Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum dictio exclusiva solus sit addenda termino essentiali in divinis Whether the exclusive word ‘alone’ should be added to the essential term in God? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod dictio exclusiva solus non sit addenda termino essentiali in divinis. Quia secundum Philosophum, in II Elench., solus est qui cum alio non est. Sed Deus est cum angelis et sanctis animabus. Ergo non possumus dicere Deum solum. Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word alone is not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), He is alone who is not with another. But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that God is alone. Praeterea, quidquid adiungitur termino essentiali in divinis, potest praedicari de qualibet persona per se, et de omnibus simul, quia enim convenienter dicitur sapiens Deus, possumus dicere, pater est sapiens Deus, et Trinitas est sapiens Deus. Sed Augustinus, in VI de Trin., dicit, consideranda est illa sententia, qua dicitur non esse patrem verum Deum solum. Ergo non potest dici solus Deus. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person per se, and of all the persons together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone. Therefore God cannot be said to be alone. Praeterea, si haec dictio solus adiungitur termino essentiali, aut hoc erit respectu praedicati personalis, aut respectu praedicati essentialis. Sed non respectu praedicati personalis, quia haec est falsa, solus Deus est pater, cum etiam homo sit pater. Neque etiam respectu praedicati essentialis. Quia si haec esset vera, solus Deus creat, videtur sequi quod haec esset vera, solus pater creat, quia quidquid dicitur de Deo, potest dici de patre. Haec autem est falsa, quia etiam filius est creator. Non ergo haec dictio solus potest in divinis adiungi termino essentiali. Obj. 3: Further if this expression alone is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, God alone is Father, since man also is a father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, God alone creates, it would follow that the Father alone creates, as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression alone cannot be joined to an essential term in God. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Tim. I, regi saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo. On the contrary, It is said, To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God (1 Tim 1:17). Respondeo dicendum quod haec dictio solus potest accipi ut categorematica vel syncategorematica. Dicitur autem dictio categorematica, quae absolute ponit rem significatam circa aliquod suppositum; ut albus circa hominem, cum dicitur homo albus. Si ergo sic accipiatur haec dictio solus, nullo modo potest adiungi alicui termino in divinis, quia poneret solitudinem circa terminum cui adiungeretur, et sic sequeretur Deum esse solitarium; quod est contra praedicta. Dictio vero syncategorematica dicitur, quae importat ordinem praedicati ad subiectum, sicut haec dictio omnis, vel nullus. Et similiter haec dictio solus, quia excludit omne aliud suppositum a consortio praedicati. Sicut, cum dicitur, solus Socrates scribit, non datur intelligi quod Socrates sit solitarius; sed quod nullus sit ei consors in scribendo, quamvis cum eo multis existentibus. Et per hunc modum nihil prohibet hanc dictionem solus adiungere alicui essentiali termino in divinis, inquantum excluduntur omnia alia a Deo a consortio praedicati, ut si dicamus, solus Deus est aeternus, quia nihil praeter Deum est aeternum. I answer that, This term alone can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given suppositum; as, for instance, white to man, as when we say a white man. If the term alone is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is above stated (A. 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression every one or no one; and likewise the term alone, as excluding every other suppositum from the predicate. Thus, when we say, Socrates alone writes, we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term alone being joined to any essential term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said God alone is eternal, because nothing but God is eternal. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet angeli et animae sanctae semper sint cum Deo, tamen, si non esset pluralitas personarum in divinis, sequeretur, quod Deus esset solus vel solitarius. Non enim tollitur solitudo per associationem alicuius quod est extraneae naturae, dicitur enim aliquis solus esse in horto, quamvis sint ibi multae plantae et animalia. Et similiter diceretur Deus esse solus vel solitarius, angelis et hominibus cum eo existentibus, si non essent in divinis personae plures. Consociatio igitur angelorum et animarum non excludit solitudinem absolutam a divinis, et multo minus solitudinem respectivam, per comparationem ad aliquod praedicatum. Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate. Ad secundum dicendum quod haec dictio solus, proprie loquendo, non ponitur ex parte praedicati, quod sumitur formaliter, respicit enim suppositum, inquantum excludit aliud suppositum ab eo cui adiungitur. Sed hoc adverbium tantum, cum sit exclusivum, potest poni ex parte subiecti, et ex parte praedicati, possumus enim dicere, tantum Socrates currit, idest nullus alius; et, Socrates currit tantum, idest nihil aliud facit. Unde non proprie dici potest, pater est solus Deus, vel, Trinitas est solus Deus, nisi forte ex parte praedicati intelligatur aliqua implicatio, ut dicatur, Trinitas est Deus qui est solus Deus. Et secundum hoc etiam posset esse vera ista, pater est Deus qui est solus Deus, si relativum referret praedicatum, et non suppositum. Augustinus autem, cum dicit patrem non esse solum Deum, sed Trinitatem esse solum Deum, loquitur expositive, ac si diceret, cum dicitur, regi saeculorum, invisibili, soli Deo, non est exponendum de persona patris, sed de sola Trinitate. Reply Obj. 2: This expression alone, properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the suppositum, as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb only, being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, Only