Respondeo dicendum quod nomine beatitudinis intelligitur ultima perfectio rationalis seu intellectualis naturae, et inde est quod naturaliter desideratur, quia unumquodque naturaliter desiderat suam ultimam perfectionem. Ultima autem perfectio rationalis seu intellectualis naturae est duplex. Una quidem, quam potest assequi virtute suae naturae, et haec quodammodo beatitudo vel felicitas dicitur. Unde et Aristoteles perfectissimam hominis contemplationem, qua optimum intelligibile, quod est Deus, contemplari potest in hac vita, dicit esse ultimam hominis felicitatem. Sed super hanc felicitatem est alia felicitas, quam in futuro expectamus, qua videbimus Deum sicuti est. Quod quidem est supra cuiuslibet intellectus creati naturam, ut supra ostensum est. I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man’s ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby we shall see God as He is. This is beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). Sic igitur dicendum est quod, quantum ad primam beatitudinem, quam angelus assequi virtute suae naturae potuit, fuit creatus beatus. Quia perfectionem huiusmodi angelus non acquirit per aliquem motum discursivum, sicut homo, sed statim ei adest propter suae naturae dignitatem, ut supra dictum est. Sed ultimam beatitudinem, quae facultatem naturae excedit, angeli non statim in principio suae creationis habuerunt, quia haec beatitudo non est aliquid naturae, sed naturae finis; et ideo non statim eam a principio debuerunt habere. So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above (Q. 58, AA. 3, 4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo ibi accipitur pro illa perfectione naturali quam angelus habuit in statu innocentiae. Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence. Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura corporalis statim in principio suae creationis habere non potuit perfectionem ad quam per suam operationem perducitur, unde, secundum Augustinum, germinatio plantarum ex terra non statim fuit in primis operibus, in quibus virtus sola germinativa plantarum data est terrae. Et similiter creatura angelica in principio suae creationis habuit perfectionem suae naturae; non autem perfectionem ad quam per suam operationem pervenire debebat. Reply Obj. 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen ad. lit. v, 4, 23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus duplicem habet Verbi cognitionem, unam naturalem, et aliam gloriae, naturalem quidem, qua cognoscit Verbum per eius similitudinem in sua natura relucentem; cognitionem vero gloriae, qua cognoscit Verbum per suam essentiam. Et utraque cognoscit angelus res in Verbo, sed naturali quidem cognitione imperfecte, cognitione vero gloriae perfecte. Prima ergo cognitio rerum in Verbo affuit angelo a principio suae creationis, secunda vero non, sed quando facti sunt beati per conversionem ad bonum. Et haec proprie dicitur cognitio matutina. Reply Obj. 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum angelus indiguerit gratia ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non indiguerit gratia ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Ad ea enim quae naturaliter possumus, gratia non indigemus. Sed naturaliter angelus convertitur in Deum, quia naturaliter Deum diligit, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo angelus non indiguit gratia ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 60, A. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God. Praeterea, ad ea tantum videmur indigere auxilio, quae sunt difficilia. Sed converti ad Deum non erat difficile angelo; cum nihil esset in eo quod huic conversioni repugnaret. Ergo angelus non indiguit auxilio gratiae ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. Praeterea, converti ad Deum est se ad gratiam praeparare, unde Zach. I, dicitur, convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos. Sed nos non indigemus gratia ad hoc quod nos ad gratiam praeparemus, quia sic esset abire in infinitum. Ergo non indiguit gratia angelus ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Obj. 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace; hence it is said (Zech 1:3): Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you. But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God. Sed contra, per conversionem ad Deum angelus pervenit ad beatitudinem. Si igitur non indiguisset gratia ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum, sequeretur quod non indigeret gratia ad habendam vitam aeternam. Quod est contra illud Apostoli, Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Rom 6:23): The grace of God is life everlasting. