Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pater et filius non sint unum principium spiritus sancti. Quia Spiritus Sanctus non videtur a patre et filio procedere inquantum sunt unum, neque in natura, quia Spiritus Sanctus sic etiam procederet a seipso, qui est unum cum eis in natura; neque etiam inquantum sunt unum in aliqua proprietate, quia una proprietas non potest esse duorum suppositorum, ut videtur. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut sunt plures. Non ergo pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Spirit would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, cum dicitur, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, non potest ibi designari unitas personalis, quia sic pater et filius essent una persona. Neque etiam unitas proprietatis, quia si propter unam proprietatem pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, pari ratione, propter duas proprietates pater videtur esse duo principia filii et spiritus sancti; quod est inconveniens. Non ergo pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. Obj. 2: Further, in this proposition the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, we do not designate personal unity, because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Spirit, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, which cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, filius non magis convenit cum patre quam Spiritus Sanctus. Sed Spiritus Sanctus et pater non sunt unum principium respectu alicuius divinae personae. Ergo neque pater et filius. Obj. 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit and the Father are not one principle as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son. Praeterea, si pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti aut unum quod est pater; aut unum quod non est pater. Sed neutrum est dare, quia si unum quod est pater, sequitur quod filius sit pater; si unum quod non est pater, sequitur quod pater non est pater. Non ergo dicendum est quod pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti. Obj. 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father. But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, si pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti videtur e converso dicendum quod unum principium spiritus sancti sit pater et filius. Sed haec videtur esse falsa, quia hoc quod dico principium, oportet quod supponat vel pro persona patris, vel pro persona filii; et utroque modo est falsa. Ergo etiam haec est falsa, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. Obj. 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this word principle stands either for the person of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, unum in substantia facit idem. Si igitur pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, sequitur quod sint idem principium. Sed hoc a multis negatur. Ergo non est concedendum quod pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti. Obj. 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Spirit, it follows that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quia sunt unum principium creaturae, dicuntur esse unus creator. Sed pater et filius non sunt unus spirator, sed duo spiratores, ut a multis dicitur. Quod etiam consonat dictis Hilarii, qui dicit, in II de Trin., quod Spiritus Sanctus a patre et filio auctoribus confitendus est. Ergo pater et filius non sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. Obj. 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that the Holy Spirit is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in V de Trin., quod pater et filius non sunt duo principia, sed unum principium spiritus sancti. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Spirit. Respondeo dicendum quod pater et filius in omnibus unum sunt, in quibus non distinguit inter eos relationis oppositio. Unde, cum in hoc quod est esse principium spiritus sancti, non opponantur relative, sequitur quod pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy Spirit it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Quidam tamen dicunt hanc esse impropriam, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti. Quia cum hoc nomen principium, singulariter acceptum, non significet personam, sed proprietatem, dicunt quod sumitur adiective, et quia adiectivum non determinatur per adiectivum, non potest convenienter dici quod pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti, nisi unum intelligatur quasi adverbialiter positum, ut sit sensus, sunt unum principium, idest uno modo. Sed simili ratione posset dici pater duo principia filii et spiritus sancti, idest duobus modis. Dicendum est ergo quod, licet hoc nomen principium significet proprietatem, tamen significat eam per modum substantivi, sicut hoc nomen pater vel filius etiam in rebus creatis. Unde numerum accipit a forma significata, sicut et alia substantiva. Sicut igitur pater et filius sunt unus Deus, propter unitatem formae significatae per hoc nomen Deus; ita sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, propter unitatem proprietatis significatae in hoc nomine principium. Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, because, they declare, since the word principle in the singular number does not signify person, but property, it must be taken as an adjective; and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning should be: They are one principle—that is, in one and the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Spirit—namely, in two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word principle signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words father and son even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word God; so they are one principle of the Holy Spirit by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word principle. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si attendatur virtus spirativa, Spiritus Sanctus procedit a patre et filio inquantum sunt unum in virtute spirativa, quae quodammodo significat naturam cum proprietate, ut infra dicetur. Neque est inconveniens unam proprietatem esse in duobus suppositis, quorum est una natura. Si vero considerentur supposita spirationis, sic Spiritus Sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut sunt plures, procedit enim ab eis ut amor unitivus duorum. Reply Obj. 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one property being in two supposita that possess one common nature. But if we consider the supposita of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, designatur una proprietas, quae est forma significata per nomen. Non tamen sequitur quod propter plures proprietates possit dici pater plura principia, quia implicaretur pluralitas suppositorum. Reply Obj. 2: In the proposition the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, one property is designated which is the form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects. Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum relativas proprietates non attenditur in divinis similitudo vel dissimilitudo, sed secundum essentiam. Unde, sicut pater non est similior sibi quam filio, ita nec filius similior patri quam Spiritus Sanctus. Reply Obj. 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy Spirit. Ad quartum dicendum quod haec duo, scilicet, pater et filius sunt unum principium quod est pater, aut, unum principium quod non est pater, non sunt contradictorie opposita. Unde non est necesse alterum eorum dare. Cum enim dicimus, pater et filius sunt unum principium, hoc quod dico principium, non habet determinatam suppositionem, imo confusam pro duabus personis simul. Unde in processu est fallacia figurae dictionis, a confusa suppositione ad determinatam. Reply Obj. 4: These two propositions, The Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father, or, one principle which is not the Father, are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son are one principle, this word principle has not determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of figure of speech as the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate. Ad quintum dicendum quod haec etiam est vera, unum principium spiritus sancti est pater et filius. Quia hoc quod dico principium non supponit pro una persona tantum, sed indistincte pro duabus, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 5: This proposition is also true:—The one principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son; because the word principle does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained. Ad sextum dicendum quod convenienter potest dici quod pater et filius sunt idem principium, secundum quod ly principium supponit confuse et indistincte pro duabus personis simul. Reply Obj. 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same principle, because the word principle stands confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together. Ad septimum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pater et filius, licet sint unum principium spiritus sancti, sunt tamen duo spiratores, propter distinctionem suppositorum, sicut etiam duo spirantes, quia actus referuntur ad supposita. Nec est eadem ratio de hoc nomine creator. Quia Spiritus Sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut sunt duae personae distinctae, ut dictum est, non autem creatura procedit a tribus personis ut sunt personae distinctae, sed ut sunt unum in essentia. Sed videtur melius dicendum quod, quia spirans adiectivum est, spirator vero substantivum, possumus dicere quod pater et filius sunt duo spirantes, propter pluralitatem suppositorum; non autem duo spiratores, propter unam spirationem. Nam adiectiva nomina habent numerum secundum supposita, substantiva vero a seipsis, secundum formam significatam. Quod vero Hilarius dicit, quod Spiritus Sanctus est a patre et filio auctoribus, exponendum est quod ponitur substantivum pro adiectivo. Reply Obj. 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, there are two spirators, by reason of the distinction of supposita, as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name Creator; because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the supposita but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the supposita but substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son as His authors, this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective. Quaestio 37 Question 37 De nomine amoris The Name ‘Love’ Deinde quaeritur de nomine amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We now inquire concerning the name Love, on which arise two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti. (1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Spirit? Secundo, utrum pater et filius diligant se spiritu sancto. (2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum amor sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti Whether ‘Love’ is the proper name of the Holy Spirit? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Dicit enim Augustinus, XV de Trin., nescio cur, sicut sapientia dicitur et pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et simul omnes non tres sed una sapientia, non ita et caritas dicatur pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et simul omnes una caritas. Sed nullum nomen quod de singulis personis praedicatur et de omnibus in communi singulariter, est nomen proprium alicuius personae. Ergo hoc nomen amor non est proprium spiritus sancti. Objection 1: It would seem that Love is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): As the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Spirit should not be called Charity, and all together one Charity. But no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of all together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore this name, Love, is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, Spiritus Sanctus est persona subsistens. Sed amor non significatur ut persona subsistens, sed ut actio quaedam ab amante transiens in amatum. Ergo amor non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Obj. 2: Further, the Holy Spirit is a subsisting person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, amor est nexus amantium, quia secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., est quaedam vis unitiva. Sed nexus est medium inter ea quae connectit, non autem aliquid ab eis procedens. Cum igitur Spiritus Sanctus procedat a patre et filio, sicut ostensum est, videtur quod non sit amor aut nexus patris et filii. Obj. 3: Further, love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): Love is a unitive force. But a bond is a medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was shown above (Q. 36, A. 2), it seems that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son. Praeterea, cuiuslibet amantis est aliquis amor. Sed Spiritus Sanctus est amans. Ergo eius est aliquis amor. Si igitur Spiritus Sanctus est amor, erit amor amoris, et spiritus a spiritu. Quod est inconveniens. Obj. 4: Further, love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Spirit is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Spirit is Love, He must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, ipse Spiritus Sanctus est amor. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): The Holy Spirit Himself is Love. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen amoris in divinis sumi potest et essentialiter et personaliter. Et secundum quod personaliter sumitur, est proprium nomen spiritus sancti; sicut verbum est proprium nomen filii. I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Spirit; as Word is the proper name of the Son. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, cum in divinis, ut supra ostensum est, sint duae processiones, una per modum intellectus, quae est processio verbi; alia per modum voluntatis, quae est processio amoris, quia prima est nobis magis nota, ad singula significanda quae in ea considerari possunt, sunt magis propria nomina adinventa; non autem in processione voluntatis. Unde et quibusdam circumlocutionibus utimur ad significandam personam procedentem, et relationes etiam quae accipiuntur secundum hanc processionem, et processionis et spirationis nominibus nominantur, ut supra dictum est, quae tamen sunt magis nomina originis quam relationis, secundum proprietatem vocabuli. To see this we must know that since as shown above (Q. 27, AA. 2, 3, 4, 5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this procession which are called procession and spiration, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term. Et tamen similiter utramque processionem considerari oportet. Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. Ita quod, cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. Sed ex parte intellectus, sunt vocabula adinventa ad significandum respectum intelligentis ad rem intellectam, ut patet in hoc quod dico intelligere, et sunt etiam alia vocabula adinventa ad significandum processum intellectualis conceptionis, scilicet ipsum dicere, et verbum. Unde in divinis intelligere solum essentialiter dicitur, quia non importat habitudinem ad verbum procedens, sed verbum personaliter dicitur, quia significat id quod procedit, ipsum vero dicere dicitur notionaliter, quia importat habitudinem principii verbi ad verbum ipsum. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word to understand; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception—namely, to speak, and word. Hence in God, to understand is applied only to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas Word is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term to speak is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. Ex parte autem voluntatis, praeter diligere et amare, quae important habitudinem amantis ad rem amatam, non sunt aliqua vocabula imposita, quae importent habitudinem ipsius impressionis vel affectionis rei amatae, quae provenit in amante ex hoc quod amat, ad suum principium, aut e converso. Et ideo, propter vocabulorum inopiam, huiusmodi habitudines significamus vocabulis amoris et dilectionis; sicut si verbum nominaremus intelligentiam conceptam, vel sapientiam genitam. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words dilection and love, which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves—to the principle of that impression, or vice versa. And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words love and dilection: just as if we were to call the Word intelligence conceived, or wisdom begotten.