Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae. Unde super illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, Glossa distinguit triplicem imaginem, scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis. I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Second, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Third, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us (Ps 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of creation, of re-creation, and of likeness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tam in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam. Unde Gen. I, cum dixisset, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, scilicet hominem, subdidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, et dixit pluraliter eos, ut Augustinus dicit, ne intelligatur in uno individuo uterque sexus fuisse coniunctus. Sed quantum ad aliquid secundario imago Dei invenitur in viro, secundum quod non invenitur in muliere, nam vir est principium mulieris et finis, sicut Deus est principium et finis totius creaturae. Unde cum apostolus dixisset quod vir imago et gloria est Dei, mulier autem est gloria viri; ostendit quare hoc dixerit, subdens, non enim vir est ex muliere, sed mulier ex viro; et vir non est creatus propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum. Reply Obj. 1: The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, To the image of God He created him, it is added, Male and female He created them (Gen 1:27). Moreover it is said them in the plural, as Augustine (Gen ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man, he adds his reason for saying this: For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man. Ad secundum et tertium dicendum quod illae rationes procedunt de imagine quae est secundum conformitatem gratiae et gloriae. Reply Obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum in homine sit imago Dei quantum ad trinitatem divinarum personarum Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in homine non sit imago Dei quantum ad Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Fide ad Petrum, una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter divinitas, et imago ad quam factus est homo. Et Hilarius, in V de Trin., dicit quod homo fit ad communem Trinitatis imaginem. Est ergo in homine imago Dei quantum ad essentiam, et non quantum ad Trinitatem personarum. Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum i): One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made. And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity. Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. Praeterea, in libro de Eccles. Dogmat. dicitur quod imago Dei attenditur in homine secundum aeternitatem. Damascenus etiam dicit quod hominem esse ad imaginem Dei, significat intellectuale, et arbitrio liberum, et per se potestativum. Gregorius etiam Nyssenus dicit quod, cum Scriptura dixit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, aequale est ac si diceret humanam naturam omnis boni factam esse participem; bonitatis enim plenitudo divinitas est. Haec autem omnia non pertinent ad distinctionem personarum, sed magis ad essentiae unitatem. Ergo in homine est imago Dei, non secundum Trinitatem personarum, sed secundum essentiae unitatem. Obj. 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement. Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fullness of goodness. Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence. Praeterea, imago ducit in cognitionem eius cuius est imago. Si igitur in homine est imago Dei secundum Trinitatem personarum, cum homo per naturalem rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est. Obj. 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above (Q. 32, A. 1). Praeterea, nomen imaginis non cuilibet trium personarum convenit, sed soli filio, dicit enim Augustinus, in VI de Trin., quod solus filius est imago patris. Si igitur in homine attenderetur Dei imago secundum personam, non esset in homine imago totius Trinitatis, sed filii tantum. Obj. 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that the Son alone is the image of the Father. Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. Sed contra est quod Hilarius, in IV de Trin., per hoc quod homo dicitur ad imaginem Dei factus, ostendit pluralitatem divinarum personarum. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, distinctio divinarum personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae, aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, atque aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium personarum; sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur. Sic igitur dicendum est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad Trinitatem personarum, nam et in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura. I answer that, as we have seen (Q. 40, A. 2), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima. Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine perfecte repraesentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trin., maxima est differentia huius Trinitatis quae est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, Trinitatem quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus. Reply Obj. 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity. Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dixerunt in homine esse solum imaginem filii. Sed hoc improbat Augustinus, in XII de Trin. Primo quidem, per hoc quod, cum secundum aequalitatem essentiae filius sit patri similis, necesse est, si homo sit factus ad similitudinem filii, quod sit factus ad similitudinem patris. Secundo quia, si homo esset factus solum ad imaginem filii, non diceret pater, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, sed tuam. Cum ergo dicitur, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, non est intelligendum quod pater fecerit hominem solum ad imaginem filii, qui est Deus, ut quidam exposuerunt, sed intelligendum est quod Deus Trinitas fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, idest totius Trinitatis. Cum autem dicitur quod Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod haec praepositio ad designet terminum factionis, ut sit sensus, faciamus hominem taliter, ut sit in eo imago. Alio modo, haec praepositio ad potest designare causam exemplarem; sicut cum dicitur, iste liber est factus ad illum. Et sic imago Dei est ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur, secundum quod imago ponitur pro exemplari. Vel, secundum quod quidam dicunt, divina essentia dicitur imago, quia secundum eam una persona aliam imitatur. Reply Obj. 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Second, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness; but to Thy image. When, therefore, it is written, He made him to the image of God, the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God made man to His image, this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition to points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him. Second, this preposition ‘to’ may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, This book is made (like) to that one. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum imago Dei sit in homine solum secundum mentem Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum mentem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei. Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum secundum mentem. Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in man’s mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 11:7) that the man is the image . . . of God. But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind. Praeterea, Gen. I, creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos. Sed distinctio masculi et feminae est secundum corpus. Ergo etiam secundum corpus attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gen 1:27): God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind. Praeterea, imago praecipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum. Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man’s body also, and not in his mind. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., triplex visio invenitur in nobis, scilicet corporalis, spiritualis sive imaginaria, et intellectualis. Si ergo secundum visionem intellectualem, quae ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei; pari ratione et in aliis visionibus. Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 7,24), there is a threefold vision in us, corporeal, spiritual, or imaginary, and intellectual. Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Eph. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, ex quo datur intelligi quod renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad mentem pertinet. Sed ad Col. III, dicit, induentes novum hominem, qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, ubi renovationem quae est secundum novi hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 4:23,24): Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man. Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col 3:10): Putting on the new man; him who is renewed unto knowledge of God, according to the image of Him that created him, where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur. Cuius ratio manifeste cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis exercitus. I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of image as we have explained above (AA. 1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a trace. Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a trace, as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a trace, and the way in which an image, represents anything. An image represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a trace represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called traces: so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur. Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum vestigii. Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A. 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker’s love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an image in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a trace. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, inquantum habet Caesaris imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis accipiatur Dei imago. Reply Obj. 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin., quidam imaginem Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed secundum plura; dicentes quod vir patris personam intimat; filii vero personam, quod de viro ita processit ut de illo nasceretur; atque ita tertiam personam, velut spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse mulierem, quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut filia. Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia sequeretur quod Spiritus Sanctus esset principium filii, sicut mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personae. Tertio, quia secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere non debuisset, nisi producta iam prole. Et ideo dicendum est quod Scriptura, postquam dixerat, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum distinctiones sexuum attendatur; sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio sexuum. Unde apostolus, ad Col. III, postquam dixerat, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum, subdit, ubi non est masculus et femina. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Spirit, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter. All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Spirit is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man’s offspring; second, because one man would be only the image of one Person; third, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, to the image of God He created him, it added, male and female He created them, not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col 3:10), after saying, According to the image of Him that created him, added, Where there is neither male nor female (Vulg. neither Gentile nor Jew). Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream, tamen corpus hominis, quia solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum caelum sit aptius, magis in hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cetera corpora animalium, factum iure videri potest; ut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei, sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum vestigii. Reply Obj. 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God’s image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals, as Augustine remarks (83 Questions, Q. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man’s body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace. Ad quartum dicendum quod tam in visione corporali quam in visione imaginaria invenitur quaedam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trin. In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris corporis; secundo vero ipsa visio, quae fit per impressionem cuiusdam similitudinis praedictae speciei in visum; tertio est ibi intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa detinens. Reply Obj. 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; second, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; third, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo quidem species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque. Sed utraque Trinitas deficit a ratione divinae imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris corporis est extra naturam animae, species autem quae est in memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animae, et ita utrobique deficit repraesentatio connaturalitatis et coaeternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a sensu videntis, et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute imaginativa, et ita per hoc non repraesentatur convenienter processio filii a solo patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quae coniungit duo praedicta, non ex eis procedit, neque in visione corporea neque in spirituali, unde non convenienter repraesentatur processio spiritus sancti a patre et filio. Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; second, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and third, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum imago Dei inveniatur in anima secundum actus Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in anima secundum actus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id esse ac nosse diligimus. Sed esse non significat actum. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus. Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that man was made to God’s image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge. But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul’s acts. Praeterea, Augustinus, in IX de Trin., assignat imaginem Dei in anima secundum haec tria, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Mens autem non significat actum; sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam intellectivae animae. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur secundum actus. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God’s image in the soul to these three things—mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul. Praeterea, Augustinus, X de Trin., assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Sed haec tria sunt vires naturales animae, ut Magister dicit, III distinctione I libri Sent. Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum actus. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to memory, understanding, and will. But these three are natural powers of the soul, as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. Praeterea, imago Trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus. Obj. 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XI de Trin., assignat Trinitatem in inferioribus animae partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam. Ergo et Trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem. On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God’s image, must be referred to actual vision. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repraesentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt. I answer that, As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word cannot exist without actual thought, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.