Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum processio amoris in divinis sit generatio Whether the procession of love in God is generation? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod processio amoris in divinis sit generatio. Quod enim procedit in similitudine naturae in viventibus, dicitur generatum et nascens. Sed id quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, procedit in similitudine naturae, alias esset extraneum a natura divina, et sic esset processio ad extra. Ergo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, procedit ut genitum et nascens. Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated and born. Praeterea, sicut similitudo est de ratione verbi, ita est etiam de ratione amoris, unde dicitur Eccli. XIII, quod omne animal diligit simile sibi. Si igitur ratione similitudinis verbo procedenti convenit generari et nasci, videtur etiam quod amori procedenti convenit generari. Obj. 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that every beast loves its like (Sir 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation. Praeterea, non est in genere quod non est in aliqua eius specie. Si igitur in divinis sit quaedam processio amoris, oportet quod, praeter hoc nomen commune, habeat aliquod nomen speciale. Sed non est aliud nomen dare nisi generatio. Ergo videtur quod processio amoris in divinis sit generatio. Obj. 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is generation. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit ut amor, procederet ut genitus. Quod est contra illud Athanasii, Spiritus Sanctus a patre et filio non factus nec creatus nec genitus, sed procedens. On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Spirit Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the statement of Athanasius: The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding. Respondeo dicendum quod processio amoris in divinis non debet dici generatio. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod haec est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem, quod intellectus fit in actu per hoc quod res intellecta est in intellectu secundum suam similitudinem, voluntas autem fit in actu, non per hoc quod aliqua similitudo voliti sit in voluntate, sed ex hoc quod voluntas habet quandam inclinationem in rem volitam. Processio igitur quae attenditur secundum rationem intellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis, et intantum potest habere rationem generationis, quia omne generans generat sibi simile. Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellentis et moventis in aliquid. I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitum vel ut filius, sed magis procedit ut spiritus, quo nomine quaedam vitalis motio et impulsio designatur, prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moveri vel impelli ad aliquid faciendum. So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidquid est in divinis, est unum cum divina natura. Unde ex parte huius unitatis non potest accipi propria ratio huius processionis vel illius, secundum quam una distinguatur ab alia, sed oportet quod propria ratio huius vel illius processionis accipiatur secundum ordinem unius processionis ad aliam. Huiusmodi autem ordo attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis et intellectus. Unde secundum horum propriam rationem sortitur in divinis nomen utraque processio, quod imponitur ad propriam rationem rei significandam. Et inde est quod procedens per modum amoris et divinam naturam accipit, et tamen non dicitur natum. Reply Obj. 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the divine nature, but is not said to be born. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo aliter pertinet ad verbum, et aliter ad amorem. Nam ad verbum pertinet inquantum ipsum est quaedam similitudo rei intellectae, sicut genitum est similitudo generantis, sed ad amorem pertinet, non quod ipse amor sit similitudo, sed inquantum similitudo est principium amandi. Unde non sequitur quod amor sit genitus, sed quod genitum sit principium amoris. Reply Obj. 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of love. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deum nominare non possumus nisi ex creaturis, ut dictum est supra. Et quia in creaturis communicatio naturae non est nisi per generationem, processio in divinis non habet proprium vel speciale nomen nisi generationis. Unde processio quae non est generatio, remansit sine speciali nomine. Sed potest nominari spiratio, quia est processio spiritus. Reply Obj. 3: We can name God only from creatures (Q. 13, A. 1). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum sint plures processiones in divinis quam duae Whether there are more than two processions in God? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sint plures processiones in divinis quam duae. Sicut enim scientia et voluntas attribuitur Deo, ita et potentia. Si igitur secundum intellectum et voluntatem accipiuntur in Deo duae processiones, videtur quod tertia sit accipienda secundum potentiam. Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power. Praeterea, bonitas maxime videtur esse principium processionis, cum bonum dicatur diffusivum sui esse. Videtur igitur quod secundum bonitatem aliqua processio in divinis accipi debeat. Obj. 