Quaestio 57 Question 57 De his materialibus quae ab angelis cognoscuntur Angelic Knowledge of Material Things Deinde quaeritur de his materialibus quae ab angelis cognoscuntur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum angeli cognoscant naturas rerum materialium. (1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things? Secundo, utrum cognoscant singularia. (2) Whether they know single things? Tertio, utrum cognoscant futura. (3) Whether they know the future? Quarto, utrum cognoscant cogitationes cordium. (4) Whether they know secret thoughts? Quinto, utrum cognoscant omnia mysteria gratiae. (5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum angeli cognoscant res materiales Whether the angels know material things? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non cognoscant res materiales. Intellectum enim est perfectio intelligentis. Res autem materiales non possunt esse perfectiones angelorum, cum sint infra ipsos. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt res materiales. Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things. Praeterea, visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per sui essentiam, ut dicitur in Glossa, II ad Cor. XII. Sed res materiales non possunt esse in anima hominis, vel in mente angeli, per suas essentias. Ergo non possunt intellectuali visione cognosci, sed solum imaginaria, qua apprehenduntur similitudines corporum; et sensibili, quae est de ipsis corporibus. In angelis autem non est visio imaginaria et sensibilis, sed solum intellectualis. Ergo angeli materialia cognoscere non possunt. Obj. 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss. But the material things cannot enter by their essence into man’s soul, nor into the angel’s mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know material things. Praeterea, res materiales non sunt intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt cognoscibiles apprehensione sensus et imaginationis; quae non est in angelis. Ergo angeli materialia non cognoscunt. Obj. 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things. Sed contra, quidquid potest inferior virtus, potest virtus superior. Sed intellectus hominis, qui est ordine naturae infra intellectum angeli, potest cognoscere res materiales. Ergo multo fortius intellectus angeli. On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man’s intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior to the angel’s, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel. Respondeo dicendum quod talis est ordo in rebus, quod superiora in entibus sunt perfectiora inferioribus, et quod in inferioribus continetur deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter, in superioribus continetur eminenter et per quandam totalitatem et simplicitatem. Et ideo in Deo, sicut in summo rerum vertice, omnia supersubstantialiter praeexistunt secundum ipsum suum simplex esse, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom. angeli autem inter ceteras creaturas sunt Deo propinquiores et similiores, unde et plura participant ex bonitate divina, et perfectius, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis angelis praeexistunt, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus; multiplicius autem et imperfectius quam in Deo. I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fullness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God. Omne autem quod est in aliquo; est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Angeli autem secundum suam naturam sunt intellectuales. Et ideo, sicut Deus per suam essentiam materialia cognoscit, ita angeli ea cognoscunt per hoc quod sunt in eis per suas intelligibiles species. Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelligible species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis secundum speciem intelligibilem quam habet in intellectu. Et sic species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu angeli, sunt perfectiones et actus intellectus angelici. Reply Obj. 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect. Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum. Similiter neque imaginatio, sed apprehendit solas similitudines corporum. Intellectus autem solus apprehendit essentias rerum. Unde in III de Anima dicitur quod obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, circa quod non errat, sicut neque sensus circa proprium sensibile. Sic ergo essentiae rerum materialium sunt in intellectu hominis vel angeli, ut intellectum est in intelligente, et non secundum esse suum reale. Quaedam vero sunt quae sunt in intellectu vel in anima secundum utrumque esse. Et utrorumque est visio intellectualis. Reply Obj. 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is what a thing is, regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si angelus acciperet cognitionem rerum materialium ab ipsis rebus materialibus, oporteret quod faceret eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas. Non autem accipit cognitionem earum a rebus materialibus, sed per species actu intelligibiles rerum sibi connaturales, rerum materialium notitiam habet; sicut intellectus noster secundum species quas intelligibiles facit abstrahendo. Reply Obj. 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves; he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum angelus singularia cognoscat Whether an angel knows singulars? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus singularia non cognoscat. Dicit enim Philosophus, in I Physic., quod sensus est singularium, ratio vero (vel intellectus) universalium. In angelis autem non est vis cognoscitiva nisi intellectiva, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo singularia non cognoscunt. Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 22): The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect, universals. Now, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from what was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Consequently they do not know singulars. Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem aliquam cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sed non videtur quod possit esse aliqua assimilatio angeli ad singulare inquantum est singulare, cum angelus sit immaterialis, ut supra dictum est, singularitatis vero principium sit materia. Ergo angelus non potest cognoscere singularia. Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Q. 50, A. 2), an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars. Praeterea, si angelus scit singularia, aut per species singulares, aut per species universales. Non per singulares, quia sic oporteret quod haberet species infinitas. Neque per universales, quia universale non est sufficiens principium cognoscendi singulare inquantum est singulare, cum in universali singularia non cognoscantur nisi in potentia. Ergo angelus non cognoscit singularia. Obj. 