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli indiguerunt gratia ad hoc quod converterentur in Deum, prout est obiectum beatitudinis. Sicut enim superius dictum est, naturalis motus voluntatis est principium omnium eorum quae volumus. Naturalis autem inclinatio voluntatis est ad id quod est conveniens secundum naturam. Et ideo, si aliquid sit supra naturam, voluntas in id ferri non potest, nisi ab aliquo alio supernaturali principio adiuta. Sicut patet quod ignis habet naturalem inclinationem ad calefaciendum, et ad generandum ignem, sed generare carnem est supra naturalem virtutem ignis, unde ignis ad hoc nullam inclinationem habet, nisi secundum quod movetur ut instrumentum ab anima nutritiva. I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above (Q. 60, A. 2), the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But the will’s natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de Dei cognitione ageretur, quod videre Deum per essentiam, in quo ultima beatitudo rationalis creaturae consistit, est supra naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati. Unde nulla creatura rationalis potest habere motum voluntatis ordinatum ad illam beatitudinem, nisi mota a supernaturali agente. Et hoc dicimus auxilium gratiae. Et ideo dicendum est quod angelus in illam beatitudinem voluntate converti non potuit, nisi per auxilium gratiae. Now it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 4, 5), when we were treating of God’s knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angelus naturaliter diligit Deum, inquantum est principium naturalis esse. Hic autem loquimur de conversione ad Deum, inquantum est beatificans per suae essentiae visionem. Reply Obj. 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence. Ad secundum dicendum quod difficile est quod transcendit potentiam. Sed hoc contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo, quia transcendit potentiam secundum suum naturalem ordinem. Et tunc, si ad hoc possit pervenire aliquo auxilio, dicitur difficile; si autem nullo modo, dicitur impossibile, sicut impossibile est hominem volare. Alio modo transcendit aliquid potentiam, non secundum ordinem naturalem potentiae, sed propter aliquod impedimentum potentiae adiunctum. Sicut ascendere non est contra naturalem ordinem potentiae animae motivae, quia anima, quantum est de se, nata est movere in quamlibet partem, sed impeditur ab hoc propter corporis gravitatem; unde difficile est homini ascendere. Converti autem ad beatitudinem ultimam, homini quidem est difficile et quia est supra naturam, et quia habet impedimentum ex corruptione corporis et infectione peccati. Sed angelo est difficile propter hoc solum quod est supernaturale. Reply Obj. 2: A thing is difficult which is beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be difficult; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is impossible; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural. Ad tertium dicendum quod quilibet motus voluntatis in Deum, potest dici conversio in ipsum. Et ideo triplex est conversio in Deum. Una quidem per dilectionem perfectam, quae est creaturae iam Deo fruentis. Et ad hanc conversionem requiritur gratia consummata. Alia conversio est, quae est meritum beatitudinis. Et ad hanc requiritur habitualis gratia, quae est merendi principium. Tertia conversio est, per quam aliquis praeparat se ad gratiam habendam. Et ad hanc non exigitur aliqua habitualis gratia, sed operatio Dei ad se animam convertentis, secundum illud Thren. ult., converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur. Unde patet quod non est procedere in infinitum. Reply Obj. 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself, according to Lament. 5:21: Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted. Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum angeli sint creati in gratia Whether the angels were created in grace? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non sint creati in gratia. Dicit enim Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., quod angelica natura primo erat informiter creata, et caelum dicta, postmodum vero formata est, et lux appellata. Sed haec formatio est per gratiam. Ergo non sunt creati in gratia. Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was first made without form, and was called heaven: but afterwards it received its form, and was then called light. But such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace. Praeterea, gratia inclinat creaturam rationalem in Deum. Si igitur angelus in gratia creatus fuisset, nullus angelus fuisset a Deo aversus. Obj. 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God. Praeterea, gratia medium est inter naturam et gloriam. Sed angeli non fuerunt beati in sua creatione. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam creati sint in gratia, sed primo in natura tantum; postea autem adepti sunt gratiam; et ultimo facti sunt beati. Obj. 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were beatified. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Civ. Dei, bonam voluntatem quis fecit in angelis, nisi ille qui eos cum sua voluntate, idest cum amore casto quo illi adhaerent, creavit, simul in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam? On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them? Respondeo dicendum quod, quamvis super hoc sint diversae opiniones, quibusdam dicentibus quod creati sunt angeli in naturalibus tantum, aliis vero quod sunt creati in gratia; hoc tamen probabilius videtur tenendum, et magis dictis sanctorum consonum est, quod fuerunt creati in gratia gratum faciente. Sic enim videmus quod omnia quae processu temporis per opus divinae providentiae, creatura sub Deo operante, sunt producta, in prima rerum conditione producta sunt secundum quasdam seminales rationes, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt.; sicut arbores et animalia et alia huiusmodi. Manifestum est autem quod gratia gratum faciens hoc modo comparatur