Articulus 8
Article 8
Utrum convenienter a sacris doctoribus sint essentialia personis attributa
Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?
Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter a sacris doctoribus sint essentialia personis attributa. Dicit enim Hilarius, in II de Trin., aeternitas est in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere. In quibus verbis ponit tria nomina propria personarum, scilicet nomen patris; et nomen imaginis, quod est proprium filio, ut supra dictum est; et nomen muneris, sive doni, quod est proprium spiritus sancti, ut supra habitum est. Ponit etiam tria appropriata, nam aeternitatem appropriat patri, speciem filio, usum spiritui sancto. Et videtur quod irrationabiliter. Nam aeternitas importat durationem essendi, species vero est essendi principium, usus vero ad operationem pertinere videtur. Sed essentia et operatio nulli personae appropriari inveniuntur. Ergo inconvenienter videntur ista appropriata personis.
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift. In which words he designates three names proper to the persons: the name of the Father, the name Image proper to the Son (Q. 35, A. 2), and the name Bounty or Gift, which is proper to the Holy Spirit (Q. 38, A. 2). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates eternity to the Father, species to the Son, and use to the Holy Spirit. This he does apparently without reason. For eternity imports duration of existence; species, the principle of existence; and ‘use’ belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
Praeterea, Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., sic dicit, in patre est unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia. Et videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia una persona non denominatur formaliter per id quod appropriatur alteri, non enim est sapiens pater sapientia genita, ut dictum est. Sed, sicut ibidem subditur, tria haec unum omnia sunt propter patrem, aequalia omnia propter filium, connexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum. Non ergo convenienter appropriantur personis.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit is the concord of equality and unity. This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1). But, as he subjoins, All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Spirit. The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.
Item, secundum Augustinum, patri attribuitur potentia, filio sapientia, spiritui sancto bonitas. Et videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Nam virtus ad potentiam pertinet. Virtus autem invenitur appropriari filio, secundum illud I ad Cor. I, Christum, Dei virtutem; et etiam spiritui sancto, secundum illud Luc. VI, virtus de illo exibat, et sanabat omnes. Non ergo potentia patri est approprianda.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed power, to the Son wisdom, to the Holy Spirit goodness. Nor does this seem fitting; for strength is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, Christ the strength of God (1 Cor 1:24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Spirit, according to the words, strength came out from Him and healed all (Luke 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
Item, Augustinus, in libro de Trin., dicit, non confuse accipiendum est quod ait Apostolus, ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso—ex ipso dicens propter patrem; per ipsum propter filium; in ipso propter spiritum sanctum. Sed videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia per hoc quod dicit in ipso, videtur importari habitudo causae finalis, quae est prima causarum. Ergo ista habitudo causae deberet appropriari patri, qui est principium non de principio.
Obj. 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): What the Apostle says, ‘From Him, and by Him, and in Him,’ is not to be taken in a confused sense. And (Contra Maxim. ii) ‘from Him’ refers to the Father, ‘by Him’ to the Son, ‘in Him’ to the Holy Spirit. This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words in Him seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is the principle from no principle.
Item, invenitur veritas appropriari filio, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Et similiter liber vitae, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIX, in capite libri scriptum est de me, Glossa, idest apud patrem, qui est caput meum. Et similiter hoc quod dico, qui est, quia super illud Isa. LXV, ecce ego, ad gentes, dicit Glossa, filius loquitur, qui dixit Moysi, ego sum qui sum. Sed videtur quod propria sint filii, et non appropriata. Nam veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera religione, est summa similitudo principii, absque omni dissimilitudine, et sic videtur quod proprie conveniat filio, qui habet principium. Liber etiam vitae videtur proprium aliquid esse, quia significat ens ab alio, omnis enim liber ab aliquo scribitur. Hoc etiam ipsum qui est videtur esse proprium filio. Quia si, cum Moysi dicitur, ego sum qui sum, loquitur Trinitas, ergo Moyses poterat dicere, ille qui est pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus, misit me ad vos. Ergo et ulterius dicere poterat, ille qui est pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus, misit me ad vos, demonstrando certam personam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia nulla persona est pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Non ergo potest esse commune Trinitati, sed est proprium filii.