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars. Sed contra, nullus potest custodire quod non cognoscit. Sed angeli custodiunt homines singulares, secundum illud Psalmi XC, Angelis suis mandavit de te, et cetera. Ergo angeli cognoscunt singularia. On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: He hath given His angels charge over Thee. Consequently the angels know singulars. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam totaliter subtraxerunt angelis singularium cognitionem. Sed hoc primo quidem derogat Catholicae fidei, quae ponit haec inferiora administrari per angelos, secundum illud Heb. I, Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus. Si autem singularium notitiam non haberent, nullam providentiam habere possent de his quae in hoc mundo aguntur; cum actus singularium sint. Et hoc est contra illud quod dicitur Eccle. V, Ne dicas coram angelo, non est providentia. Secundo, etiam derogat philosophiae documentis, secundum quae ponuntur angeli motores caelestium orbium, et quod eos moveant secundum intellectum et voluntatem. I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to Heb. 1:14: They are all ministering spirits. Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: Say not before the angel: There is no providence. Second, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and will. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod angelus habet quidem cognitionem singularium, sed in causis universalibus, ad quas reducuntur particulares omnes effectus, sicut si astrologus iudicet de aliqua eclipsi futura, per dispositiones caelestium motuum. Sed haec positio praedicta inconvenientia non evadit, quia sic cognoscere singulare in causis universalibus, non est cognoscere ipsum ut est singulare, hoc est ut est hic et nunc. Astrologus enim cognoscens eclipsim futuram per computationem caelestium motuum, scit eam in universali; et non prout est hic et nunc, nisi per sensum accipiat. Administratio autem et providentia et motus sunt singularium, prout sunt hic et nunc. Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognitivis omnia rerum genera, intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia, sensu autem singularia et corporalia; ita angelus per unam intellectivam virtutem utraque cognoscit. Hoc enim rerum ordo habet, quod quanto aliquid est superius, tanto habeat virtutem magis unitam et ad plura se extendentem, sicut in ipso homine patet quod sensus communis, qui est superior quam sensus proprius, licet sit unica potentia, omnia cognoscit quae quinque sensibus exterioribus cognoscuntur, et quaedam alia quae nullus sensus exterior cognoscit, scilicet differentiam albi et dulcis. Et simile etiam est in aliis considerare. Unde cum angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, inconveniens est dicere quod homo quacumque sua potentia cognoscat aliquid, quod angelus per unam vim suam cognoscitivam, scilicet intellectum, non cognoscat. Unde Aristoteles pro inconvenienti habet ut litem, quam nos scimus, Deus ignoret; ut patet in I de Anima, et in III Metaphys. Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. iii, text. 15). Modus autem quo intellectus angeli singularia cognoscit, ex hoc considerari potest quod, sicut a Deo effluunt res ut subsistant in propriis naturis, ita etiam ut sint in cognitione angelica. Manifestum est autem quod a Deo effluit in rebus non solum illud quod ad naturam universalem pertinet, sed etiam ea quae sunt individuationis principia, est enim causa totius substantiae rei, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam. Et secundum quod causat, sic et cognoscit, quia scientia eius est causa rei, ut supra ostensum est. Sicut igitur Deus per essentiam suam, per quam omnia causat, est similitudo omnium, et per eam omnia cognoscit non solum quantum ad naturas universales, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem; ita angeli per species a Deo inditas, res cognoscunt non solum quantum ad naturam universalem, sed etiam secundum earum singularitatem, inquantum sunt quaedam repraesentationes multiplicatae illius unicae et simplicis essentiae. The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de intellectu nostro, qui non intelligit res nisi abstrahendo; et per ipsam abstractionem a materialibus conditionibus, id quod abstrahitur, fit universale. Hic autem modus intelligendi non convenit angelis, ut supra dictum est, et ideo non est eadem ratio. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels, as was said above (Q. 55, A. 2, A. 3 ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison. Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum suam naturam angeli non assimilantur rebus materialibus sicut assimilatur aliquid alicui secundum convenientiam in genere vel in specie, aut in accidente; sed sicut superius habet similitudinem cum inferiori, ut sol cum igne. Et per hunc etiam modum in Deo est similitudo omnium, et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, inquantum in ipso praeexistit ut in causa quidquid in rebus invenitur. Et eadem ratione species intellectus angeli, quae sunt quaedam derivatae similitudines a divina essentia, sunt similitudines rerum non solum quantum ad formam, sed etiam quantum ad materiam. Reply Obj. 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel’s intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their matter. Ad tertium dicendum quod angeli cognoscunt singularia per formas universales, quae tamen sunt similitudines rerum et quantum ad principia universalia, et quantum ad individuationis principia. Quomodo autem per eandem speciem possint multa cognosci iam supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above (Q. 55, A. 3, ad 3). Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum angeli cognoscant futura Whether angels know the future? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli cognoscant futura. Angeli enim potentiores sunt in cognoscendo quam homines. Sed homines aliqui cognoscunt multa futura. Ergo multo fortius angeli. Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. Therefore much more do the angels. Praeterea, praesens et futurum sunt differentiae temporis. Sed intellectus angeli est supra tempus, parificatur enim intelligentia aeternitati, idest aevo, ut dicitur in libro de Causis. Ergo quantum ad intellectum angeli, non differunt praeteritum et futurum; sed indifferenter cognoscit utrumque. Obj. 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel’s intellect is above time; because, as is said in De Causis, an intelligence keeps pace with eternity, that is, aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel’s mind, past and future are not different, but he knows each indifferently.