Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum in nomine verbi importetur respectus ad creaturam Whether the name ‘Word’ imports relation to creatures? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in nomine verbi non importetur respectus ad creaturam. Omne enim nomen connotans effectum in creatura, essentialiter in divinis dicitur. Sed verbum non dicitur essentialiter, sed personaliter, ut dictum est. Ergo verbum non importat respectum ad creaturam. Objection 1: It would seem that the name ‘Word’ does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures. Praeterea, quae important respectum ad creaturas, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut dominus et creator. Sed verbum dicitur de Deo ab aeterno. Ergo non importat respectum ad creaturam. Obj. 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time; as Lord and Creator. But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature. Praeterea, verbum importat respectum ad id a quo procedit. Si ergo importat respectum ad creaturam, sequitur quod procedat a creatura. Obj. 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the creature. Praeterea, ideae sunt plures secundum diversos respectus ad creaturas. Si igitur verbum importat respectum ad creaturas, sequitur quod in Deo non sit unum verbum tantum, sed plura. Obj. 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many. Praeterea, si verbum importat respectum ad creaturam, hoc non est nisi inquantum creaturae cognoscuntur a Deo. Sed Deus non solum cognoscit entia, sed etiam non entia. Ergo in verbo importabitur respectus ad non entia, quod videtur falsum. Obj. 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod in nomine verbi significatur non solum respectus ad patrem, sed etiam ad illa quae per verbum facta sunt operativa potentia. On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power. Respondeo dicendum quod in verbo importatur respectus ad creaturam. Deus enim, cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnem creaturam. Verbum autem in mente conceptum, est repraesentativum omnis eius quod actu intelligitur. Unde in nobis sunt diversa verba, secundum diversa quae intelligimus. Sed quia Deus uno actu et se et omnia intelligit, unicum verbum eius est expressivum non solum patris, sed etiam creaturarum. I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures. Et sicut Dei scientia Dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum, creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva; ita verbum Dei eius quod in Deo patre est, est expressivum tantum, creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum. Et propter hoc dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, dixit, et facta sunt; quia in verbo importatur ratio factiva eorum quae Deus facit. And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps 32:9): He spake, and they were made; because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nomine personae includitur etiam natura oblique, nam persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. In nomine igitur personae divinae, quantum ad relationem personalem, non importatur respectus ad creaturam, sed importatur in eo quod pertinet ad naturam. Nihil tamen prohibet, inquantum includitur in significatione eius essentia, quod importetur respectus ad creaturam, sicut enim proprium est filio quod sit filius, ita proprium est ei quod sit genitus Deus, vel genitus creator. Et per hunc modum importatur relatio ad creaturam in nomine verbi. Reply Obj. 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum relationes consequantur actiones, quaedam nomina important relationem Dei ad creaturam, quae consequitur actionem Dei in exteriorem effectum transeuntem, sicut creare et gubernare, et talia dicuntur de Deo ex tempore. Quaedam vero relationem quae consequitur actionem non transeuntem in exteriorem effectum, sed manentem in agente, ut scire et velle, et talia non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore. Et huiusmodi relatio ad creaturam importatur in nomine verbi. Nec est verum quod nomina importantia relationem Dei ad creaturas, omnia dicantur ex tempore, sed sola illa nomina quae important relationem consequentem actionem Dei in exteriorem effectum transeuntem, ex tempore dicuntur. Reply Obj. 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent—as to know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect. Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae non cognoscuntur a Deo per scientiam a creaturis acceptam, sed per essentiam suam. Unde non oportet quod a creaturis procedat verbum, licet verbum sit expressivum creaturarum. Reply Obj. 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures. Ad quartum dicendum quod nomen ideae principaliter est impositum ad significandum respectum ad creaturam, et ideo pluraliter dicitur in divinis, neque est personale. Sed nomen verbi principaliter impositum est ad significandam relationem ad dicentem, et ex consequenti ad creaturas, inquantum Deus, intelligendo se, intelligit omnem creaturam. Et propter hoc in divinis est unicum tantum verbum, et personaliter dictum. Reply Obj. 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a personal one. Ad quintum dicendum quod eo modo quo scientia Dei est non entium, et verbum Dei est non entium, quia non est aliquid minus in verbo Dei quam in scientia Dei, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed tamen verbum est entium ut expressivum et factivum, non entium autem, ut expressivum et manifestativum. Reply Obj. 5: God’s knowledge of non-beings and God’s Word about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings. Quaestio 35 Question 35 De imagine Image Deinde quaeritur de imagine. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum imago in divinis dicatur personaliter. (1) Whether Image in God is said personally? Secundo, utrum sit proprium filii. (2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum imago dicatur personaliter in divinis Whether 'Image' in God is said personally? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago non dicatur personaliter in divinis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, una est sanctae Trinitatis divinitas et imago, ad quam factus est homo. Igitur imago dicitur essentialiter, et non personaliter. Objection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God. For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, The Godhead of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one. Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally. Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., quod imago est eius rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens. Sed species, sive forma, in divinis dicitur essentialiter. Ergo et imago. Obj. 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): An image is a like species of that which it represents. But species or form is said of God essentially. Therefore so also is Image. Praeterea, imago ab imitando dicitur, in quo importatur prius et posterius. Sed in divinis personis nihil est prius et posterius ergo imago non potest esse nomen personale in divinis. Obj. 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies before and after. But in the divine persons there is no before and after. Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, quid est absurdius quam imaginem ad se dici? Ergo imago in divinis relative dicitur. Et sic est nomen personale. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): What is more absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself? Therefore the Image in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name. Respondeo dicendum quod de ratione imaginis est similitudo. Non tamen quaecumque similitudo sufficit ad rationem imaginis; sed similitudo quae est in specie rei, vel saltem in aliquo signo speciei. Signum autem speciei in rebus corporeis maxime videtur esse figura, videmus enim quod diversorum animalium secundum speciem, sunt diversae figurae, non autem diversi colores. Unde, si depingatur color alicuius rei in pariete, non dicitur esse imago, nisi depingatur figura. Sed neque ipsa similitudo speciei sufficit vel figurae; sed requiritur ad rationem imaginis origo, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., unum ovum non est imago alterius, quia non est de illo expressum. Ad hoc ergo quod vere aliquid sit imago, requiritur quod ex alio procedat simile ei in specie, vel saltem in signo speciei. Ea vero quae processionem sive originem important in divinis, sunt personalia. Unde hoc nomen imago est nomen personale. I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only similitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species of different animals are of different figures; but not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived from it. Therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name Image is a personal name. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod imago proprie dicitur quod procedit ad similitudinem alterius. Illud autem ad cuius similitudinem aliquid procedit, proprie dicitur exemplar, improprie vero imago. Sic tamen Augustinus utitur nomine imaginis, cum dicit divinitatem sanctae Trinitatis esse imaginem ad quam factus est homo. Reply Obj. 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly called the image. Nevertheless Augustine uses the name of Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made. Ad secundum dicendum quod species, prout ponitur ab Hilario in definitione imaginis, importat formam deductam in aliquo ab alio. Hoc enim modo imago dicitur esse species alicuius, sicuti id quod assimilatur alicui, dicitur forma eius, inquantum habet formam illi similem. Reply Obj. 2: Species, as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form. Ad tertium dicendum quod imitatio in divinis personis non significat posterioritatem, sed solam assimilationem. Reply Obj. 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum nomen imaginis sit proprium filio Whether the name of 'Image' is proper to the Son? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomen imaginis non sit proprium filio. Quia, ut dicit Damascenus, Spiritus Sanctus est imago filii. Non est ergo proprium filii. Objection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), The Holy Spirit is the Image of the Son. Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone. Praeterea, de ratione imaginis est similitudo cum expressione, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Sed hoc convenit spiritui sancto, procedit enim ab alio secundum modum similitudinis. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus est imago. Et ita non est proprium filii quod sit imago. Obj. 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to the Holy Spirit, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the Holy Spirit is an Image; and so to be Image does not belong to the Son alone. Praeterea, homo etiam dicitur imago Dei, secundum illud I ad Cor. XI, vir non debet velare caput suum, quoniam imago et gloria Dei est. Ergo non est proprium filio. Obj. 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to 1 Cor. 11:7, The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God. Therefore Image is not proper to the Son. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod solus filius est imago patris. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): The Son alone is the Image of the Father.