Obj. 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to John 14:6, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life; and likewise the book of life, according to Ps. 39:9, In the beginning of the book it is written of Me, where a gloss observes, that is, with the Father Who is My head, also this word Who is; because on the text of Isaias, Behold I go to the Gentiles (65:1), a gloss adds, The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am. These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude. So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the book of life seems proper to the Son, as signifying a thing from another; for every book is written by someone. This also, Who is, appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, I am Who am, the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit sent me to you, so also he could have said further, He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit sent me to you, pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus noster, qui ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem manuducitur, oportet quod Deum consideret secundum modum quem ex creaturis assumit. In consideratione autem alicuius creaturae, quatuor per ordinem nobis occurrunt. Nam primo, consideratur res ipsa absolute, inquantum est ens quoddam. Secunda autem consideratio rei est, inquantum est una. Tertia consideratio rei est, secundum quod inest ei virtus ad operandum et ad causandum. Quarta autem consideratio rei est, secundum habitudinem quam habet ad causata. Unde haec etiam quadruplex consideratio circa Deum nobis occurrit.
I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. First, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Second, it is considered as one. Third, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.
Secundum igitur primam considerationem, qua consideratur absolute Deus secundum esse suum, sic sumitur appropriatio Hilarii, secundum quam aeternitas appropriatur patri, species filio, usus spiritui sancto. Aeternitas enim, inquantum significat esse non principiatum, similitudinem habet cum proprio patris, qui est principium non de principio. Species autem, sive pulchritudo, habet similitudinem cum propriis filii. Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.
According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which eternity is appropriated to the Father, species to the Son, use to the Holy Spirit. For eternity as meaning a being without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is a principle without a principle. Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, integrity or perfection, since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.
Quantum igitur ad primum, similitudinem habet cum proprio filii, inquantum est filius habens in se vere et perfecte naturam patris. Unde, ad hoc innuendum, Augustinus in sua expositione dicit, ubi, scilicet in filio, summa et prima vita est, et cetera.
The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): Where—that is, in the Son—there is supreme and primal life, etc.
Quantum vero ad secundum, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est imago expressa patris. Unde videmus quod aliqua imago dicitur esse pulchra, si perfecte repraesentat rem, quamvis turpem. Et hoc tetigit Augustinus cum dicit, ubi est tanta convenientia, et prima aequalitas, et cetera.
The second agrees with the Son’s property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality, etc.
Quantum vero ad tertium, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est verbum, quod quidem lux est, et splendor intellectus, ut Damascenus dicit. Et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit, tanquam verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei, et cetera.
The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God, etc.
Usus autem habet similitudinem cum propriis spiritus sancti, largo modo accipiendo usum, secundum quod uti comprehendit sub se etiam frui; prout uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, et frui est cum gaudio uti, ut Augustinus, X de Trin., dicit. Usus ergo quo pater et filius se invicem fruuntur, convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo, usus ab illo appellatus est. Usus vero quo nos fruimur Deo, similitudinem habet cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est donum. Et hoc ostendit Augustinus cum dicit, est in Trinitate Spiritus Sanctus, genitoris genitique suavitas, ingenti largitate atque ubertate nos perfundens. Et sic patet quare aeternitas, species et usus personis attribuantur vel approprientur, non autem essentia vel operatio. Quia in ratione horum, propter sui communitatem, non invenitur aliquid similitudinem habens cum propriis personarum.
Use has a likeness to the property of the Holy Spirit; provided the use be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of to enjoy; according as to use is to employ something at the beck of the will, and to enjoy means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So use, whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Spirit, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him (Hilary). But the use by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Spirit as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): In the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth. Thus it is clear how eternity, species, and use are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.
Secunda vero consideratio Dei est, inquantum consideratur ut unus. Et sic Augustinus patri appropriat unitatem, filio aequalitatem, spiritui sancto concordiam sive connexionem. Quae quidem tria unitatem importare manifestum est, sed differenter. Nam unitas dicitur absolute, non praesupponens aliquid aliud. Et ideo appropriatur patri, qui non praesupponit aliquam personam, cum sit principium non de principio. Aequalitas autem importat unitatem in respectu ad alterum, nam aequale est quod habet unam quantitatem cum alio. Et ideo aequalitas appropriatur filio, qui est principium de principio. Connexio autem importat unitatem aliquorum duorum. Unde appropriatur spiritui sancto, inquantum est a duobus.
The second consideration of God regards Him as one. In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, concord or union to the Holy Spirit. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For unity is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the principle without principle. Equality implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the principle from a principle. Union implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as He proceeds from two.
Ex quo etiam intelligi potest quod dicit Augustinus, tria esse unum propter patrem, aequalia propter filium, connexa propter spiritum sanctum. Manifestum est enim quod illi attribuitur unumquodque, in quo primo invenitur, sicut omnia inferiora dicuntur vivere propter animam vegetabilem, in qua primo invenitur ratio vitae in istis inferioribus. Unitas autem statim invenitur in persona patris, etiam, per impossibile, remotis aliis personis. Et ideo aliae personae a patre habent unitatem. Sed remotis aliis personis, non invenitur aequalitas in patre, sed statim, posito filio, invenitur aequalitas. Et ideo dicuntur omnia aequalia propter filium, non quod filius sit principium aequalitatis patri; sed quia, nisi esset patri aequalis filius, pater aequalis non posset dici. Aequalitas enim eius primo consideratur ad filium, hoc enim ipsum quod Spiritus Sanctus patri aequalis est, a filio habet. Similiter, excluso spiritu sancto, qui est duorum nexus, non posset intelligi unitas connexionis inter patrem et filium. Et ideo dicuntur omnia esse connexa propter spiritum sanctum, quia, posito spiritu sancto, invenitur unde pater et filius possint dici connexi.
And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Spirit. For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now unity is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His equality is considered first in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Spirit is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Spirit, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Spirit; because given the Holy Spirit, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.
Secundum vero tertiam considerationem, qua in Deo sufficiens virtus consideratur ad causandum, sumitur tertia appropriatio, scilicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Quae quidem appropriatio fit et secundum rationem similitudinis, si consideretur quod in divinis personis est, et secundum rationem dissimilitudinis, si consideretur quod in creaturis est. Potentia enim habet rationem principii. Unde habet similitudinem cum patre caelesti, qui est principium totius divinitatis. Deficit autem interdum patri terreno, propter senectutem. Sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum filio caelesti, inquantum est verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapientiae. Deficit autem interdum filio terreno, propter temporis paucitatem. Bonitas autem, cum sit ratio et obiectum amoris, habet similitudinem cum spiritu divino, qui est amor. Sed repugnantiam habere videtur ad spiritum terrenum, secundum quod importat violentam quandam impulsionem; prout dicitur Isa. XXV, spiritus robustorum quasi turbo impellens parietem. Virtus autem appropriatur filio et spiritui sancto, non secundum quod virtus dicitur ipsa potentia rei, sed secundum quod interdum virtus dicitur id quod a potentia rei procedit, prout dicimus aliquod virtuosum factum esse virtutem alicuius agentis.
According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of power, wisdom, and goodness. This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For power has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. Wisdom has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. Goodness, as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Spirit; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to Isaiah 25:4: The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall. Strength is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength.
Secundum vero quartam considerationem, prout consideratur Deus in habitudine ad suos effectus, sumitur illa appropriatio ex quo, per quem, et in quo. Haec enim praepositio ex importat quandoque quidem habitudinem causae materialis, quae locum non habet in divinis, aliquando vero habitudinem causae efficientis. Quae quidem competit Deo ratione suae potentiae activae, unde et appropriatur patri, sicut et potentia. Haec vero praepositio per designat quidem quandoque causam mediam; sicut dicimus quod faber operatur per martellum. Et sic ly per quandoque non est appropriatum, sed proprium filii, secundum illud Ioan. I, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; non quia filius sit instrumentum, sed quia ipse est principium de principio. Quandoque vero designat habitudinem formae per quam agens operatur; sicut dicimus quod artifex operatur per artem. Unde, sicut sapientia et ars appropriantur filio, ita et ly per quem. Haec vero praepositio in denotat proprie habitudinem continentis. Continet autem Deus res dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suas similitudines; prout scilicet res dicuntur esse in Deo, inquantum sunt in eius scientia. Et sic hoc quod dico in ipso, esset appropriandum filio. Alio vero modo continentur res a Deo, inquantum Deus sua bonitate eas conservat et gubernat, ad finem convenientem adducendo. Et sic ly in quo appropriatur spiritui sancto, sicut et bonitas. Nec oportet quod habitudo causae finalis, quamvis sit prima causarum, approprietur patri, qui est principium non de principio, quia personae divinae, quarum pater est principium, non procedunt ut ad finem, cum quaelibet illarum sit ultimus finis; sed naturali processione, quae magis ad rationem naturalis potentiae pertinere videtur.
According to the fourth consideration, i.e., God’s relation to His effects, there arises appropriation of the expression from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom. For this preposition from sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition by sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works by a hammer. Hence the word by is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, All things were made by Him (John 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as the principle from a principle. Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form by which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression by Whom. The preposition in strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression in Him should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression in Him is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as likewise is goodness. Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is the principle without a principle: because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power.
Ad illud vero quod de aliis quaeritur, dicendum quod veritas, cum pertineat ad intellectum, ut supra dictum est, appropriatur filio, non tamen est proprium eius. Quia veritas, ut supra dictum est, considerari potest prout est in intellectu, vel prout est in re. Sicut igitur intellectus et res essentialiter sumpta sunt essentialia et non personalia, ita et veritas. Definitio autem Augustini inducta, datur de veritate secundum quod appropriatur filio. Liber autem vitae in recto quidem importat notitiam, sed in obliquo vitam, est enim, ut supra dictum est, notitia Dei de his qui habituri sunt vitam aeternam. Unde appropriatur filio, licet vita approprietur spiritui sancto, inquantum importat quendam interiorem motum, et sic convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Esse autem scriptum ab alio, non est de ratione libri inquantum est liber; sed inquantum est quoddam artificiatum. Unde non importat originem, neque est personale, sed appropriatum personae. Ipsum autem qui est appropriatur personae filii, non secundum propriam rationem, sed ratione adiuncti, inquantum scilicet in locutione Dei ad Moysen, praefigurabatur liberatio humani generis, quae facta est per filium. Sed tamen, secundum quod ly qui sumitur relative, posset referre interdum personam filii, et sic sumeretur personaliter, ut puta si dicatur, filius est genitus qui est; sicut et Deus genitus personale est. Sed infinite sumptum est essentiale. Et licet hoc pronomen iste, grammatice loquendo, ad aliquam certam personam videatur pertinere; tamen quaelibet res demonstrabilis, grammatice loquendo, persona dici potest, licet secundum rei naturam non sit persona; dicimus enim iste lapis, et iste asinus. Unde et, grammatice loquendo, essentia divina, secundum quod significatur et supponitur per hoc nomen Deus, potest demonstrari hoc pronomine iste; secundum illud Exod. XV, iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum.
Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since truth belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The book of life directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (Q. 24, A. 1), it is God’s knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Spirit as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression Who is is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God’s word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word Who is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, The Son is the begotten ‘Who is,’ inasmuch as God begotten is personal. But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun this seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, this stone, and this ass. So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word God signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun this, according to Ex. 15:2: This is my God, and I will glorify Him.
Quaestio 40
Question 40
De personis in comparatione ad relationes sive proprietates
Persons Compared to Relations or Properties
Deinde quaeritur de personis in comparatione ad relationes sive proprietates. Et quaeruntur quatuor.
We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum relatio sit idem quod persona.
(1) Whether relation is the same as person?
Secundo, utrum relationes distinguant et constituant personas.
(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
Tertio, utrum, abstractis per intellectum relationibus a personis, remaneant hypostases distinctae.
(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct?
Quarto, utrum relationes, secundum intellectum, praesupponant actus personarum, vel e converso.
(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
Articulus 1
Article 1
Utrum in divinis sit idem relatio quod persona
Whether relation is the same as person?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis non sit idem relatio quod persona. Quaecumque enim sunt idem, multiplicato uno eorum, multiplicatur et aliud. Sed contingit in una persona esse plures relationes, sicut in persona patris est paternitas et communis spiratio, et iterum unam relationem in duabus personis esse, sicut communis spiratio est in patre et filio. Ergo relatio non est idem quod persona.
Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration. Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.
Praeterea, nihil est in seipso, secundum Philosophum, in IV Physic. Sed relatio est in persona. Nec potest dici quod ratione identitatis, quia sic esset etiam in essentia. Ergo relatio sive proprietas et persona non sunt idem in divinis.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or property, is not the same as person in God.
