Quaestio 58 Question 58 De modo angelicae cognitionis The Mode of Angelic Knowledge Post haec considerandum est de modo angelicae cognitionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur septem. After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry: Primo, utrum intellectus angeli quandoque sit in potentia, quandoque in actu. (1) Whether the angel’s intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act? Secundo, utrum angelus possit simul intelligere multa. (2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time? Tertio, utrum intelligat discurrendo. (3) Whether the angel’s knowledge is discursive? Quarto, utrum intelligat componendo et dividendo. (4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing? Quinto, utrum in intellectu angeli possit esse falsitas. (5) Whether there can be error in the angel’s intellect? Sexto, utrum cognitio angeli possit dici matutina et vespertina. (6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening? Septimo, utrum sit eadem cognitio matutina et vespertina, vel diversae. (7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum intellectus angeli quandoque sit in potentia Whether the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus angeli quandoque sit in potentia. Motus enim est actus existentis in potentia, ut dicitur III Physic. Sed mentes angelicae intelligendo moventur, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo mentes angelicae quandoque sunt in potentia. Objection 1: It would seem that the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels’ minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality. Praeterea, cum desiderium sit rei non habitae, possibilis tamen haberi, quicumque desiderat aliquid intelligere, est in potentia ad illud. Sed I Petri I, dicitur, in quem desiderant angeli prospicere. Ergo intellectus angeli quandoque est in potentia. Obj. 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. But it is said (1 Pet 1:12): On Whom the angels desire to look. Therefore the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality. Praeterea, in libro de Causis dicitur quod intelligentia intelligit secundum modum suae substantiae. Sed substantia angeli habet aliquid de potentia permixtum. Ergo quandoque intelligit in potentia. Obj. 3: Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance. But the angel’s intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes understands potentially. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt., quod angeli, ex quo creati sunt, ipsa verbi aeternitate, sancta et pia contemplatione perfruuntur. Sed intellectus contemplans non est in potentia, sed in actu. Ergo intellectus angeli non est in potentia. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii): Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation. Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima et in VIII Physic., intellectus dupliciter est in potentia, uno modo, sicut ante addiscere vel invenire, idest antequam habeat habitum scientiae; alio modo dicitur esse in potentia, sicut cum iam habet habitum scientiae, sed non considerat. I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, as before learning or discovering, that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; second, as when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not actually consider. Primo igitur modo, intellectus angeli nunquam est in potentia respectu eorum ad quae eius cognitio naturalis se extendere potest. Sicut enim corpora superiora, scilicet caelestia, non habent potentiam ad esse, quae non sit completa per actum; ita caelestes intellectus, scilicet angeli, non habent aliquam intelligibilem potentiam, quae non sit totaliter completa per species intelligibiles connaturales eis. Sed quantum ad ea quae eis divinitus revelantur, nihil prohibet intellectus eorum esse in potentia, quia sic etiam corpora caelestia sunt in potentia quandoque ut illuminentur a sole. In the first way an angel’s intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun. Secundo vero modo, intellectus angeli potest esse in potentia ad ea quae cognoscit naturali cognitione, non enim omnia quae naturali cognitione cognoscit, semper actu considerat. Sed ad cognitionem verbi, et eorum quae in verbo videt, nunquam hoc modo est in potentia, quia semper actu intuetur verbum, et ea quae in verbo videt. In hac enim visione eorum beatitudo consistit, beatitudo autem non consistit in habitu, sed in actu, ut dicit Philosophus, in I Ethic. In the second way an angel’s intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus ibi non sumitur secundum quod est actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sed secundum quod est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu. Sic enim intelligere et sentire dicuntur motus, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Reply Obj. 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28. Ad secundum dicendum quod desiderium illud angelorum non excludit rem desideratam, sed eius fastidium. Vel dicuntur desiderare Dei visionem, quantum ad novas revelationes, quas pro opportunitate negotiorum a Deo recipiunt. Reply Obj. 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform. Ad tertium dicendum quod in substantia angeli non est aliqua potentia denudata ab actu. Et similiter nec intellectus angeli sic est in potentia, quod sit absque actu. Reply Obj. 3: In the angel’s substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel’s intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum angelus possit simul multa intelligere Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit simul multa intelligere. Dicit enim Philosophus, II Topic., quod contingit multa scire, sed unum tantum intelligere. Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one. Praeterea, nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod intellectus formatur per speciem intelligibilem, sicut corpus formatur per figuram. Sed unum corpus non potest formari diversis figuris. Ergo unus intellectus non potest simul intelligere diversa intelligibilia. Obj. 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just as the body is formed by shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things. Praeterea, intelligere est motus quidam. Nullus autem motus terminatur ad diversos terminos. Ergo non contingit simul multa intelligere. Obj. 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, IV sup. Gen. ad Litt., Potentia spiritualis mentis angelicae cuncta quae voluerit, facillime simul comprehendit. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 32): The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it wills. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ad unitatem motus requiritur unitas termini, ita ad unitatem operationis requiritur unitas obiecti. Contingit autem aliqua accipi ut plura, et ut unum; sicut partes alicuius continui. Si enim unaquaeque per se accipiatur, plures sunt, unde et non una operatione, nec simul accipiuntur per sensum et intellectum. Alio modo accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum in toto, et sic simul et una operatione cognoscuntur tam per sensum quam per intellectum, dum totum continuum consideratur, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Et sic etiam intellectus noster simul intelligit subiectum et praedicatum, prout sunt partes unius propositionis; et duo comparata, secundum quod conveniunt in una comparatione. I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. Ex quo patet quod multa, secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi; sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur. Unumquodque autem est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod eius similitudo est in intellectu. Quaecumque igitur per unam speciem intelligibilem cognosci possunt, cognoscuntur ut unum intelligibile; et ideo simul cognoscuntur. Quae vero per diversas species intelligibiles cognoscuntur, ut diversa intelligibilia capiuntur. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects. Angeli igitur ea cognitione qua cognoscunt res per verbum, omnia cognoscunt una intelligibili specie, quae est essentia divina. Et ideo quantum ad talem cognitionem, omnia simul cognoscunt, sicut et in patria non erunt volubiles nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientiam nostram simul uno conspectu videbimus, ut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trin. Ea vero cognitione qua cognoscunt res per species innatas, omnia illa simul possunt intelligere, quae una specie cognoscuntur; non autem illa quae diversis. Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once: just as in heaven our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intelligere multa ut unum, est quodammodo unum intelligere. Reply Obj. 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus formatur per intelligibilem speciem quam apud se habet. Et ideo sic potest una specie intelligibili multa simul intelligibilia intueri, sicut unum corpus per unam figuram potest simul multis corporibus assimilari. Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies. Ad tertium dicendum sicut ad primum. To the third objection the answer is the same as the first. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum angelus cognoscat discurrendo Whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive?