quod potest Deus prava agere si velit, nihil enim prohibet conditionalem esse veram, cuius antecedens et consequens est impossibile; sicut si dicatur, si homo est asinus, habet quatuor pedes. Vel ut intelligatur quod Deus potest aliqua agere, quae nunc prava videntur; quae tamen si ageret, bona essent. Vel loquitur secundum communem opinionem gentilium, qui homines dicebant transferri in deos, ut Iovem vel Mercurium. Reply Obj. 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: If man is a donkey, he has four feet. Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury. Ad tertium dicendum quod Dei omnipotentia ostenditur maxime in parcendo et miserando, quia per hoc ostenditur Deum habere summam potestatem, quod libere peccata dimittit, eius enim qui superioris legi astringitur, non est libere peccata condonare. Vel quia, parcendo hominibus et miserando, perducit eos ad participationem infiniti boni, qui est ultimus effectus divinae virtutis. Vel quia, ut supra dictum est, effectus divinae misericordiae est fundamentum omnium divinorum operum, nihil enim debetur alicui nisi propter id quod est datum ei a Deo non debitum. In hoc autem maxime divina omnipotentia manifestatur, quod ad ipsam pertinet prima institutio omnium bonorum. Reply Obj. 3: God’s omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q. 21, A. 4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things. Ad quartum dicendum quod possibile absolutum non dicitur neque secundum causas superiores, neque secundum causas inferiores sed secundum seipsum. Possibile vero quod dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam, nominatur possibile secundum proximam causam. Unde ea quae immediate nata sunt fieri a Deo solo, ut creare, iustificare, et huiusmodi, dicuntur possibilia secundum causam superiorem, quae autem nata sunt fieri a causis inferioribus, dicuntur possibilia secundum causas inferiores. Nam secundum conditionem causae proximae, effectus habet contingentiam vel necessitatem, ut supra dictum est. In hoc autem reputatur stulta mundi sapientia, quod ea quae sunt impossibilia naturae, etiam Deo impossibilia iudicabat. Et sic patet quod omnipotentia Dei impossibilitatem et necessitatem a rebus non excludit. Reply Obj. 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately—as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like—are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum Deus possit facere quod praeterita non fuerint Whether God can make the past not to have been? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit facere quod praeterita non fuerint. Quod enim est impossibile per se, magis est impossibile quam quod est impossibile per accidens. Sed Deus potest facere id quod est impossibile per se, ut caecum illuminare, vel mortuum resuscitare. Ergo multo magis potest Deus facere illud quod est impossibile per accidens. Sed praeterita non fuisse, est impossibile per accidens, accidit enim Socratem non currere esse impossibile, ex hoc quod praeteriit. Ergo Deus potest facere quod praeterita non fuerint. Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been. Praeterea, quidquid Deus facere potuit, potest, cum eius potentia non minuatur. Sed Deus potuit facere, antequam Socrates curreret, quod non curreret. Ergo, postquam cucurrit, potest Deus facere quod non cucurrerit. Obj. 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run. Praeterea, caritas est maior virtus quam virginitas. Sed Deus potest reparare caritatem amissam. Ergo et virginitatem. Ergo potest facere quod illa quae corrupta fuit, non fuerit corrupta. Obj. 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, cum Deus omnia possit, non potest de corrupta facere incorruptam. Ergo eadem ratione non potest facere de quocumque alio praeterito quod non fuerit. On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted. Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sub omnipotentia Dei non cadit aliquid quod contradictionem implicat. Praeterita autem non fuisse, contradictionem implicat. Sicut enim contradictionem implicat dicere quod Socrates sedet et non sedet, ita, quod sederit et non sederit. Dicere autem quod sederit, est dicere quod sit praeteritum, dicere autem quod non sederit, est dicere quod non fuerit. Unde praeterita non fuisse, non subiacet divinae potentiae. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, quisquis ita dicit, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut quae facta sunt, facta non fuerint, non videt hoc se dicere, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sunt, falsa sint. Et Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod hoc solo privatur Deus, ingenita facere quae sunt facta. I answer that, As was said above (Q. 7, A. 2), there does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): Of this one thing alone is God deprived—namely, to make undone the things that have been done. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet praeterita non fuisse sit impossibile per accidens, si consideretur id quod est praeteritum, idest cursus Socratis; tamen, si consideretur praeteritum sub ratione praeteriti, ipsum non fuisse est impossibile non solum per se, sed absolute, contradictionem implicans. Et sic est magis impossibile quam mortuum resurgere, quod non implicat contradictionem, quod dicitur impossibile secundum aliquam potentiam, scilicet naturalem. Talia enim impossibilia divinae potentiae subduntur. Reply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut Deus, quantum est ad perfectionem divinae potentiae, omnia potest, sed quaedam non subiacent eius potentiae, quia deficiunt a ratione possibilium; ita, si attendatur immutabilitas divinae potentiae, quidquid Deus potuit, potest; aliqua tamen olim habuerunt rationem possibilium, dum erant fienda, quae iam deficiunt a ratione possibilium, dum sunt facta. Et sic dicitur Deus ea non posse, quia ea non possunt fieri. Reply Obj. 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnem corruptionem mentis et corporis Deus auferre potest a muliere corrupta, hoc tamen ab ea removeri non poterit, quod corrupta non fuerit. Sicut etiam ab aliquo peccatore auferre non potest quod non peccaverit, et quod caritatem non amiserit. Reply Obj. 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum Deus possit facere nisi ea quae facit Whether God can do what he does not? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere nisi ea quae facit. Deus enim non potest facere quae non praescivit et praeordinavit se facturum. Sed non praescivit neque praeordinavit se facturum, nisi ea quae facit. Ergo non potest facere nisi ea quae facit. Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. Praeterea, Deus non potest facere nisi quod debet, et quod iustum est fieri. Sed Deus non debet facere quae non facit, nec iustum est ut faciat quae non facit. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit. Obj. 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. Praeterea, Deus non potest facere nisi quod bonum est, et conveniens rebus factis. Sed rebus factis a Deo non est bonum nec conveniens aliter esse quam sint. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit. Obj. 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matt. XXVI, an non possum rogare patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum? Neque autem ipse rogabat, neque pater exhibebat ad repugnandum Iudaeis. Ergo Deus potest facere quod non facit. On the contrary, It is said: Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels? (Matt 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc quidam dupliciter erraverunt. Quidam enim posuerunt Deum agere quasi ex necessitate naturae; ut sicut ex actione rerum naturalium non possunt alia provenire nisi quae eveniunt, utpote ex semine hominis homo, ex semine olivae oliva; ita ex operatione divina non possint aliae res, vel alius ordo rerum effluere, nisi sicut nunc est. Sed supra ostendimus Deum non agere quasi ex necessitate naturae, sed voluntatem eius esse omnium rerum causam; neque etiam ipsam voluntatem naturaliter et ex necessitate determinari ad has res. Unde nullo modo iste cursus rerum sic ex necessitate a Deo provenit, quod alia provenire non possent. I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place—as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (Q. 19, A. 3) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Alii vero dixerunt quod potentia divina determinatur ad hunc cursum rerum, propter ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae divinae, sine quo Deus nihil operatur. Cum autem potentia Dei, quae est eius essentia, non sit aliud quam Dei sapientia, convenienter quidem dici potest quod nihil sit in Dei potentia, quod non sit in ordine divinae sapientiae, nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Sed tamen ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus, in quo ratio iustitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, non adaequat divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem. Manifestum est enim quod tota ratio ordinis, quam sapiens rebus a se factis imponit, a fine sumitur. Quando igitur finis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis, sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (Q. 21, A. 2), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nobis, in quibus est aliud potentia et essentia a voluntate et intellectu, et iterum intellectus aliud a sapientia, et voluntas aliud a iustitia, potest esse aliquid in potentia, quod non potest esse in voluntate iusta, vel in intellectu sapiente. Sed in Deo est idem potentia et essentia et voluntas et intellectus et sapientia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia divina, quod non possit esse in voluntate iusta ipsius, et in intellectu sapiente eius. Tamen, quia voluntas non determinatur ex necessitate ad haec vel illa, nisi forte ex suppositione, ut supra dictum est; neque sapientia Dei et iustitia determinantur ad hunc ordinem, ut supra dictum est; nihil prohibet esse aliquid in potentia Dei, quod non vult, et quod non continetur sub ordine quem statuit rebus. Reply Obj. 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has placed in things.