ad beatitudinem, sicut ratio seminalis in natura ad effectum naturalem, unde I Ioan. III, gratia semen Dei nominatur. Sicut igitur, secundum opinionem Augustini, ponitur quod statim in prima creatione corporalis creaturae inditae sunt ei seminales rationes omnium naturalium effectuum, ita statim a principio sunt angeli creati in gratia. I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state, while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, being created by the work of Divine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect; hence (1 John 3:9) grace is called the seed of God. As, then, in Augustine’s opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod informitas illa angeli potest intelligi vel per comparationem ad formationem gloriae, et sic praecessit tempore informitas formationem. Reply Obj. 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Vel per comparationem ad formationem gratiae, et sic non praecessit ordine temporis, sed ordine naturae; sicut etiam de formatione corporali Augustinus ponit. Or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen ad lit. i, 15). Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis forma inclinat suum subiectum secundum modum naturae eius. Modus autem naturalis intellectualis naturae est, ut libere feratur in ea quae vult. Et ideo inclinatio gratiae non imponit necessitatem, sed habens gratiam potest ea non uti, et peccare. Reply Obj. 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject’s nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can fail to make use of it, and can sin. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis gratia sit medium inter naturam et gloriam ordine naturae tamen ordine temporis in natura creata non debuit simul esse gloria cum natura, quia est finis operationis ipsius naturae per gratiam adiutae. Gratia autem non se habet ut finis operationis, quia non est ex operibus; sed ut principium bene operandi. Et ideo statim cum natura gratiam dare conveniens fuit. Reply Obj. 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be given straightway with nature. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum angelus beatus suam beatitudinem meruerit Whether an angel merits his beatitude? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus beatus suam beatitudinem non meruerit. Meritum enim est ex difficultate actus meritorii. Sed nullam difficultatem angelus habuit ad bene operandum. Ergo bona operatio non fuit ei meritoria. Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him. Praeterea, naturalibus non meremur. Sed naturale fuit angelo quod converteretur ad Deum. Ergo per hoc non meruit beatitudinem. Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude. Praeterea, si angelus beatus beatitudinem suam meruit, aut ergo antequam eam haberet, aut post. Sed non ante, quia, ut multis videtur, ante non habuit gratiam, sine qua nullum est meritum. Nec etiam post, quia sic etiam modo mereretur, quod videtur esse falsum, quia sic minor angelus merendo ad superioris angeli gradum posset pertingere, et non essent stabiles distinctiones graduum gratiae; quod est inconveniens. Non ergo angelus beatus suam beatitudinem meruit. Obj. 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude. Sed contra, Apoc. XXI, dicitur quod mensura angeli, in illa caelesti Ierusalem, est mensura hominis. Sed homo ad beatitudinem pertingere non potest nisi per meritum. Ergo neque angelus. On the contrary, It is stated (Rev 21:17) that the measure of the angel in that heavenly Jerusalem is the measure of a man. But man can only reach beatitude by merit. Therefore the same is the case with the angel. Respondeo dicendum quod soli Deo beatitudo perfecta est naturalis quia idem est sibi esse et beatum esse. Cuiuslibet autem creaturae esse beatum non est natura, sed ultimus finis. Quaelibet autem res ad ultimum finem per suam operationem pertingit. Quae quidem operatio in finem ducens, vel est factiva finis, quando finis non excedit virtutem eius quod operatur propter finem, sicut medicatio est factiva sanitatis, vel est meritoria finis, quando finis excedit virtutem operantis propter finem, unde expectatur finis ex dono alterius. Beatitudo autem ultima excedit et naturam angelicam et humanam, ut ex dictis patet. Unde relinquitur quod tam homo quam angelus suam beatitudinem meruerit. I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude, however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it is looked for from another’s bestowing. Now it is evident from what has gone before (AA. 1, 2; Q. 12, AA. 4, 5) that ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains, then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude. Et si quidem angelus in gratia creatus fuit, sine qua nullum est meritum, absque difficultate dicere possumus quod suam beatitudinem meruerit. Et similiter si quis diceret quod qualitercumque gratiam habuerit antequam gloriam. And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory. Si vero gratiam non habuit antequam esset beatus, sic oportet dicere quod beatitudinem absque merito habuit, sicut nos gratiam. Quod tamen est contra rationem beatitudinis, quae habet rationem finis, et est praemium virtutis, ut etiam Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic. But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9).