Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum hoc nomen pater sit proprie nomen divinae personae Whether this name ‘Father’ is properly the name of a divine person? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen pater non sit proprie nomen divinae personae. Hoc enim nomen pater significat relationem. Persona autem est substantia individua. Non ergo hoc nomen pater est proprie nomen significativum personae. Objection 1: It would seem that this name Father is not properly the name of a divine person. For the name Father signifies relation. Moreover person is an individual substance. Therefore this name Father is not properly a name signifying a Person. Praeterea, generans communius est quam pater, nam omnis pater est generans, sed non e converso. Sed nomen communius magis proprie dicitur in divinis, ut dictum est. Ergo magis proprium nomen est personae divinae generans et genitor, quam pater. Obj. 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is more properly applied to God, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 11). Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Father. Praeterea, nihil quod secundum metaphoram dicitur, potest esse nomen proprium alicuius. Sed verbum metaphorice apud nos dicitur genitum vel proles, et per consequens ille cuius est verbum, metaphorice dicitur pater. Non ergo principium verbi in divinis potest proprie dici pater. Obj. 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not properly called Father. Praeterea, omne quod proprie dicitur in divinis, per prius dicitur de Deo quam de creaturis. Sed generatio per prius videtur dici de creaturis quam de Deo, verior enim ibi videtur esse generatio, ubi aliquid procedit ab alio distinctum non secundum relationem tantum, sed etiam secundum essentiam. Ergo nomen patris, quod a generatione sumitur, non videtur esse proprium alicuius divinae personae. Obj. 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name Father taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, ipse invocabit me, pater meus es tu. On the contrary, It is said (Ps 88:27): He shall cry out to me: Thou art my Father. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen proprium cuiuslibet personae significat id per quod illa persona distinguitur ab omnibus aliis. Sicut enim de ratione hominis est anima et corpus, ita de intellectu huius hominis est haec anima et hoc corpus, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys.; his autem hic homo ab omnibus aliis distinguitur. Id autem per quod distinguitur persona patris ab omnibus aliis, est paternitas. Unde proprium nomen personae patris est hoc nomen pater, quod significat paternitatem. I answer that, The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other persons. Hence this name Father, whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apud nos relatio non est subsistens persona, et ideo hoc nomen pater, apud nos, non significat personam, sed relationem personae. Non autem est ita in divinis, ut quidam falso opinati sunt, nam relatio quam significat hoc nomen pater, est subsistens persona. Unde supra dictum est quod hoc nomen persona in divinis significat relationem ut subsistentem in divina natura. Reply Obj. 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this name father among us does not signify a person, but the relation of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God the relation signified by the name Father is a subsisting person. Hence, as above explained (Q. 29, A. 4), this name person in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in II de anima, denominatio rei maxime debet fieri a perfectione et fine. Generatio autem significat ut in fieri, sed paternitas significat complementum generationis. Et ideo potius est nomen divinae personae pater, quam generans vel genitor. Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the name Father is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or begettor. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum non est aliquid subsistens in natura humana, unde non proprie potest dici genitum vel filius. Sed verbum divinum est aliquid subsistens in natura divina, unde proprie, et non metaphorice, dicitur filius, et eius principium, pater. Reply Obj. 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father. Ad quartum dicendum quod nomen generationis et paternitatis, sicut et alia nomina quae proprie dicuntur in divinis, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum significandi. Unde et Apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. III, flecto genua mea ad patrem domini nostri Iesu Christi, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Quod sic apparet. Manifestum est enim quod generatio accipit speciem a termino, qui est forma generati. Et quanto haec fuerit propinquior formae generantis, tanto verior et perfectior est generatio; sicut generatio univoca est perfectior quam non univoca, nam de ratione generantis est, quod generet sibi simile secundum formam. Unde hoc ipsum quod in generatione divina est eadem numero forma generantis et geniti, in rebus autem creatis non est eadem numero, sed specie tantum, ostendit quod generatio, et per consequens paternitas, per prius sit in Deo quam in creaturis. Unde hoc ipsum quod in divinis est distinctio geniti a generante secundum relationem tantum, ad veritatem divinae generationis et paternitatis pertinet. Reply Obj. 4: The terms generation and paternity like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named (Eph 3:14). This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum hoc nomen pater dicatur in divinis per prius secundum quod personaliter sumitur Whether this name ‘Father’ is applied to God, first as a personal name? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen pater non dicatur in divinis per prius secundum quod personaliter sumitur. Commune enim, secundum intellectum, est prius proprio. Sed hoc nomen pater, secundum quod personaliter sumitur, est proprium personae patris, secundum vero quod sumitur essentialiter est commune toti Trinitati, nam toti Trinitati dicimus pater noster. Ergo per prius dicitur pater essentialiter sumptum, quam personaliter. Objection 1: It would seem that this name Father is not applied to God first as a personal name. For in the intellect the common precedes the particular. But this name Father as a personal name, belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say Our Father to the whole Trinity. Therefore Father comes first as an essential name before its personal sense. Praeterea, in his quae sunt eiusdem rationis, non est praedicatio per prius et posterius. Sed paternitas et filiatio secundum unam rationem videntur dici secundum quod persona divina est pater filii, et secundum quod tota Trinitas est pater noster vel creaturae, cum, secundum Basilium, accipere sit commune creaturae et filio. Ergo non per prius dicitur pater in divinis secundum quod sumitur essentialiter, quam secundum quod sumitur personaliter. Obj. 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature’s; since, according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature and to the Son. Therefore Father in God is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally. Praeterea, inter ea quae non dicuntur secundum rationem unam, non potest esse comparatio. Sed filius comparatur creaturae in ratione filiationis vel generationis, secundum illud Coloss. I, qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae. Ergo non per prius dicitur in divinis paternitas personaliter sumpta, quam essentialiter; sed secundum rationem eandem. Obj. 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature. Therefore paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same concept as, paternity taken essentially. Sed contra est quod aeternum prius est temporali. Ab aeterno autem Deus est pater filii, ex tempore autem pater est creaturae. Ergo per prius dicitur paternitas in Deo respectu filii, quam respectu creaturae. On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the creature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature. Respondeo dicendum quod per prius dicitur nomen de illo in quo salvatur tota ratio nominis perfecte, quam de illo in quo salvatur secundum aliquid, de hoc enim dicitur quasi per similitudinem ad id in quo perfecte salvatur, quia omnia imperfecta sumuntur a perfectis. Et inde est quod hoc nomen leo per prius dicitur de animali in quo tota ratio leonis salvatur, quod proprie dicitur leo, quam de aliquo homine in quo invenitur aliquid de ratione leonis, ut puta audacia vel fortitudo, vel aliquid huiusmodi, de hoc enim per similitudinem dicitur. I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which only partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence this name lion is applied first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion’s nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said by way of similitude. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod perfecta ratio paternitatis et filiationis invenitur in Deo patre et Deo filio, quia patris et filii una est natura et gloria. Now it is manifest from the foregoing (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 28, A. 4), that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and glory of the Father and the Son. Sed in creatura filiatio invenitur respectu Dei, non secundum perfectam rationem, cum non sit una natura creatoris et creaturae; sed secundum aliqualem similitudinem. Quae quanto perfectior fuerit, tanto propinquius acceditur ad veram filiationis rationem. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. Dicitur enim Deus alicuius creaturae pater, propter similitudinem vestigii tantum, utpote irrationalium creaturarum; secundum illud Iob XXXVIII, quis est pluviae pater? Aut quis genuit stillas roris? For God is called the Father of some creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational creatures, according to Job 38:28: Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew? Alicuius vero creaturae, scilicet rationalis, secundum similitudinem imaginis; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, nonne ipse est pater tuus, qui possedit et fecit et creavit te? Of some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according to Deut. 32:6: Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee? Aliquorum vero est pater secundum similitudinem gratiae, qui etiam dicuntur filii adoptivi, secundum quod ordinantur ad haereditatem aeternae gloriae per munus gratiae acceptum; secundum illud Rom. VIII, ipse spiritus reddit testimonium spiritui nostro, quod sumus filii Dei; si autem filii, et haeredes. And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to Rom. 8:16, 17: The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also. Aliquorum vero secundum similitudinem gloriae, prout iam gloriae haereditatem possident; secundum illud Rom. V, gloriamur in spe gloriae filiorum Dei. Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to Rom. 5:2: We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God. Sic igitur patet quod per prius paternitas dicitur in divinis secundum quod importatur respectus personae ad personam, quam secundum quod importatur respectus Dei ad creaturam. Therefore it is plain that paternity is applied to God first, as importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to creatures. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod communia absolute dicta, secundum ordinem intellectus nostri, sunt priora quam propria, quia includuntur in intellectu propriorum, sed non e converso; in intellectu enim personae patris intelligitur Deus, sed non convertitur. Reply Obj. 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not conversely. Sed communia quae important respectum ad creaturam, per posterius dicuntur quam propria quae important respectus personales, quia persona procedens in divinis, procedit ut principium productionis creaturarum. Sicut enim verbum conceptum in mente artificis, per prius intelligitur procedere ab artifice quam artificiatum, quod producitur ad similitudinem verbi concepti in mente; ita per prius procedit filius a patre quam creatura, de qua nomen filiationis dicitur secundum quod aliquid participat de similitudine filii; ut patet per illud quod dicitur Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, et praedestinavit fieri conformes imaginis filii eius. But common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations; because the person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist’s mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words of Rom. 8:29: Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son. Ad secundum dicendum quod accipere dicitur esse commune creaturae et filio, non secundum univocationem, sed secundum similitudinem quandam remotam, ratione cuius dicitur primogenitus creaturae. Unde in auctoritate inducta subditur, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus, postquam dixerat conformes fieri aliquos imaginis filii Dei. Reply Obj. 2: To receive is said to be common to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority quoted subjoins: That He may be the First Born among many brethren, after saying that some were conformed to the image of the Son of God. Sed filius Dei naturaliter habet quoddam singulare prae aliis, scilicet habere per naturam id quod accipit; ut idem Basilius dicit. Et secundum hoc dicitur unigenitus, ut patet Ioan. I, unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse nobis enarravit. But the Son of God possesses a position of singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten (John 1:18): The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto us. Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium. From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum esse ingenitum sit patri proprium Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse ingenitum non sit patri proprium. Omnis enim proprietas ponit aliquid in eo cuius est proprietas. Sed ingenitus nihil ponit in patre, sed removet tantum. Ergo non significat proprietatem patris. Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it is the property. But unbegotten supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Father. Praeterea, ingenitum aut dicitur privative, aut negative. Si negative, tunc quidquid non est genitum, potest dici ingenitum. Sed Spiritus Sanctus non est genitus, neque etiam essentia divina. Ergo ingenitum etiam eis convenit, et sic non est proprium patri. Si autem privative sumatur, cum omnis privatio significet imperfectionem in privato, sequitur quod persona patris sit imperfecta. Quod est impossibile. Obj. 2: Further, unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Spirit is not begotten; neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be. Praeterea, ingenitus in divinis non significat relationem, quia non dicitur relative, significat ergo substantiam. Ingenitus igitur et genitus secundum substantiam differunt. Filius autem, qui est genitus, non differt a patre secundum substantiam. Pater ergo non debet dici ingenitus. Obj. 3: Further, in God, unbegotten does not signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.