Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sub omnipotentia Dei non cadit aliquid quod contradictionem implicat. Praeterita autem non fuisse, contradictionem implicat. Sicut enim contradictionem implicat dicere quod Socrates sedet et non sedet, ita, quod sederit et non sederit. Dicere autem quod sederit, est dicere quod sit praeteritum, dicere autem quod non sederit, est dicere quod non fuerit. Unde praeterita non fuisse, non subiacet divinae potentiae. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, quisquis ita dicit, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut quae facta sunt, facta non fuerint, non videt hoc se dicere, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sunt, falsa sint. Et Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod hoc solo privatur Deus, ingenita facere quae sunt facta. I answer that, As was said above (Q. 7, A. 2), there does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): Of this one thing alone is God deprived—namely, to make undone the things that have been done. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet praeterita non fuisse sit impossibile per accidens, si consideretur id quod est praeteritum, idest cursus Socratis; tamen, si consideretur praeteritum sub ratione praeteriti, ipsum non fuisse est impossibile non solum per se, sed absolute, contradictionem implicans. Et sic est magis impossibile quam mortuum resurgere, quod non implicat contradictionem, quod dicitur impossibile secundum aliquam potentiam, scilicet naturalem. Talia enim impossibilia divinae potentiae subduntur. Reply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut Deus, quantum est ad perfectionem divinae potentiae, omnia potest, sed quaedam non subiacent eius potentiae, quia deficiunt a ratione possibilium; ita, si attendatur immutabilitas divinae potentiae, quidquid Deus potuit, potest; aliqua tamen olim habuerunt rationem possibilium, dum erant fienda, quae iam deficiunt a ratione possibilium, dum sunt facta. Et sic dicitur Deus ea non posse, quia ea non possunt fieri. Reply Obj. 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnem corruptionem mentis et corporis Deus auferre potest a muliere corrupta, hoc tamen ab ea removeri non poterit, quod corrupta non fuerit. Sicut etiam ab aliquo peccatore auferre non potest quod non peccaverit, et quod caritatem non amiserit. Reply Obj. 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum Deus possit facere nisi ea quae facit Whether God can do what he does not? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere nisi ea quae facit. Deus enim non potest facere quae non praescivit et praeordinavit se facturum. Sed non praescivit neque praeordinavit se facturum, nisi ea quae facit. Ergo non potest facere nisi ea quae facit. Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. Praeterea, Deus non potest facere nisi quod debet, et quod iustum est fieri. Sed Deus non debet facere quae non facit, nec iustum est ut faciat quae non facit. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit. Obj. 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. Praeterea, Deus non potest facere nisi quod bonum est, et conveniens rebus factis. Sed rebus factis a Deo non est bonum nec conveniens aliter esse quam sint. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit. Obj. 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matt. XXVI, an non possum rogare patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum? Neque autem ipse rogabat, neque pater exhibebat ad repugnandum Iudaeis. Ergo Deus potest facere quod non facit. On the contrary, It is said: Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels? (Matt 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc quidam dupliciter erraverunt. Quidam enim posuerunt Deum agere quasi ex necessitate naturae; ut sicut ex actione rerum naturalium non possunt alia provenire nisi quae eveniunt, utpote ex semine hominis homo, ex semine olivae oliva; ita ex operatione divina non possint aliae res, vel alius ordo rerum effluere, nisi sicut nunc est. Sed supra ostendimus Deum non agere quasi ex necessitate naturae, sed voluntatem eius esse omnium rerum causam; neque etiam ipsam voluntatem naturaliter et ex necessitate determinari ad has res. Unde nullo modo iste cursus rerum sic ex necessitate a Deo provenit, quod alia provenire non possent. I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place—as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (Q. 19, A. 3) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Alii vero dixerunt quod potentia divina determinatur ad hunc cursum rerum, propter ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae divinae, sine quo Deus nihil operatur. Cum autem potentia Dei, quae est eius essentia, non sit aliud quam Dei sapientia, convenienter quidem dici potest quod nihil sit in Dei potentia, quod non sit in ordine divinae sapientiae, nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Sed tamen ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus, in quo ratio iustitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, non adaequat divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem. Manifestum est enim quod tota ratio ordinis, quam sapiens rebus a se factis imponit, a fine sumitur. Quando igitur finis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis, sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (Q. 21, A. 2), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nobis, in quibus est aliud potentia et essentia a voluntate et intellectu, et iterum intellectus aliud a sapientia, et voluntas aliud a iustitia, potest esse aliquid in potentia, quod non potest esse in voluntate iusta, vel in intellectu sapiente. Sed in Deo est idem potentia et essentia et voluntas et intellectus et sapientia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia divina, quod non possit esse in voluntate iusta ipsius, et in intellectu sapiente eius. Tamen, quia voluntas non determinatur ex necessitate ad haec vel illa, nisi forte ex suppositione, ut supra dictum est; neque sapientia Dei et iustitia determinantur ad hunc ordinem, ut supra dictum est; nihil prohibet esse aliquid in potentia Dei, quod non vult, et quod non continetur sub ordine quem statuit rebus. Reply Obj. 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has placed in things. Et quia potentia intelligitur ut exequens, voluntas autem ut imperans, et intellectus et sapientia ut dirigens, quod attribuitur potentiae secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam absolutam. Et huiusmodi est omne illud in quo potest salvari ratio entis, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem attribuitur potentiae divinae secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis iustae, hoc dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata. Secundum hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus potest alia facere, de potentia absoluta, quam quae praescivit et praeordinavit se facturum, non tamen potest esse quod aliqua faciat, quae non praesciverit et praeordinaverit se facturum. Quia ipsum facere subiacet praescientiae et praeordinationi, non autem ipsum posse, quod est naturale. Ideo enim Deus aliquid facit, quia vult, non tamen ideo potest, quia vult, sed quia talis est in sua natura. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above (A. 3). What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non debet aliquid alicui nisi sibi. Unde, cum dicitur quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod debet, nihil aliud significatur nisi quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod ei est conveniens et iustum. Sed hoc quod dico conveniens et iustum, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod hoc quod dico conveniens et iustum, prius intelligatur coniungi cum hoc verbo est, ita quod restringatur ad standum pro praesentibus; et sic referatur ad potentiam. Et sic falsum est quod dicitur, est enim sensus, Deus non potest facere nisi quod modo conveniens est et iustum. Si vero prius coniungatur cum hoc verbo potest, quod habet vim ampliandi, et postmodum cum hoc verbo est, significabitur quoddam praesens confusum, et erit locutio vera, sub hoc sensu, Deus non potest facere nisi id quod, si faceret, esset conveniens et iustum. Reply Obj. 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words befitting and just may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb is; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb can (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then second with is, the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet iste cursus rerum sit determinatus istis rebus quae nunc sunt, non tamen ad hunc cursum limitatur divina sapientia et potestas. Unde, licet istis rebus quae nunc sunt, nullus alius cursus esset bonus et conveniens, tamen Deus posset alias res facere, et alium eis imponere ordinem. Reply Obj. 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum Deus possit meliora facere ea quae facit Whether God can do better than what he does? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit meliora facere ea quae facit. Quidquid enim Deus facit, potentissime et sapientissime facit. Sed tanto fit aliquid melius, quanto fit potentius et sapientius. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid facere melius quam facit. Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does. Praeterea, Augustinus, contra Maximinum, sic argumentatur, si Deus potuit, et noluit, gignere filium sibi aequalem, invidus fuit. Eadem ratione, si Deus potuit res meliores facere quam fecerit, et noluit, invidus fuit. Sed invidia est omnino relegata a Deo. Ergo Deus unumquodque fecit optimum. Non ergo Deus potest aliquid facere melius quam fecit. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious. For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does. Praeterea, id quod est maxime et valde bonum, non potest melius fieri, quia maximo nihil est maius. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid., bona sunt singula quae Deus fecit, sed simul universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo. Ergo bonum universi non potest melius fieri a Deo. Obj. 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe. Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God. Praeterea, homo Christus est plenus gratia et veritate, et spiritum habet non ad mensuram, et sic non potest esse melior. Beatitudo etiam creata dicitur esse summum bonum, et sic non potest esse melius. Beata etiam virgo Maria est super omnes choros angelorum exaltata, et sic non potest esse melior. Non igitur omnia quae fecit Deus, potest facere meliora. Obj. 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes. III, quod Deus potens est omnia facere abundantius quam petimus aut intelligimus. On the contrary, It is said (Eph 3:20): God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand. Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas alicuius rei est duplex. Una quidem, quae est de essentia rei; sicut esse rationale est de essentia hominis. Et quantum ad hoc bonum, Deus non potest facere aliquam rem meliorem quam ipsa sit, licet possit facere aliquam aliam ea meliorem. Sicut etiam non potest facere quaternarium maiorem, quia, si esset maior, iam non esset quaternarius, sed alius numerus. Sic enim se habet additio differentiae substantialis in definitionibus, sicut additio unitatis in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Alia bonitas est, quae est extra essentiam rei; sicut bonum hominis est esse virtuosum vel sapientem. Et secundum tale bonum, potest Deus res a se factas facere meliores. Simpliciter autem loquendo, qualibet re a se facta potest Deus facere aliam meliorem. I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it—thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deum posse aliquid facere melius quam facit, si ly melius sit nomen, verum est, qualibet enim re potest facere aliam meliorem. Eandem vero potest facere meliorem quodammodo, et quodammodo non, sicut dictum est. Si vero ly melius sit adverbium, et importet modum ex parte facientis, sic Deus non potest facere melius quam sicut facit, quia non potest facere ex maiori sapientia et bonitate. Si autem importet modum ex parte facti, sic potest facere melius, quia potest dare rebus a se factis meliorem modum essendi quantum ad accidentalia, licet non quantum ad essentialia. Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if better is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, better is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance. Ad secundum dicendum quod de ratione filii est quod aequetur patri, cum ad perfectum venerit, non est autem de ratione creaturae alicuius, quod sit melior quam a Deo facta est. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails. Ad tertium dicendum quod universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse melius; propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo, in quo bonum universi consistit. Quorum si unum aliquod esset melius, corrumperetur proportio ordinis, sicut, si una chorda plus debito intenderetur, corrumperetur citharae melodia. Posset tamen Deus alias res facere, vel alias addere istis rebus factis, et sic esset illud universum melius. Reply Obj. 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe. Ad quartum dicendum quod humanitas Christi ex hoc quod est unita Deo, et beatitudo creata ex hoc quod est fruitio Dei, et beata virgo ex hoc quod est mater Dei, habent quandam dignitatem infinitam, ex bono infinito quod est Deus. Et ex hac parte non potest aliquid fieri melius eis, sicut non potest aliquid melius esse Deo. Reply Obj. 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God. Quaestio 26 Question 26 De divina beatitudine Divine Beatitude Ultimo autem, post considerationem eorum quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent, considerandum est de divina beatitudine. After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum beatitudo Deo competat. (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God? Secundo, secundum quid dicitur Deus esse beatus, utrum secundum actum intellectus. (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect? Tertio, utrum sit essentialiter beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?