Praeterea, quaecumque sunt idem, ita se habent, quod quidquid praedicatur de uno, praedicatur et de alio. Non autem quidquid praedicatur de persona, praedicatur de proprietate. Dicimus enim quod pater generat, sed non dicimus quod paternitas sit generans. Ergo proprietas non est idem quod persona in divinis.
Obj. 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not the same as person in God.
Sed contra, in divinis non differt quod est et quo est, ut habetur a Boetio in libro de Hebd. Sed pater paternitate est pater. Ergo pater idem est quod paternitas. Et eadem ratione aliae proprietates idem sunt cum personis.
On the contrary, in God what is and whereby it is are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the persons.
Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt. Quidam enim dixerunt proprietates neque esse personas, neque in personis. Qui fuerunt moti ex modo significandi relationum, quae quidem non significant ut in aliquo, sed magis ut ad aliquid. Unde dixerunt relationes esse assistentes, sicut supra expositum est. Sed quia relatio, secundum quod est quaedam res in divinis, est ipsa essentia; essentia autem idem est quod persona, ut ex dictis patet; oportet quod relatio sit idem quod persona.
I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons; and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which do not indeed signify existence in something, but rather existence towards something. Whence, they styled the relations assistant, as above explained (Q. 28, A. 2). But since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above (Q. 39, A. 1), relation must necessarily be the same as person.
Hanc igitur identitatem alii considerantes, dixerunt proprietates quidem esse personas, non autem in personis, quia non ponebant proprietates in divinis nisi secundum modum loquendi, ut supra dictum est. Necesse est autem ponere proprietates in divinis, ut supra ostendimus. Quae quidem significantur in abstracto, ut quaedam formae personarum. Unde, cum de ratione formae sit, quod sit in eo cuius est forma, oportet dicere proprietates esse in personis, et eas tamen esse personas; sicut essentiam esse in Deo dicimus, quae tamen est Deus.
Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not in the persons; for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2). We must, however, say that there are properties in God; as we have shown (Q. 32, A. 2). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since the nature of a form requires it to be in that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God, and yet is God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod persona et proprietas sunt idem re, differunt tamen secundum rationem. Unde non oportet quod, multiplicato uno, multiplicetur reliquum. Considerandum tamen est quod, propter divinam simplicitatem, consideratur duplex realis identitas in divinis eorum quae differunt in rebus creatis. Quia enim divina simplicitas excludit compositionem formae et materiae, sequitur quod in divinis idem est abstractum et concretum, ut deitas et Deus. Quia vero divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subiecti et accidentis, sequitur quod quidquid attribuitur Deo, est eius essentia, et propter hoc sapientia et virtus idem sunt in Deo, quia ambo sunt in divina essentia. Et secundum hanc duplicem rationem identitatis, proprietas in divinis est idem cum persona. Nam proprietates personales sunt idem cum personis, ea ratione qua abstractum est idem cum concreto. Sunt enim ipsae personae subsistentes; ut paternitas est ipse pater, et filiatio filius, et processio Spiritus Sanctus. Proprietates autem non personales sunt idem cum personis secundum aliam rationem identitatis, qua omne illud quod attribuitur Deo, est eius essentia. Sic igitur communis spiratio est idem cum persona patris et cum persona filii, non quod sit una persona per se subsistens; sed, sicut una essentia est in duabus personis, ita et una proprietas, ut supra dictum est.
Reply Obj. 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as Godhead and God. And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same as person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Spirit. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above explained (Q. 30, A. 2).
Ad secundum dicendum quod proprietates dicuntur esse in essentia, per modum identitatis tantum. In personis autem dicuntur esse per modum identitatis, non quidem secundum rem tantum, sed quantum ad modum significandi, sicut forma in supposito. Et ideo proprietates determinant et distinguunt personas, non autem essentiam.
Reply Obj. 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
Ad tertium dicendum quod participia et verba notionalia significant actus notionales. Actus autem suppositorum sunt. Proprietates autem non significantur ut supposita, sed ut formae suppositorum. Et ideo modus significandi repugnat, ut participia et verba notionalia de proprietatibus praedicentur.
Reply Obj. 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a suppositum. Now, properties are not designated as supposita, but as forms of supposita. And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties.