Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum sint plures processiones in divinis quam duae Whether there are more than two processions in God? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sint plures processiones in divinis quam duae. Sicut enim scientia et voluntas attribuitur Deo, ita et potentia. Si igitur secundum intellectum et voluntatem accipiuntur in Deo duae processiones, videtur quod tertia sit accipienda secundum potentiam. Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power. Praeterea, bonitas maxime videtur esse principium processionis, cum bonum dicatur diffusivum sui esse. Videtur igitur quod secundum bonitatem aliqua processio in divinis accipi debeat. Obj. 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God. Praeterea, maior est fecunditatis virtus in Deo quam in nobis. Sed in nobis non est tantum una processio verbi, sed multae, quia ex uno verbo in nobis procedit aliud verbum; et similiter ex uno amore alius amor. Ergo et in Deo sunt plures processiones quam duae. Obj. 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions. Sed contra est quod in Deo non sunt nisi duo procedentes, scilicet Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Ergo sunt ibi tantum duae processiones. On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed—the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are in Him but two processions. Respondeo dicendum quod processiones in divinis accipi non possunt nisi secundum actiones quae in agente manent. Huiusmodi autem actiones in natura intellectuali et divina non sunt nisi duae, scilicet intelligere et velle. Nam sentire, quod etiam videtur esse operatio in sentiente, est extra naturam intellectualem, neque totaliter est remotum a genere actionum quae sunt ad extra; nam sentire perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum. Relinquitur igitur quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo, nisi verbi et amoris. I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature, these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentia est principium agendi in aliud, unde secundum potentiam accipitur actio ad extra. Et sic secundum attributum potentiae non accipitur processio divinae personae, sed solum processio creaturarum. Reply Obj. 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum, sicut dicit Boetius in libro de Hebd., pertinet ad essentiam et non ad operationem, nisi forte sicut obiectum voluntatis. Reply Obj. 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will. Unde, cum processiones divinas secundum aliquas actiones necesse sit accipere, secundum bonitatem et huiusmodi alia attributa non accipiuntur aliae processiones nisi verbi et amoris, secundum quod Deus suam essentiam, veritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat. Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions, no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of Love, according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, Deus uno simplici actu omnia intelligit, et similiter omnia vult. Unde in eo non potest esse processio verbi ex verbo, neque amoris ex amore, sed est in eo solum unum verbum perfectum, et unus amor perfectus. Et in hoc eius perfecta fecunditas manifestatur. Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 14, A. 5; Q. 19, A. 5), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity. Quaestio 28 Question 28 De relationibus divinis The Divine Relations Deinde considerandum est de relationibus divinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in Deo sint aliquae relationes reales. (1) Whether there are real relations in God? Secundo, utrum illae relationes sint ipsa essentia divina, vel sint extrinsecus affixae. (2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it? Tertio, utrum possint esse in Deo plures relationes realiter distinctae ab invicem. (3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other? Quarto, de numero harum relationum. (4) The number of these relations. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in Deo sint aliquae relationes reales Whether there are real relations in God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint aliquae relationes reales. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod cum quis praedicamenta in divinam vertit praedicationem, cuncta mutantur in substantiam quae praedicari possunt; ad aliquid vero omnino non potest praedicari. Sed quidquid est realiter in Deo, de ipso praedicari potest. Ergo relatio non est realiter in Deo. Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), All possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively. But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God. Praeterea, dicit Boetius in eodem libro, quod similis est relatio in Trinitate patris ad filium, et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum, ut eius quod est idem, ad id quod est idem. Sed huiusmodi relatio est rationis tantum, quia omnis relatio realis exigit duo extrema realiter. Ergo relationes quae ponuntur in divinis, non sunt reales relationes, sed rationis tantum. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Spirit, is the relation of the same to the same. But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind. Praeterea, relatio paternitatis est relatio principii. Sed cum dicitur, Deus est principium creaturarum, non importatur aliqua relatio realis, sed rationis tantum. Ergo nec paternitas in divinis est relatio realis. Et eadem ratione nec aliae relationes quae ponuntur ibi. Obj. 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God. Praeterea, generatio in divinis est secundum intelligibilis verbi processionem. Sed relationes quae consequuntur operationem intellectus, sunt relationes rationis. Ergo paternitas et filiatio, quae dicuntur in divinis secundum generationem, sunt relationes rationis tantum. Obj. 