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God. Praeterea, maior est fecunditatis virtus in Deo quam in nobis. Sed in nobis non est tantum una processio verbi, sed multae, quia ex uno verbo in nobis procedit aliud verbum; et similiter ex uno amore alius amor. Ergo et in Deo sunt plures processiones quam duae. Obj. 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions. Sed contra est quod in Deo non sunt nisi duo procedentes, scilicet Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Ergo sunt ibi tantum duae processiones. On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed—the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are in Him but two processions. Respondeo dicendum quod processiones in divinis accipi non possunt nisi secundum actiones quae in agente manent. Huiusmodi autem actiones in natura intellectuali et divina non sunt nisi duae, scilicet intelligere et velle. Nam sentire, quod etiam videtur esse operatio in sentiente, est extra naturam intellectualem, neque totaliter est remotum a genere actionum quae sunt ad extra; nam sentire perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum. Relinquitur igitur quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo, nisi verbi et amoris. I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature, these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentia est principium agendi in aliud, unde secundum potentiam accipitur actio ad extra. Et sic secundum attributum potentiae non accipitur processio divinae personae, sed solum processio creaturarum. Reply Obj. 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum, sicut dicit Boetius in libro de Hebd., pertinet ad essentiam et non ad operationem, nisi forte sicut obiectum voluntatis. Reply Obj. 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will. Unde, cum processiones divinas secundum aliquas actiones necesse sit accipere, secundum bonitatem et huiusmodi alia attributa non accipiuntur aliae processiones nisi verbi et amoris, secundum quod Deus suam essentiam, veritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat. Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions, no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of Love, according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, Deus uno simplici actu omnia intelligit, et similiter omnia vult. Unde in eo non potest esse processio verbi ex verbo, neque amoris ex amore, sed est in eo solum unum verbum perfectum, et unus amor perfectus. Et in hoc eius perfecta fecunditas manifestatur. Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 14, A. 5; Q. 19, A. 5), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity. Quaestio 28 Question 28 De relationibus divinis The Divine Relations Deinde considerandum est de relationibus divinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in Deo sint aliquae relationes reales. (1) Whether there are real relations in God? Secundo, utrum illae relationes sint ipsa essentia divina, vel sint extrinsecus affixae. (2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it? Tertio, utrum possint esse in Deo plures relationes realiter distinctae ab invicem. (3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other? Quarto, de numero harum relationum. (4) The number of these relations. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in Deo sint aliquae relationes reales Whether there are real relations in God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint aliquae relationes reales. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod cum quis praedicamenta in divinam vertit praedicationem, cuncta mutantur in substantiam quae praedicari possunt; ad aliquid vero omnino non potest praedicari. Sed quidquid est realiter in Deo, de ipso praedicari potest. Ergo relatio non est realiter in Deo. Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), All possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively. But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God. Praeterea, dicit Boetius in eodem libro, quod similis est relatio in Trinitate patris ad filium, et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum, ut eius quod est idem, ad id quod est idem. Sed huiusmodi relatio est rationis tantum, quia omnis relatio realis exigit duo extrema realiter. Ergo relationes quae ponuntur in divinis, non sunt reales relationes, sed rationis tantum. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Spirit, is the relation of the same to the same. But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind. Praeterea, relatio paternitatis est relatio principii. Sed cum dicitur, Deus est principium creaturarum, non importatur aliqua relatio realis, sed rationis tantum. Ergo nec paternitas in divinis est relatio realis. Et eadem ratione nec aliae relationes quae ponuntur ibi. Obj. 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God. Praeterea, generatio in divinis est secundum intelligibilis verbi processionem. Sed relationes quae consequuntur operationem intellectus, sunt relationes rationis. Ergo paternitas et filiatio, quae dicuntur in divinis secundum generationem, sunt relationes rationis tantum. Obj. 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations. Sed contra est quod pater non dicitur nisi a paternitate, et filius a filiatione. Si igitur paternitas et filiatio non sunt in Deo realiter, sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter pater aut filius, sed secundum rationem intelligentiae tantum, quod est haeresis Sabelliana. On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.