Ad primum ergo dicendum quod daemones non delectantur in obscenitatibus carnalium peccatorum; quasi ipsi afficiantur ad delectationes carnales, sed hoc totum ex invidia procedit, quod in peccatis hominum quibuscumque delectantur, inquantum sunt impedimenta humani boni. Reply Obj. 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man’s good. Ad secundum dicendum quod avaritia, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est immoderatus appetitus rerum temporalium quae veniunt in usum vitae humanae, quaecumque pecunia aestimari possunt, et ad ista non afficiuntur daemones, sicut nec ad delectationes carnales. Unde avaritia proprie sumpta in eis esse non potest. Sed si avaritia dicatur omnis immoderata cupiditas habendi quodcumque bonum creatum, sic avaritia continetur in superbia quae est in daemonibus. Ira vero cum quadam passione est, sicut et concupiscentia. Unde ipsa in daemonibus esse non potest nisi metaphorice. Acedia vero est quaedam tristitia, qua homo redditur tardus ad spirituales actus propter corporalem laborem; qui daemonibus non competit. Et sic patet quod sola superbia et invidia sunt pure spiritualia peccata, quae daemonibus competere possunt, ita tamen quod invidia non sumatur pro passione, sed pro voluntate renitente bono alterius. Reply Obj. 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another. Ad tertium dicendum quod sub invidia et superbia, prout in daemonibus ponuntur, comprehenduntur omnia peccata quae ab illis derivantur. Reply Obj. 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Diabolus appetierit esse ut Deus Whether the devil desired to be as God? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non appetierit esse ut Deus. Illud enim quod non cadit in apprehensione, non cadit in appetitu, cum bonum apprehensum moveat appetitum vel sensibilem, vel rationalem, vel intellectualem (in solo enim huiusmodi appetitu contingit esse peccatum). Sed creaturam aliquam esse aequalem Deo, non cadit in apprehensione, implicat enim contradictionem, quia necesse est finitum esse infinitum, si aequatur infinito. Ergo angelus non potuit appetere esse ut Deus. Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be God’s equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for if the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God. Praeterea, illud quod est finis naturae, absque peccato appeti potest. Sed assimilari Deo est finis in quem tendit naturaliter quaelibet creatura. Si ergo angelus appetiit esse ut Deus, non per aequalitatem, sed per similitudinem, videtur quod in hoc non peccaverit. Obj. 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin. Praeterea, angelus in maiori plenitudine sapientiae conditus est quam homo. Sed nullus homo, nisi omnino amens, eligit esse aequalis angelo, nedum Deo, quia electio non est nisi possibilium, de quibus est consilium. Ergo multo minus peccavit angelus appetendo esse ut Deus. Obj. 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fullness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XIV, ex persona Diaboli, ascendam in caelum, et ero similis altissimo. Et Augustinus dicit in libro de Quaestionibus Vet. Test., quod elatione inflatus, voluit dici Deus. On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Isa 14:13, 14), I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High. And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being inflated with pride, he wished to be called God. Respondeo dicendum quod angelus, absque omni dubio, peccavit appetendo esse ut Deus. Sed hoc potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo, per aequiparantiam; alio modo, per similitudinem. Primo quidem modo, non potuit appetere esse ut Deus, quia scivit hoc esse impossibile, naturali cognitione; nec primum actum peccandi in ipso praecessit vel habitus vel passio ligans cognoscitivam ipsius virtutem, ut in particulari deficiens eligeret impossibile, sicut in nobis interdum accidit. I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; second, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. Et tamen, dato quod esset possibile, hoc esset contra naturale desiderium. Inest enim unicuique naturale desiderium ad conservandum suum esse, quod non conservaretur, si transmutaretur in alteram naturam. Unde nulla res quae est in inferiori gradu naturae, potest appetere superioris naturae gradum, sicut asinus non appetit esse equus, quia si transferretur in gradum superioris naturae, iam ipsum non esset. Sed in hoc imaginatio decipitur, quia enim homo appetit esse in altiori gradu quantum ad aliqua accidentalia, quae possunt crescere absque corruptione subiecti, aestimatur quod possit appetere altiorem gradum naturae, in quem pervenire non posset nisi esse desineret. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Manifestum est autem quod Deus excedit angelum, non secundum aliqua accidentalia, sed secundum gradum naturae, et etiam unus angelus alium. Unde impossibile est quod angelus inferior appetat esse aequalis superiori; nedum quod appetat esse aequalis Deo. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God. Appetere autem esse ut Deus per similitudinem, contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad id in quo aliquid natum est Deo assimilari. Et sic, si aliquis quantum ad hoc appetat esse Deo similis, non peccat, dummodo similitudinem Dei debito ordine appetat adipisci, ut scilicet eam a Deo habeat. Peccaret vero si quis etiam appeteret secundum iustitiam esse similis Deo, quasi propria virtute, et non ex virtute Dei. To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God’s power. Alio vero modo potest aliquis appetere similis esse Deo, quantum ad hoc in quo non natus est assimilari; sicut si quis appeteret creare caelum et terram, quod est proprium Dei; in quo appetitu esset peccatum. Et hoc modo Diabolus appetiit esse ut Deus. Non ut ei assimilaretur quantum ad hoc quod est nulli subesse simpliciter, quia sic etiam suum non esse appeteret, cum nulla creatura esse possit nisi per hoc quod sub Deo esse participat. Sed in hoc appetiit esse similis Deo, quia appetiit ut finem ultimum beatitudinis id ad quod virtute suae naturae poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quae est ex gratia Dei. Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem quae datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suae naturae, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem. Et hoc consonat dictis Anselmi, qui dicit quod appetiit illud ad quod pervenisset si stetisset. Et haec duo quodammodo in idem redeunt, quia secundum utrumque appetiit finalem beatitudinem per suam virtutem habere, quod est proprium Dei. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own ‘not-being’; since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect—by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God’s grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God’s ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm’s opinion, who says that he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast. These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone. Quia vero quod est per se, est principium et causa eius quod est per aliud, ex hoc etiam consecutum est quod appetiit aliquem principatum super alia habere. In quo etiam perverse voluit Deo assimilari. Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta. From this we have the answer to all the objections. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum aliqui daemones sint naturaliter mali Whether any demons are naturally wicked? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqui daemones sint naturaliter mali. Dicit enim Porphyrius, ut Augustinus introducit X de Civ. Dei, quod est quoddam genus daemonum natura fallax, simulans deos et animas defunctorum. Sed esse fallacem est esse malum. Ergo aliqui daemones sunt naturaliter mali. Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead. But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked. Praeterea, sicut angeli sunt creati a Deo, ita et homines. Sed aliqui homines sunt naturaliter mali, de quibus dicitur Sap. XII, erat eorum malitia naturalis. Ergo et angeli aliqui possunt esse naturaliter mali. Obj. 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis 12:10): Their malice is natural. Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked. Praeterea, aliqua animalia irrationalia habent quasdam naturales malitias, sicut vulpes naturaliter est subdola, et lupus naturaliter est rapax, et tamen sunt creaturae Dei. Ergo et daemones, licet sint creaturae Dei, possunt esse naturaliter mali. Obj. 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious; yet they are God’s creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God’s creatures, they may be naturally wicked. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod daemones non sunt natura mali. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the demons are not naturally wicked. Respondeo dicendum quod omne quod est, inquantum est et naturam habet aliquam, in bonum aliquod naturaliter tendit, utpote ex principio bono existens, quia semper effectus convertitur in suum principium. Contingit autem alicui bono particulari aliquod malum esse adiunctum, sicut igni coniungitur hoc malum quod est esse consumptivum aliorum, sed bono universali nullum malum potest esse adiunctum. Si ergo aliquid sit cuius natura ordinetur in aliquod bonum particulare, potest naturaliter tendere in aliquod malum, non inquantum malum, sed per accidens, inquantum est coniunctum cuidam bono. Si vero aliquid sit cuius natura ordinetur in aliquod bonum secundum communem boni rationem, hoc secundum suam naturam non potest tendere in aliquod malum. Manifestum est autem quod quaelibet natura intellectualis habet ordinem in bonum universale, quod potest apprehendere, et quod est obiectum voluntatis. Unde cum daemones sint substantiae intellectuales, nullo modo possunt habere inclinationem naturalem in aliquod quodcumque malum. Et ideo non possunt esse naturaliter mali. I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibidem reprehendit Porphyrium de hoc quod dixit quod daemones erant naturaliter fallaces, dicens eos non esse naturaliter fallaces, sed propria voluntate. Porphyrius autem hac ratione posuit daemones esse natura fallaces, quia ponebat daemones esse animalia habentia naturam sensitivam. Natura autem sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquod bonum particulare, cui potest esse coniunctum malum. Et secundum hoc, aliquam inclinationem naturalem habere possunt ad malum; per accidens tamen, inquantum malum est coniunctum bono. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good. Ad secundum dicendum quod malitia aliquorum hominum potest dici naturalis, vel propter consuetudinem, quae est altera natura; vel propter naturalem inclinationem ex parte naturae sensitivae, ad aliquam inordinatam passionem, sicut quidam dicuntur naturaliter iracundi vel concupiscentes; non autem ex parte naturae intellectualis. Reply Obj. 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature. Ad tertium dicendum quod animalia bruta secundum naturam sensitivam habent naturalem inclinationem ad quaedam particularia bona, quibus coniuncta sunt aliqua mala; sicut vulpes ad quaerendum victum sagaciter, cui adiungitur dolositas. Unde esse dolosum non est malum vulpi, cum sit ei naturale; sicut nec esse furiosum est malum cani, sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Reply Obj. 