Socrates—that is, no one else—runs: and Socrates runs only—that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, The Trinity is God Who alone is God. In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the suppositum. So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, To the King of ages, invisible, the only God, as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone. Ad tertium dicendum quod utroque modo potest haec dictio solus adiungi termino essentiali. Haec enim propositio, solus Deus est pater, est duplex. Quia ly pater potest praedicare personam patris, et sic est vera, non enim homo est illa persona. Vel potest praedicare relationem tantum, et sic est falsa, quia relatio paternitatis etiam in aliis invenitur, licet non univoce. Similiter haec est vera, solus Deus creat; nec tamen sequitur, ergo solus pater, quia, ut sophistae dicunt, dictio exclusiva immobilitat terminum cui adiungitur, ut non possit fieri sub eo descensus pro aliquo suppositorum; non enim sequitur, solus homo est animal rationale mortale, ergo solus Socrates. Reply Obj. 3: In both ways can the term alone be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, God alone is Father, can mean two things, because the word Father can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow that therefore the Father alone creates, because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premise, Man alone is a mortal rational animal, we cannot conclude, Therefore Socrates alone is such. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum dictio exclusiva possit adiungi termino personali, etiam si praedicatum sit commune Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even if the predicate is common? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dictio exclusiva possit adiungi termino personali, etiam si praedicatum sit commune. Dicit enim dominus, ad patrem loquens, Ioan. XVII, ut cognoscant te, solum Deum verum. Ergo solus pater est Deus verus. Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said: That they may know Thee, the only true God (John 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God. Praeterea, Matth. XI dicitur, nemo novit filium nisi pater; quod idem significat ac si diceretur, solus pater novit filium. Sed nosse filium est commune. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 2: Further, He said: No one knows the Son but the Father (Matt 11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion follows. Praeterea, dictio exclusiva non excludit illud quod est de intellectu termini cui adiungitur, unde non excludit partem, neque universale, non enim sequitur, solus Socrates est albus, ergo manus eius non est alba; vel, ergo homo non est albus. Sed una persona est in intellectu alterius, sicut pater in intellectu filii, et e converso. Non ergo per hoc quod dicitur, solus pater est Deus, excluditur filius vel Spiritus Sanctus. Et sic videtur haec locutio esse vera. Obj. 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say Socrates alone is white, that therefore his hand is not white, or that man is not white. But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, ‘The Father alone is God,’ we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Spirit; so that such a mode of speaking is true. Praeterea, ab Ecclesia cantatur, tu solus altissimus, Iesu Christe. Obj. 4: Further, the Church sings: Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ. Sed contra, haec locutio, solus pater est Deus, habet duas expositivas, scilicet, pater est Deus, et, nullus alius a patre est Deus. Sed haec secunda est falsa, quia filius alius est a patre, qui est Deus. Ergo et haec est falsa, solus pater est Deus. Et sic de similibus. On the contrary, This proposition The Father alone is God includes two assertions—namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicimus, solus pater est Deus, haec propositio potest habere multiplicem intellectum. Si enim solus ponat solitudinem circa patrem, sic est falsa, secundum quod sumitur categorematice. Secundum vero quod sumitur syncategorematice, sic iterum potest intelligi multipliciter. Quia si excludat a forma subiecti, sic est vera, ut sit sensus, solus pater est Deus, idest, ille cum quo nullus alius est pater, est Deus. Et hoc modo exponit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., cum dicit, solum patrem dicimus, non quia separatur a filio vel spiritu sancto; sed hoc dicentes, significamus quod illi simul cum eo non sunt pater. I answer that, When we say, The Father alone is God, such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If alone means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways. For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being the Father alone is God—that is, He who with no other is the Father, is God. In this way Augustine expounds when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Spirit, but because they are not the Father together with Him. Sed hic sensus non habetur ex consueto modo loquendi, nisi intellecta aliqua implicatione, ut si dicatur, ille qui solus dicitur pater, est Deus. Secundum vero proprium sensum, excludit a consortio praedicati. Et sic haec propositio est falsa, si excludit alium masculine, est autem vera, si excludit aliud neutraliter tantum, quia filius est alius a patre, non tamen aliud; similiter et Spiritus Sanctus. Sed quia haec dictio solus respicit proprie subiectum, ut dictum est, magis se habet ad excludendum alium quam aliud. Unde non est extendenda talis locutio; sed pie exponenda, sicubi inveniatur in authentica scriptura. This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said He who alone is called the Father is God. But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Spirit. But because this diction alone, properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicimus, te solum Deum verum, non intelligitur de persona patris, sed de tota Trinitate, ut Augustinus exponit. Vel, si intelligatur de persona patris, non excluduntur aliae personae, propter essentiae unitatem, prout ly solus excludit tantum aliud, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: When we say, Thee the only true God, we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word only excludes another thing, as above explained. Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum. Cum enim aliquid essentiale dicitur de patre, non excluditur filius vel Spiritus Sanctus, propter essentiae unitatem. Tamen sciendum est quod in auctoritate praedicta, haec dictio nemo non idem est quod nullus homo, quod videtur significare vocabulum (non enim posset excipi persona patris), sed sumitur, secundum usum loquendi, distributive pro quacumque rationali natura. The same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Spirit, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted, the term no one is not the same as no man, which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature. Ad tertium dicendum quod dictio exclusiva non excludit illa quae sunt de intellectu termini cui adiungitur, si non differunt secundum suppositum, ut pars et universale. Sed filius differt supposito a patre, et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in suppositum, as part and universal. But the Son differs in suppositum from the Father; and so there is no parity. Ad quartum dicendum quod non dicimus absolute quod solus filius sit altissimus, sed quod solus sit altissimus cum spiritu sancto, in gloria Dei patris. Reply Obj. 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most High with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father. Quaestio 32 Question 32 De cognitione divinarum personarum The Knowledge of the Divine Persons Consequenter inquirendum est de cognitione divinarum personarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum per rationem naturalem possint cognosci divinae personae. (1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason? Secundo, utrum sint aliquae notiones divinis personis attribuendae. (2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons? Tertio, de numero notionum. (3) The number of the notions. Quarto, utrum liceat diversimode circa notiones opinari. (4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum trinitas divinarum personarum possit per naturalem rationem cognosci Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Trinitas divinarum personarum possit per naturalem rationem cognosci. Philosophi enim non devenerunt in Dei cognitionem nisi per rationem naturalem, inveniuntur autem a philosophis multa dicta de Trinitate personarum. Dicit enim Aristoteles, in I de caelo et mundo, per hunc numerum, scilicet ternarium, adhibuimus nos ipsos magnificare Deum unum, eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae sunt creata. Augustinus etiam dicit, VII Confes., ibi legi, scilicet in libris Platonicorum, non quidem his verbis, sed hoc idem omnino, multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat verbum, et huiusmodi quae ibi sequuntur, in quibus verbis distinctio divinarum personarum traditur. Dicitur etiam in Glossa Rom. I, et Exod. VIII, quod magi Pharaonis defecerunt in tertio signo, idest in notitia tertiae personae, scilicet spiritus sancti, et sic ad minus duas cognoverunt. Trismegistus etiam dixit, monas genuit monadem, et in se suum reflexit ardorem, per quod videtur generatio filii, et spiritus sancti processio intimari. Cognitio ergo divinarum personarum potest per rationem naturalem haberi. Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): Through this number—namely, three—we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all things created. And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): I have read in their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, and so on; in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign—that is, as regards knowledge of a third person—i.e., of the Holy Spirit—and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat. By which words the generation of the Son and procession of the Holy Spirit seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural reason. Praeterea, Ricardus de sancto Victore dicit, in libro de Trin., credo sine dubio quod ad quamcumque explanationem veritatis, non modo probabilia, imo etiam necessaria argumenta non desint. Unde etiam ad probandum Trinitatem personarum, aliqui induxerunt rationem ex infinitate bonitatis divinae, quae seipsam infinite communicat in processione divinarum personarum. Quidam vero per hoc, quod nullius boni sine consortio potest esse iucunda possessio. Augustinus vero procedit ad manifestandum Trinitatem personarum, ex processione verbi et amoris in mente nostra, quam viam supra secuti sumus. Ergo per rationem naturalem potest cognosci Trinitas personarum. Obj. 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth. So even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some are moved by the consideration that no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership. Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11, 12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this (Q. 27, AA. 1, 3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason. Praeterea, superfluum videtur homini tradere quod humana ratione cognosci non potest. Sed non est dicendum quod traditio divina de cognitione Trinitatis sit superflua. Ergo Trinitas personarum ratione humana cognosci potest. Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason. Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit, in libro II de Trin., non putet homo sua intelligentia generationis sacramentum posse consequi. Ambrosius etiam dicit, impossibile est generationis scire secretum, mens deficit, vox silet. Sed per originem generationis et processionis distinguitur Trinitas in personis divinis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Cum ergo illud homo non possit scire et intelligentia consequi, ad quod ratio necessaria haberi non potest, sequitur quod Trinitas personarum per rationem cognosci non possit. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. ii), Let no man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind. And Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 5), It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent. But the trinity of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession (Q. 30, A. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.