Quaestio 60 Question 60 De amore seu dilectione angelorum The Love or Dilection of the Angels Deinde considerandum est de actu voluntatis, qui est amor sive dilectio, nam omnis actus appetitivae virtutis ex amore seu dilectione derivatur. The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of love. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in angelis sit dilectio naturalis. (1) Whether there is natural love in the angels? Secundo, utrum in eis sit dilectio electiva. (2) Whether there is in them love of choice? Tertio, utrum angelus diligat seipsum dilectione naturali an electiva. (3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice? Quarto, utrum unus angelus diligat alium dilectione naturali sicut seipsum. (4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself? Quinto, utrum angelus naturali dilectione diligat Deum plus quam seipsum. (5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in angelis sit amor vel dilectio naturalis Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non sit amor vel dilectio naturalis. Amor enim naturalis dividitur contra intellectualem; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed amor angeli est intellectualis. Ergo non est naturalis. Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel’s love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural. Praeterea, ea quae amant amore naturali, magis aguntur quam agant, nihil enim habet dominium suae naturae. Sed angeli non aguntur, sed agunt; cum sint liberi arbitrii, ut ostensum est. Ergo in angelis non est amor seu dilectio naturalis. Obj. 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above (Q. 59, A. 3). Consequently there is no natural love in them. Praeterea, omnis dilectio aut est recta, aut non recta. Dilectio autem recta pertinet ad caritatem, dilectio autem non recta pertinet ad iniquitatem. Neutrum autem horum pertinet ad naturam, quia caritas est supra naturam, iniquitas autem est contra naturam. Ergo nulla dilectio naturalis est in angelis. Obj. 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no natural love in the angels. Sed contra est quod dilectio sequitur cognitionem, nihil enim amatur nisi cognitum, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sed in angelis est cognitio naturalis. Ergo et dilectio naturalis. On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est in angelis ponere dilectionem naturalem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod semper prius salvatur in posteriori. Natura autem prior est quam intellectus, quia natura cuiuscumque rei est essentia eius. Unde id quod est naturae, oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum. I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem, quae est appetitus naturalis vel amor. Quae tamen inclinatio diversimode invenitur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura intellectuali invenitur inclinatio naturalis secundum voluntatem; in natura autem sensitiva, secundum appetitum sensitivum, in natura vero carente cognitione, secundum solum ordinem naturae in aliquid. Unde cum angelus sit natura intellectualis, oportet quod in voluntate eius sit naturalis dilectio. But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectualis amor dividitur contra naturalem qui est solum naturalis, inquantum est naturae quae non addit supra rationem naturae perfectionem sensus aut intellectus. Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia quae sunt in toto mundo, aguntur ab aliquo, praeter primum agens, quod ita agit quod nullo modo ab alio agitur, in quo est idem natura et voluntas. Et ideo non est inconveniens si angelus agatur, inquantum inclinatio naturalis est sibi indita ab auctore suae naturae. Non tamen sic agitur quod non agat; cum habeat liberam voluntatem. Reply Obj. 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera ita dilectio naturalis semper est recta, cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit quam inclinatio naturae indita ab auctore naturae. Dicere ergo quod inclinatio naturalis non sit recta, est derogare auctori naturae. Alia tamen est rectitudo naturalis dilectionis, et alia est rectitudo caritatis et virtutis, quia una rectitudo est perfectiva alterius. Sicut etiam alia est veritas naturalis cognitionis; et alia est veritas cognitionis infusae vel acquisitae. Reply Obj. 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum in angelis sit dilectio electiva Whether there is love of choice in the angels? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non sit dilectio electiva. Dilectio enim electiva videtur esse amor rationalis, cum electio sequatur consilium, quod in inquisitione consistit, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed rationalis amor dividitur contra intellectualem (qui est proprius angelorum); ut dicitur IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo in angelis non est dilectio electiva. Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels. Praeterea, in angelis non est nisi cognitio naturalis, praeter cognitionem infusam, quia non discurrunt de principiis ad acquirendum conclusiones. Et sic ad omnia quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt, sic se habent sicut intellectus noster ad prima principia quae naturaliter cognoscere potest. Sed dilectio sequitur cognitionem, ut dictum est. Ergo in angelis, praeter dilectionem gratuitam, non est nisi dilectio naturalis. Non ergo electiva. Obj. 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them. Sed contra, naturalibus neque meremur neque demeremur. Sed angeli sua dilectione aliqua merentur, vel demerentur. Ergo in eis est aliqua dilectio electiva. On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them. Respondeo dicendum quod in angelis est quaedam dilectio naturalis et quaedam electiva. Et naturalis dilectio in eis est principium electivae, quia semper id quod pertinet ad prius, habet rationem principii; unde, cum natura sit primum quod est in unoquoque, oportet quod id quod ad naturam pertinet, sit principium in quolibet. I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything. Et hoc apparet in homine et quantum ad intellectum, et quantum ad voluntatem. Intellectus enim cognoscit principia naturaliter, et ex hac cognitione causatur in homine scientia conclusionum, quae non cognoscuntur naturaliter ab homine, sed per inventionem vel doctrinam. Similiter in voluntate finis hoc modo se habet, sicut principium in intellectu, ut dicitur in II Physic. Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum, omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates, cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter finem. Dilectio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis, dilectio autem ab hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio electiva. This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end’s sake, is the love of choice. Hoc tamen differenter se habet ex parte intellectus, et voluntatis. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio intellectus fit secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Est autem ex imperfectione intellectualis naturae in homine, quod non statim eius intellectus naturaliter habet omnia intelligibilia, sed quaedam, a quibus in alia quodammodo movetur. Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est, e converso, secundum ordinem appetentis ad res. Quarum quaedam sunt secundum se bona, et ideo secundum se appetibilia, quaedam vero habent rationem bonitatis ex ordine ad aliud, et sunt appetibilia propter aliud. Unde non est ex imperfectione appetentis, quod aliquid appetat naturaliter ut finem, et aliquid per electionem, ut ordinatur in finem. Quia igitur natura intellectualis in angelis perfecta est, invenitur in eis sola cognitio naturalis, non autem ratiocinativa, sed invenitur in eis dilectio et naturalis et electiva. There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q. 59, A. 2), the mind’s knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man’s intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on account of something else. Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice. Haec autem dicta sunt, praetermissis his quae supra naturam sunt, horum enim natura non est principium sufficiens. De his autem infra dicetur. In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (Q. 62). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis dilectio electiva est amor rationalis, secundum quod rationalis amor dividitur contra intellectualem. Dicitur enim sic amor rationalis, qui sequitur cognitionem ratiocinativam, non omnis autem electio consequitur discursum rationis, ut supra dictum est, cum de libero arbitrio ageretur; sed solum electio hominis. Unde ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow. Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum angelus diligat seipsum dilectione naturali et electiva Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non diligat seipsum dilectione naturali et electiva. Dilectio enim naturalis est ipsius finis, sicut dictum est; dilectio autem electiva, eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed idem non potest esse finis et ad finem, respectu eiusdem. Ergo non potest esse eiusdem dilectio naturalis et electiva. Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A. 2), natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object. Praeterea, amor est virtus unitiva et concretiva, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed unitio et concretio est diversorum in unum reductorum. Ergo non potest angelus diligere seipsum. Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): Love is a uniting and a binding power. But uniting and binding imply various things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself. Praeterea, dilectio est quidam motus. Sed omnis motus in alterum tendit. Ergo videtur quod angelus non possit amare seipsum dilectione naturali, nec electiva. Obj. 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural or elective love.