Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum donum sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti Whether ‘Gift’ is the proper name of the Holy Spirit? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum non sit proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Donum enim dicitur ex eo quod datur. Sed, sicut dicitur Isa. IX, filius datus est nobis. Ergo esse donum convenit filio, sicut spiritui sancto. Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Isaiah says (9:16): A Son is given to us. Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, omne nomen proprium alicuius personae significat aliquam eius proprietatem. Sed hoc nomen donum non significat proprietatem aliquam spiritus sancti. Ergo donum non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Obj. 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Spirit. Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, Spiritus Sanctus potest dici spiritus alicuius hominis, ut supra dictum est. Sed non potest dici donum alicuius hominis, sed solum donum Dei. Ergo donum non est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. Obj. 3: Further, the Holy Spirit can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but God’s Gift only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Spirit. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., sicut natum esse est filio a patre esse, ita spiritui sancto donum Dei esse est a patre et filio procedere. Sed Spiritus Sanctus sortitur proprium nomen inquantum procedit a patre et filio. Ergo et donum est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): As ‘to be born’ is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Spirit, ‘to be the Gift of God’ is to proceed from Father and Son. But the Holy Spirit receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Spirit. Respondeo dicendum quod donum, secundum quod personaliter sumitur in divinis, est proprium nomen spiritus sancti. I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Spirit. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod donum proprie est datio irreddibilis, secundum Philosophum, idest quod non datur intentione retributionis, et sic importat gratuitam donationem. Ratio autem gratuitae donationis est amor, ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo quod damus ei, est amor quo volumus ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod amor habet rationem primi doni, per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur. Unde, cum Spiritus Sanctus procedat ut amor, sicut iam dictum est, procedit in ratione doni primi. Unde dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod per donum quod est Spiritus Sanctus, multa propria dona dividuntur membris Christi. In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)—i.e., a thing which is not given with the intention of a return—and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 37, A. 1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): By the gift, which is the Holy Spirit, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut filius, quia procedit per modum verbi, quod de ratione sua habet quod sit similitudo sui principii dicitur proprie imago, licet etiam Spiritus Sanctus sit similis patri; ita etiam Spiritus Sanctus, quia a patre procedit ut amor, dicitur proprie donum, licet etiam filius detur. Hoc enim ipsum quod filius datur, est ex patris amore, secundum illud Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut filium suum unigenitum daret. Reply Obj. 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although the Holy Spirit also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father’s love, according to the words, God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son (John 3:16). Ad secundum dicendum quod in nomine doni importatur quod sit dantis per originem. Et sic importatur proprietas originis spiritus sancti, quae est processio. Reply Obj. 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Spirit—that is, His procession. Ad tertium dicendum quod donum, antequam detur, est tantum dantis, sed postquam datur, est eius cui datur. Quia igitur donum non importat dationem in actu, non potest dici quod sit donum hominis; sed donum Dei dantis. Cum autem iam datum est, tunc hominis est vel spiritus vel datum. Reply Obj. 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because Gift does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man. Quaestio 39 Question 39 De Personis ad essentiam relatis The Persons in Relation to the Essence Post ea quae de personis divinis absolute tractata sunt, considerandum restat de personis in comparatione ad essentiam, et ad proprietates, et ad actus notionales; et de comparatione ipsarum ad invicem. Those things having been considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the persons in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, octo quaeruntur. As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum essentia in divinis sit idem quod persona. (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person? Secundo, utrum dicendum sit quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. (2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence? Tertio, utrum nomina essentialia praedicanda sint de personis in plurali vel in singulari. (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular? Quarto, utrum adiectiva notionalia, aut verba vel participia, praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretive acceptis. (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense? Quinto, utrum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus in abstracto acceptis. (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract? Sexto, utrum nomina personarum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretis. (6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names? Septimo, utrum essentialia attributa sint approprianda personis. (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons? Octavo, quod attributum cuique personae debeat appropriari. (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in divinis essentia sit idem quod persona Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis essentia non sit idem quod persona. In quibuscumque enim essentia est idem quod persona seu suppositum, oportet quod sit tantum unum suppositum unius naturae, ut patet in omnibus substantiis separatis, eorum enim quae sunt idem re, unum multiplicari non potest, quin multiplicetur et reliquum. Sed in divinis est una essentia et tres personae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo essentia non est idem quod persona. Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or suppositum, there can be only one suppositum of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (Q. 28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). Therefore essence is not the same as person. Praeterea, affirmatio et negatio simul et semel non verificantur de eodem. Sed affirmatio et negatio verificantur de essentia et persona, nam persona est distincta, essentia vero non est distincta. Ergo persona et essentia non sunt idem. Obj. 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same. Praeterea, nihil subiicitur sibi ipsi. Sed persona subiicitur essentiae, unde suppositum vel hypostasis nominatur. Ergo persona non est idem quod essentia. Obj. 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called suppositum or hypostasis. Therefore person is not the same as essence. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., cum dicimus personam patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam patris. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6): When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father. Respondeo dicendum quod considerantibus divinam simplicitatem, quaestio ista in manifesto habet veritatem. Ostensum est enim supra quod divina simplicitas hoc requirit, quod in Deo sit idem essentia et suppositum; quod in substantiis intellectualibus nihil est aliud quam persona. I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as suppositum, which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. Sed difficultatem videtur ingerere quod, multiplicatis personis divinis, essentia retinet unitatem. Et quia, ut Boetius dicit, relatio multiplicat personarum Trinitatem, posuerunt aliqui hoc modo in divinis differre essentiam et personam, quo et relationes dicebant esse assistentes, considerantes in relationibus solum quod ad alterum sunt, et non quod res sunt. Sed, sicut supra ostensum est, sicut relationes in rebus creatis accidentaliter insunt, ita in Deo sunt ipsa essentia divina. Ex quo sequitur quod in Deo non sit aliud essentia quam persona secundum rem; et tamen quod personae realiter ab invicem distinguantur. Persona enim, ut dictum est supra, significat relationem, prout est subsistens in natura divina. Relatio autem, ad essentiam comparata, non differt re, sed ratione tantum, comparata autem ad oppositam relationem, habet, virtute oppositionis, realem distinctionem. Et sic remanet una essentia, et tres personae. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), relation multiplies the Trinity of persons, some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be adjacent; considering only in the relations the idea of reference to another, and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Q. 28, A. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (Q. 29, A. 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in creaturis non potest esse distinctio suppositorum per relationes, sed oportet quod sit per essentialia principia, quia relationes non sunt subsistentes in creaturis. In divinis autem relationes sunt subsistentes, et ideo, secundum quod habent oppositionem ad invicem, possunt distinguere supposita. Neque tamen distinguitur essentia, quia relationes ipsae non distinguuntur ab invicem secundum quod sunt realiter idem cum essentia. Reply Obj. 1: There cannot be a distinction of suppositum in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the supposita; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence. Ad secundum dicendum quod, inquantum essentia et persona in divinis differunt secundum intelligentiae rationem, sequitur quod aliquid possit affirmari de uno, quod negatur de altero, et per consequens quod, supposito uno, non supponatur alterum. Reply Obj. 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other. Ad tertium dicendum quod rebus divinis nomina imponimus secundum modum rerum creatarum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia naturae rerum creatarum individuantur per materiam, quae subiicitur naturae speciei, inde est quod individua dicuntur subiecta, vel supposita, vel hypostases. Et propter hoc etiam divinae personae supposita vel hypostases nominantur, non quod ibi sit aliqua suppositio vel subiectio secundum rem. Reply Obj. 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called subjects, supposita, or hypostases. So the divine persons are named supposita or hypostases, but not as if there really existed any real supposition or subjection. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum sit dicendum tres personas esse unius essentiae Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?