Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum pater et filius diligant se spiritu sancto Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pater et filius non diligant se spiritu sancto. Augustinus enim, in VII de Trin., probat quod pater non est sapiens sapientia genita. Sed sicut filius est sapientia genita, ita Spiritus Sanctus est amor procedens, ut dictum est. Ergo pater et filius non diligunt se amore procedente, qui est Spiritus Sanctus. Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Spirit. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Spirit is the Love proceeding, as explained above (Q. 27, A. 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, cum dicitur, pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto, hoc verbum diligere aut sumitur essentialiter, aut notionaliter. Sed non potest esse vera secundum quod sumitur essentialiter, quia pari ratione posset dici quod pater intelligit filio. Neque etiam secundum quod sumitur notionaliter, quia pari ratione posset dici quod pater et filius spirant spiritu sancto, vel quod pater generat filio. Ergo nullo modo haec est vera, pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto. Obj. 2: Further, in the proposition, The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, this word love is to be taken either essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might say that the Father understands by the Son; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be said that the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Spirit, or that the Father generates by the Son. Therefore in no way is this proposition true: The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, eodem amore pater diligit filium, et se, et nos. Sed pater non diligit se spiritu sancto. Quia nullus actus notionalis reflectitur super principium actus, non enim potest dici quod pater generat se, vel spirat se. Ergo etiam non potest dici quod diligat se spiritu sancto, secundum quod diligere sumitur notionaliter. Item, amor quo diligit nos, non videtur esse Spiritus Sanctus, quia importatur respectus ad creaturam, et ita ad essentiam pertinet. Ergo et haec est falsa, pater diligit filium spiritu sancto. Obj. 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Spirit; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the Father begets Himself, or that He spirates Himself. Therefore, neither can it be said that He loves Himself by the Holy Spirit, if to love is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Spirit; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false: The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Spiritus Sanctus est quo genitus a generante diligitur, genitoremque suum diligit. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): The Holy Spirit is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem difficultatem affert quod, cum dicitur, pater diligit filium spiritu sancto, cum ablativus construatur in habitudine alicuius causae, videtur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit principium diligendi patri et filio; quod est omnino impossibile. I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Spirit is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted. Et ideo quidam dixerunt hanc esse falsam, pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto. Et dicunt hanc esse retractatam ab Augustino in suo simili, cum scilicet retractavit istam, pater est sapiens sapientia genita. Quidam vero dicunt quod est propositio impropria; et est sic exponenda, pater diligit filium spiritu sancto, idest amore essentiali, qui appropriatur spiritui sancto. Quidam vero dixerunt quod ablativus iste construitur in habitudine signi, ut sit sensus, Spiritus Sanctus est signum quod pater diligat filium, inquantum scilicet procedit ab eis ut amor. Quidam vero dixerunt quod ablativus iste construitur in habitudine causae formalis, quia Spiritus Sanctus est amor, quo formaliter pater et filius se invicem diligunt. Quidam vero dixerunt quod construitur in habitudine effectus formalis. Et isti propinquius ad veritatem accesserunt. In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten. Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded as that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit—that is, by His essential Love, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, the Holy Spirit is the sign that the Father loves the Son; inasmuch as the Holy Spirit proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Spirit is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth. Unde ad huius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, cum res communiter denominentur a suis formis, sicut album ab albedine, et homo ab humanitate; omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur, quantum ad hoc habet habitudinem formae. Ut si dicam, iste est indutus vestimento, iste ablativus construitur in habitudine causae formalis, quamvis non sit forma. Contingit autem aliquid denominari per id quod ab ipso procedit, non solum sicut agens actione; sed etiam sicut ipso termino actionis, qui est effectus, quando ipse effectus in intellectu actionis includitur. Dicimus enim quod ignis est calefaciens calefactione, quamvis calefactio non sit calor, qui est forma ignis, sed actio ab igne procedens, et dicimus quod arbor est florens floribus, quamvis flores non sint forma arboris, sed quidam effectus ab ipsa procedentes. To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as white from whiteness, and man from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I say, This man is clothed with a garment, the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action—that is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree’s form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod, cum diligere in divinis dupliciter sumatur, essentialiter scilicet et notionaliter; secundum quod essentialiter sumitur, sic pater et filius non diligunt se spiritu sancto, sed essentia sua. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quis audet dicere patrem nec se nec filium nec spiritum sanctum diligere nisi per spiritum sanctum? Et secundum hoc procedunt primae opiniones. Secundum vero quod notionaliter sumitur, sic diligere nihil est aliud quam spirare amorem; sicut dicere est producere verbum, et florere est producere flores. Sicut ergo dicitur arbor florens floribus, ita dicitur pater dicens verbo vel filio, se et creaturam, et pater et filius dicuntur diligentes spiritu sancto, vel amore procedente, et se et nos. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God to love is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Spirit, but by their essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, except by the Holy Spirit? The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than to spirate love; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Spirit, or by Love proceeding. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse sapientem vel intelligentem in divinis non sumitur nisi essentialiter, et ideo non potest dici quod pater sit sapiens vel intelligens filio. Sed diligere sumitur non solum essentialiter, sed etiam notionaliter. Et secundum hoc, possumus dicere quod pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say that the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son. But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, as was above explained. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quando in intellectu alicuius actionis importatur determinatus effectus, potest denominari principium actionis et ab actione et ab effectu; sicut possumus dicere quod arbor est florens floritione, et floribus. Sed quando in actione non includitur determinatus effectus, tunc non potest principium actionis denominari ab effectu, sed solum ab actione, non enim dicimus quod arbor producit florem flore, sed productione floris. In hoc igitur quod dico spirat vel generat, importatur actus notionalis tantum. Unde non possumus dicere quod pater spiret spiritu sancto, vel generet filio. Possumus autem dicere quod pater dicit verbo, tanquam persona procedente, et dicit dictione, tanquam actu notionali, quia dicere importat determinatam personam procedentem, cum dicere sit producere verbum. Et similiter diligere, prout notionaliter sumitur, est producere amorem. Et ideo potest dici quod pater diligit filium spiritu sancto, tanquam persona procedente, et ipsa dilectione, tanquam actu notionali. Reply Obj. 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, spirates or begets, this imports only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Spirit, or begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, and speaks by the speaking, as by a notional act; forasmuch as to speak imports a determinate person proceeding; since to speak means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, as by the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act. Ad tertium dicendum quod pater non solum filium, sed etiam se et nos diligit spiritu sancto. Quia, ut dictum est, diligere, prout notionaliter sumitur, non solum importat productionem divinae personae, sed etiam personam productam per modum amoris, qui habet habitudinem ad rem dilectam. Unde, sicut pater dicit se et omnem creaturam verbo quod genuit, inquantum verbum genitum sufficienter repraesentat patrem et omnem creaturam; ita diligit se et omnem creaturam spiritu sancto, inquantum Spiritus Sanctus procedit ut amor bonitatis primae, secundum quam pater amat se et omnem creaturam. Et sic etiam patet quod respectus importatur ad creaturam et in verbo et in amore procedente, quasi secundario; inquantum scilicet veritas et bonitas divina est principium intelligendi et amandi omnem creaturam. Reply Obj. 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Spirit; because, as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word begotten adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures. Quaestio 38 Question 38 De nomine doni The Name ‘Gift’ Consequenter quaeritur de dono. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum donum possit esse nomen personale. (1) Whether Gift can be a personal name? Secundo, utrum sit proprium spiritus sancti. (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Spirit? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum donum sit nomen personale Whether ‘Gift’ is a personal name? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum non sit nomen personale. Omne enim nomen personale importat aliquam distinctionem in divinis. Sed nomen doni non importat aliquam distinctionem in divinis, dicit enim Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod Spiritus Sanctus ita datur sicut Dei donum, ut etiam seipsum det sicut Deus. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of Gift does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that the Holy Spirit is so given as God’s Gift, that He also gives Himself as God. Therefore Gift is not a personal name. Praeterea, nullum nomen personale convenit essentiae divinae. Sed essentia divina est donum quod pater dat filio, ut patet per Hilarium, IX de Trin. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. Obj. 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore Gift is not a personal name. Praeterea, secundum Damascenum, nihil est subiectum aut serviens in divinis personis. Sed donum importat quandam subiectionem et ad eum cui datur, et ad eum a quo datur. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore Gift is not a personal name. Praeterea, donum importat respectum ad creaturam, et ita videtur de Deo dici ex tempore. Sed nomina personalia dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, ut pater et filius. Ergo donum non est nomen personale. Obj. 4: Further, Gift imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God from eternity; as Father, and Son. Therefore Gift is not a personal name. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin., sicut corpus carnis nihil aliud est quam caro, sic donum spiritus sancti nihil aliud est quam Spiritus Sanctus. Sed Spiritus Sanctus est nomen personale. Ergo et donum. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing but the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit is a personal name; so also therefore is Gift. Respondeo dicendum quod in nomine doni importatur aptitudo ad hoc quod donetur. Quod autem donatur, habet habitudinem et ad id a quo datur, et ad id cui datur, non enim daretur ab aliquo nisi esset eius; et ad hoc alicui datur, ut eius sit. Persona autem divina dicitur esse alicuius, vel secundum originem, sicut filius est patris; vel inquantum ab aliquo habetur. Habere autem dicimur id quo libere possumus uti vel frui, ut volumus. Et per hunc modum divina persona non potest haberi nisi a rationali creatura Deo coniuncta. Aliae autem creaturae moveri quidem possunt a divina persona; non tamen sic quod in potestate earum sit frui divina persona, et uti effectu eius. Ad quod quandoque pertingit rationalis creatura; ut puta cum sic fit particeps divini verbi et procedentis amoris, ut possit libere Deum vere cognoscere et recte amare. Unde sola creatura rationalis potest habere divinam personam. Sed ad hoc quod sic eam habeat, non potest propria virtute pervenire, unde oportet quod hoc ei desuper detur; hoc enim dari nobis dicitur, quod aliunde habemus. Et sic divinae personae competit dari, et esse donum. I answer that, The word gift imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can be given, and can be a gift. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nomen doni importat distinctionem personalem, secundum quod donum dicitur esse alicuius per originem. Et tamen Spiritus Sanctus dat seipsum, inquantum est sui ipsius, ut potens se uti, vel potius frui; sicut et homo liber dicitur esse sui ipsius. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quid tam tuum est quam tu? Reply Obj. 1: The name Gift imports a personal distinction, in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Spirit gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): What is more yours than yourself? Vel dicendum, et melius, quod donum oportet esse aliquo modo dantis. Sed hoc esse huius dicitur multipliciter. Uno modo, per modum identitatis, sicut dicit Augustinus super Ioan., et sic donum non distinguitur a dante, sed ab eo cui datur. Et sic dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus dat se. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse alicuius ut possessio vel servus, et sic oportet quod donum essentialiter distinguatur a dante. Et sic donum Dei est aliquid creatum. Tertio modo dicitur hoc esse huius per originem tantum, et sic filius est patris, et Spiritus Sanctus utriusque. Inquantum ergo donum hoc modo dicitur esse dantis, sic distinguitur a dante personaliter, et est nomen personale. Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, this is this one’s, can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense gift is the same as the giver, but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Spirit gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another’s as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third sense, this is this one’s through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father’s; and the Holy Spirit belongs to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal name. Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia dicitur esse donum patris primo modo, quia essentia est patris per modum identitatis. Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence is the Father’s gift in the first sense, as being the Father’s by way of identity. Ad tertium dicendum quod donum, secundum quod est nomen personale in divinis, non importat subiectionem, sed originem tantum, in comparatione ad dantem. In comparatione vero ad eum cui datur, importat liberum usum vel fruitionem, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained. Ad quartum dicendum quod donum non dicitur ex eo quod actu datur, sed inquantum habet aptitudinem ut possit dari. Unde ab aeterno divina persona dicitur donum, licet ex tempore detur. Nec tamen per hoc quod importatur respectus ad creaturam, oportet quod sit essentiale, sed quod aliquid essentiale in suo intellectu includatur, sicut essentia includitur in intellectu personae, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 3). Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum donum sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti Whether ‘Gift’ is the proper name of the Holy Spirit? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum non sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Donum enim dicitur ex eo quod datur. Sed, sicut dicitur Isa. IX, filius datus est nobis. Ergo esse donum convenit filio, sicut spiritui sancto. Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Isaiah says (9:16): A Son is given to us. Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, omne nomen proprium alicuius personae significat aliquam eius proprietatem. Sed hoc nomen donum non significat proprietatem aliquam spiritus sancti. Ergo donum non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Obj. 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Spirit. Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, Spiritus Sanctus potest dici spiritus alicuius hominis, ut supra dictum est. Sed non potest dici donum alicuius hominis, sed solum donum Dei. Ergo donum non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Obj. 3: Further, the Holy Spirit can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but God’s Gift only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit.