Articulus 4
Article 4
Utrum omnia sint bona bonitate divina
Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona bonitate divina. Dicit enim Augustinus, VIII de Trin., bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Sed unumquodque est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum ipso bono quod est Deus.
Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), This and that are good; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good. But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia dicuntur bona inquantum ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia sunt bona bonitate divina.
Obj. 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.
Sed contra est quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.
On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.
Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae relationem important, aliquid ab extrinseco denominari; sicut aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et mensuratum a mensura.
I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated placed from place, and measured from measure.
Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa fuit opinio. Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat ideam hominis et equi separatam, quam vocabat per se hominem et per se equum, ita ponebat ideam entis et ideam unius separatam, quam dicebat per se ens et per se unum, et eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel unum. Hoc autem quod est per se bonum et per se unum, ponebat esse summum bonum. Et quia bonum convertitur cum ente, sicut et unum, ipsum per se bonum dicebat esse Deum, a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis.
But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Q. 84, A. 4) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of being and of one, and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called being or one; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation.
Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc absolute verum est, quod est aliquod unum per essentiam suam bonum, quod dicimus Deum, ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut ex superioribus patet.
Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves—as Aristotle argues in many ways—still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (Q. 2, A. 3), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above (Q. 4, A. 3).
Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae bonitates.
Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
Quaestio 7
Question 7
De infinitate Dei
The Infinity of God
Post considerationem divinae perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de existentia eius in rebus, attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus.
After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God’s existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum Deus sit infinitus.
(1) Whether God is infinite?
Secundo, utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum essentiam.
(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
Tertio, utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum magnitudinem.
(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
Quarto, utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem.
(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Articulus 1
Article 1
Utrum Deus sit infinitus
Whether God is infinite?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit infinitus. Omne enim infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est infinitus.
Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.
Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
Praeterea, quod ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum secundum locum, ergo quod ita est hoc quod non est aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam. Sed Deus est hoc, et non est aliud, non enim est lapis nec lignum. Ergo Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam.
Obj. 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, quod Deus est infinitus et aeternus et incircumscriptibilis.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that God is infinite and eternal, and boundless.
Respondeo dicendum quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio, ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa infinitatem ipsius. Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam, consequenter attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem, dicentes aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum.
I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia, antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate huius rei.
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing.
Materia autem perficitur per formam per quam finitur, et ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur materiae, habet rationem imperfecti; est enim quasi materia non habens formam. Forma autem non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo contrahitur; unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti.
Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect.
Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.
Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above (Q. 4, A. 1, Obj. 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
Ad secundum dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est sicut forma ipsius, cuius signum est, quod figura, quae consistit in terminatione quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum quod competit quantitati, est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, et alia removentur ab eo, sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc ipso quod non esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente in subiecto.
Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject.
Articulus 2
Article 2
Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam
Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam. Virtus enim rei proportionatur essentiae eius. Si igitur essentia Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus sit infinita. Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum quantitas virtutis per effectum cognoscatur.
Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect.
Praeterea, quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.
Praeterea, materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse infinitum.
Obj. 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.