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations. Sed contra est quod pater non dicitur nisi a paternitate, et filius a filiatione. Si igitur paternitas et filiatio non sunt in Deo realiter, sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter pater aut filius, sed secundum rationem intelligentiae tantum, quod est haeresis Sabelliana. On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy. Respondeo dicendum quod relationes quaedam sunt in divinis realiter. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod solum in his quae dicuntur ad aliquid, inveniuntur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, et non secundum rem. Quod non est in aliis generibus, quia alia genera, ut quantitas et qualitas, secundum propriam rationem significant aliquid alicui inhaerens. Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid, significant secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud. I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Qui quidem respectus aliquando est in ipsa natura rerum; utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et invicem inclinationem habent. Et huiusmodi relationes oportet esse reales. Sicut in corpore gravi est inclinatio et ordo ad locum medium, unde respectus quidam est in ipso gravi respectu loci medii. Et similiter est de aliis huiusmodi. Aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea quae dicuntur ad aliquid, est tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri, et tunc est relatio rationis tantum; sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali, ut speciem ad genus. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the center; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the center, and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. Cum autem aliquid procedit a principio eiusdem naturae, necesse est quod ambo, scilicet procedens et id a quo procedit, in eodem ordine conveniant, et sic oportet quod habeant reales respectus ad invicem. Cum igitur processiones in divinis sint in identitate naturae, ut ostensum est, necesse est quod relationes quae secundum processiones divinas accipiuntur, sint relationes reales. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2, 4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad aliquid dicitur omnino non praedicari in Deo, secundum propriam rationem eius quod dicitur ad aliquid; inquantum scilicet propria ratio eius quod ad aliquid dicitur, non accipitur per comparationem ad illud cui inest relatio, sed per respectum ad alterum. Non ergo per hoc excludere voluit quod relatio non esset in Deo, sed quod non praedicaretur per modum inhaerentis secundum propriam relationis rationem, sed magis per modum ad aliud se habentis. Reply Obj. 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another. Ad secundum dicendum quod relatio quae importatur per hoc nomen idem, est relatio rationis tantum, si accipiatur simpliciter idem, quia huiusmodi relatio non potest consistere nisi in quodam ordine quem ratio adinvenit alicuius ad seipsum, secundum aliquas eius duas considerationes. Secus autem est, cum dicuntur aliqua eadem esse, non in numero, sed in natura generis sive speciei. Boetius igitur relationes quae sunt in divinis, assimilat relationi identitatis, non quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad hoc solum, quod per huiusmodi relationes non diversificatur substantia, sicut nec per relationem identitatis. Reply Obj. 2: The relation signified by the term the same is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity. Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum creatura procedat a Deo in diversitate naturae, Deus est extra ordinem totius creaturae, nec ex eius natura est eius habitudo ad creaturas. Non enim producit creaturas ex necessitate suae naturae, sed per intellectum et per voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in Deo non est realis relatio ad creaturas. Sed in creaturis est realis relatio ad Deum, quia creaturae continentur sub ordine divino, et in earum natura est quod dependeant a Deo. Sed processiones divinae sunt in eadem natura. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above explained (Q. 14, AA. 3, 4; Q. 19, A. 8). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists. Ad quartum dicendum quod relationes quae consequuntur solam operationem intellectus in ipsis rebus intellectis, sunt relationes rationis tantum, quia scilicet eas ratio adinvenit inter duas res intellectas. Sed relationes quae consequuntur operationem intellectus, quae sunt inter verbum intellectualiter procedens et illud a quo procedit, non sunt relationes rationis tantum, sed rei, quia et ipse intellectus et ratio est quaedam res, et comparatur realiter ad id quod procedit intelligibiliter, sicut res corporalis ad id quod procedit corporaliter. Et sic paternitas et filiatio sunt relationes reales in divinis. Reply Obj. 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum relatio in Deo sit idem quod sua essentia Whether relation in God is the same as his essence? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod relatio in Deo non sit idem quod sua essentia. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de Trin., quod non omne quod dicitur in Deo, dicitur secundum substantiam. Dicitur enim ad aliquid, sicut pater ad filium, sed haec non secundum substantiam dicuntur. Ergo relatio non est divina essentia. Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance. Therefore the relation is not the divine essence. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., omnis res quae relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid excepto relativo; sicut homo dominus, et homo servus. Si igitur relationes aliquae sunt in Deo, oportet esse in Deo aliquid aliud praeter relationes. Sed hoc aliud non potest esse nisi essentia. Ergo essentia est aliud a relationibus. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man. Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.