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv). Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus per culpam propriae voluntatis Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus per culpam propriae voluntatis. Dicitur enim Ioan. VIII, de diabolo, ille homicida erat ab initio. Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil (John 8:44): He was a murderer from the beginning. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, I super Gen. ad Litt., informitas creaturae non praecessit formationem tempore, sed origine tantum. Per caelum autem quod legitur primo creatum, ut ipse dicit in II libro, intelligitur natura angelica informis; per hoc autem quod dicitur quod Deus dixit, fiat lux, et facta est lux, intelligitur formatio eius per conversionem ad Verbum; simul ergo natura angeli creata est, et facta est lux. Sed simul dum facta est lux, distincta est a tenebris, per quas intelliguntur angeli peccantes. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis quidam angeli fuerunt beati, et quidam peccaverunt. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen ad lit. ii, 8), the heaven, which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: Be light made: and light was made, we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from darkness, whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned. Praeterea, peccatum opponitur merito. Sed in primo instanti suae creationis aliqua natura intellectualis potest mereri; sicut anima Christi, vel etiam ipsi boni angeli. Ergo et daemones in primo instanti suae creationis potuerunt peccare. Obj. 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation. Praeterea, natura angelica virtuosior est quam natura corporea. Sed res corporalis statim in primo instanti suae creationis incipit habere suam operationem; sicut ignis in primo instanti quo generatus est, incipit moveri sursum. Ergo et angelus in primo instanti suae creationis potuit operari. Aut ergo habuit operationem rectam, aut non rectam. Si rectam, cum gratiam habuerint, per eam meruerunt beatitudinem. In angelis autem statim ad meritum sequitur praemium, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fuissent statim beati, et ita nunquam peccassent, quod est falsum. Relinquitur ergo quod in primo instanti, non recte operando, peccaverunt. Obj. 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (Q. 62, A. 5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Inter ea autem erant etiam daemones. Ergo et daemones aliquando fuerunt boni. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. But among them were also the demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod statim daemones in primo instanti suae creationis mali fuerunt, non quidem per naturam, sed per peccatum propriae voluntatis, quia ex quo est factus Diabolus, iustitiam recusavit. Cui sententiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, quisquis acquiescit, non cum illis haereticis sapit, idest Manichaeis, qui dicunt quod diabolus habet naturam mali. Sed quia haec opinio auctoritati Scripturae contradicit (dicitur enim, sub figura principis Babylonis, de Diabolo, Isaiae XIV, quomodo cecidisti, Lucifer, qui mane oriebaris? Et Ezech. XXVIII, in deliciis Paradisi Dei fuisti dicitur ad Diabolum sub persona regis Tyri), ideo a magistris haec opinio tanquam erronea rationabiliter reprobata est. I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil’s nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of Scripture—for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (Isa 14:12): How art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning! and it is said to the devil in the person of the King of Tyre (Ezek 28:13): Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God,—consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous. Unde aliqui dixerunt quod angeli in primo instanti suae creationis peccare potuerunt, sed non peccaverunt. Sed haec opinio etiam a quibusdam improbatur ea ratione quia, cum duae operationes se consequuntur, impossibile videtur quod in eodem nunc utraque operatio terminetur. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum angeli fuit operatio creatione posterior. Terminus autem creationis est ipsum esse angeli; terminus vero operationis peccati est quod sunt mali. Impossibile ergo videtur quod in primo instanti quo angelus esse coepit, fuerit malus. Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel’s sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel’s very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence. Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficiens. Habet enim solum locum in motibus temporalibus, qui successive aguntur; sicut si motus localis sequitur ad alterationem, non potest in eodem instanti terminari alteratio et localis motus. Sed si sunt mutationes instantaneae, simul et in eodem instanti potest esse terminus primae et secundae mutationis; sicut in eodem instanti in quo illuminatur luna a sole, illuminatur aer a luna. Manifestum est autem quod creatio est instantanea; et similiter motus liberi arbitrii in angelis; non enim indigent collatione et discursu rationis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde nihil prohibet simul et in eodem instanti esse terminum creationis, et terminum liberi arbitrii. This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively; thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (Q. 58, A. 3). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant.