Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum anima sit producta in esse per creationem Whether the soul was produced by creation? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale, fit ex materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus purus. Ergo anima est facta ex materia. Non ergo est creata. Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created. Praeterea, omnis actus materiae alicuius videtur educi de potentia materiae, cum enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet praeexistit in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiae corporalis, ut ex eius definitione apparet. Ergo anima educitur de potentia materiae. Obj. 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. Praeterea, anima est forma quaedam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione omnes aliae formae. Et sic nulla forma exibit in esse per generationem. Quod est inconveniens. Obj. 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit in esse per creationem. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:27): God created man to His own image. But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created. Respondeo dicendum quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, quod non est verum de aliis formis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente, neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae; neque spirituali, quia sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem. I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said in Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as of something rather than as something. The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter—whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being—or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum, quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia praeiacente. Reply Obj. 1: The soul’s simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul’s essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. Ad secundum dicendum quod actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est; propterea non educitur de potentia materiae. Reply Obj. 2: The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. 75, A. 2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de anima rationali, et de aliis formis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum anima rationalis sit producta a Deo immediate, sed mediantibus angelis Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately, or by the instrumentality of the angels? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis non sit producta a Deo immediate, sed mediantibus angelis. Maior enim ordo est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Sed corpora inferiora producuntur per corpora superiora, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo et inferiores spiritus, qui sunt animae rationales, producuntur per spiritus superiores, qui sunt angeli. Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels. Praeterea, finis rerum respondet principio, Deus enim est principium et finis rerum. Ergo et exitus rerum a principio respondet reductioni rerum in finem. Sed infima reducuntur per prima, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo et infima procedunt in esse per prima, scilicet animae per angelos. Obj. 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But inferior things are forwarded by the higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels. Praeterea, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed spirituales substantiae sunt multo magis perfectae quam corporales. Cum ergo corpora faciant sibi similia secundum speciem, multo magis angeli poterunt facere aliquid infra se secundum speciem naturae, scilicet animam rationalem. Obj. 3: Further, perfect is that which can produce its like, as is stated in Meteor. iv. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, quod Deus ipse inspiravit in faciem hominis spiraculum vitae. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:7) that God Himself breathed into the face of man the breath of life. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod angeli, secundum quod operantur in virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem. Solus autem Deus potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando. Et quia anima rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate. I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 3): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. Nam quod corpora causant vel sibi similia vel inferiora, et quod superiora reducunt inferiora, totum hoc provenit per quandam transmutationem. Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior—all these things are effected through a certain transmutation. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus Whether the human soul was produced before the body? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. Opus enim creationis praecessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut supra habitum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem; corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis producta est ante corpus. Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (Q. 66, A. 1; Q. 70, A. 1). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body. Praeterea, anima rationalis magis convenit cum angelis quam cum animalibus brutis. Sed angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, quando et bruta animalia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit creata ante corpus. Obj. 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus. Obj. 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body. Sed contra est quod actus proprius fit in potentia propria. Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore. On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum angelis creatas; propter hoc quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam angelos, aequales esse secundum suae naturae conditionem, sed solum merito distare; sic ut quaedam earum corporibus alligarentur, quae sunt animae hominum vel caelestium corporum; quaedam vero in sui puritate, secundum diversos ordines, remanerent. De qua opinione supra iam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad praesens. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them—namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies—are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. 47, A. 2); and so we need say nothing about it here. Augustinus vero, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod anima primi hominis ante corpus cum angelis est creata, propter aliam rationem. Quia scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes, quod non potest de anima dici; quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut spirituali praeexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata produci potuit. Et ideo videtur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum angelis fuerit creata; et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus administrandum. Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut eius verba demonstrant. Dicit enim, credatur, si nulla Scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi, anima vero iam ipsa crearetur. Augustine, however (Gen ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some causal virtues; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen ad lit. vii, 29): We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created. Posset autem hoc utique tolerari secundum eos qui ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et naturam completam, et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed solum ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur corpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanae naturae, hoc omnino esse non potest. Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto statu suae naturae, secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei species exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. Sustinendo ergo opinionem Augustini de operibus sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima humana praecessit in operibus sex dierum secundum quandam similitudinem generis, prout convenit cum angelis in intellectuali natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secundum alios vero sanctos, tam anima quam corpus primi hominis in operibus sex dierum sunt producta. Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days (Q. 74, A. 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si natura animae haberet integram speciem, ita quod secundum se crearetur, ratio illa procederet, ut per se in principio crearetur. Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore. Reply Obj. 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body. Et similiter est dicendum ad secundum. Nam anima si per se speciem haberet, magis conveniret cum angelis. Sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet ad genus animalium, ut formale principium. Reply Obj. 2: The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. Ad tertium dicendum quod animam remanere post corpus, accidit per defectum corporis, qui est mors. Qui quidem defectus in principio creationis animae, esse non debuit. Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created. Quaestio 91 Question 91 De productione corporis primi hominis The Production of the First Man’s Body Deinde considerandum est de productione corporis primi hominis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We have now to consider the production of the first man’s body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, de materia ex qua productum est. (1) The matter from which it was produced; Secundo, de auctore a quo productum est. (2) The author by whom it was produced;