Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, inobedientia ad hominem eorum quae ei debent esse subiecta, subsecuta est in poenam eius, eo quod ipse fuit inobediens Deo. Et ideo in statu innocentiae, ante inobedientiam praedictam, nihil ei repugnabat quod naturaliter deberet ei esse subiectum. Omnia autem animalia sunt homini naturaliter subiecta. Quod apparet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex ipso naturae processu. Sicut enim in generatione rerum intelligitur quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecto ad perfectum (nam materia est propter formam, et forma imperfectior propter perfectiorem), ita etiam est in usu rerum naturalium, nam imperfectiora cedunt in usum perfectorum; plantae enim utuntur terra ad sui nutrimentum, animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus. Unde naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in I Politic., quod venatio sylvestrium animalium est iusta et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter suum. Secundo apparet hoc ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde, cum homo sit supra cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius gubernationi alia animalia subduntur. Tertio apparet idem ex proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus invenitur, secundum aestimationem naturalem, quaedam participatio prudentiae ad aliquos particulares actus, in homine autem invenitur universalis prudentia, quae est ratio omnium agibilium. Omne autem quod est per participationem, subditur ei quod est per essentiam et universaliter. Unde patet quod naturalis est subiectio aliorum animalium ad hominem. I answer that, As above stated (Q. 95, A. 1), for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Second, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Third, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in subiectos multa potest facere superior potestas, quae non potest facere inferior. Angelus autem est naturaliter superior homine. Unde aliquis effectus poterat fieri circa animalia virtute angelica, qui non poterat fieri potestate humana; scilicet quod statim omnia animalia congregarentur. Reply Obj. 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod animalia quae nunc sunt ferocia et occidunt alia animalia, in statu illo fuissent mansueta non solum circa hominem, sed etiam circa alia animalia. Sed hoc est omnino irrationabile. Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est mutata, ut quibus nunc naturale est comedere aliorum animalium carnes, tunc vixissent de herbis, sicut leones et falcones. Nec Glossa Bedae dicit, Gen. I, quod ligna et herbae datae sunt omnibus animalibus et avibus in cibum, sed quibusdam. Fuisset ergo naturalis discordia inter quaedam animalia. Nec tamen propter hoc subtraherentur dominio hominis; sicut nec nunc propter hoc subtrahuntur dominio Dei, cuius providentia hoc totum dispensatur. Et huius providentiae homo executor fuisset, ut etiam nunc apparet in animalibus domesticis, ministrantur enim falconibus domesticis per homines gallinae in cibum. Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man’s sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede’s gloss on Gen. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. Ad tertium dicendum quod homines in statu innocentiae non indigebant animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia nudi erant, et non erubescebant, nullo instante inordinatae concupiscentiae motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis Paradisi vescebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur. Indigebant tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. Quod significatum est per hoc, quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant. Reply Obj. 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals—neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence—nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise—nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. Ad quartum dicendum quod alia animalia habent quandam participationem prudentiae et rationis secundum aestimationem naturalem; ex qua contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc quaedam domestica ei obediunt. Reply Obj. 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum homo habuisset dominium super omnes alias creaturas Whether man had mastership over all other creatures? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non habuisset dominium super omnes alias creaturas. Angelus enim naturaliter est maioris potestatis quam homo. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus III de Trin., materia corporalis non obedivisset ad nutum etiam sanctis angelis. Ergo multo minus homini in statu innocentiae. Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels. Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. Praeterea, in plantis non sunt de viribus animae nisi nutritiva et augmentativa et generativa. Hae autem non sunt natae obedire rationi; ut in uno et eodem homine apparet. Ergo, cum dominium competat homini secundum rationem, videtur quod plantis homo in statu innocentiae non dominaretur. Obj. 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. Praeterea, quicumque dominatur alicui rei, potest illam rem mutare. Sed homo non potuisset mutare cursum caelestium corporum, hoc enim solius Dei est, ut Dionysius dicit in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo non dominabatur eis. Obj. 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, praesit universae creaturae. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:26): That he may have dominion over . . . every creature. Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo angelis non dominabatur in primo statu, et quod dicitur omni creaturae, intelligitur quae non est ad imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima imperando. Unde et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per imperium dominabatur. Viribus autem naturalibus, et ipsi corpori, homo dominatur non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum auxilio. I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his reason, which makes him like to the angels; his sensitive powers, whereby he is like the animals; his natural forces, which liken him to the plants; and the body itself, wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read all creatures, we must understand the creatures which are not made to God’s image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man’s mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. The answers to the objections appear from the above. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum homines in statu innocentiae omnes fuissent aequales Whether men were equal in the state of innocence? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiae omnes fuissent aequales. Dicit enim Gregorius quod, ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares. Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal. Praeterea, similitudo et aequalitas est ratio mutuae dilectionis; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit sibi simile, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi. In illo autem statu inter homines abundabat dilectio, quae est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in statu innocentiae. Obj. 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Ecclus. 13:19, Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself. Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. Praeterea, cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inaequalitatis inter homines videtur nunc esse, ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro meritis praemiat, quosdam vero punit, ex parte vero naturae, quia propter naturae defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam autem fortes et perfecti. Quae in primo statu non fuissent. Obj. 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Ordo autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. Ergo in primo statu, qui decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 13:1): The things which are of God, are well ordered. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place. Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant. I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile. Sed et secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed per liberum arbitrium; ex quo homo habet quod possit magis et minus animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel cognoscendum. Unde quidam magis profecissent in iustitia et scientia quam alii. Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a legibus naturae, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod commodum aut auxilium reciperet magis et minus, cum etiam et cibis eorum vita sustentaretur. There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et pulchriores et melius complexionati. Ita tamen quod in illis qui excederentur, nullus esset defectus sive peccatum, sive circa animam sive circa corpus. So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere disparitatem quae est secundum differentiam iustitiae et peccati; ex qua contingit quod aliqui poenaliter sunt sub aliis coercendi. Reply Obj. 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. Ad secundum dicendum quod aequalitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit aequalis. Sed tamen inter inaequales potest esse maior dilectio quam inter aequales, licet non aequaliter utrinque respondeat. Pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter, quam frater fratrem; licet filius non tantundem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo diligitur. Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. Ad tertium dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu naturae. Reply Obj. 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum homo in statu innocentiae homini dominabatur Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae homini non dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, hominem rationalem, ad imaginem suam factum, non voluit Deus nisi irrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle. Praeterea, illud quod est introductum in poenam peccati, non fuisset in statu innocentiae. Sed hominem subesse homini, introductum est in poenam peccati, dictum est enim mulieri post peccatum, sub potestate viri eris, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erat homo homini subiectus. Obj. 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen 3:16): Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power. Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man. Praeterea, subiectio libertati opponitur. Sed libertas est unum de praecipuis bonis, quod in statu innocentiae non defuisset, quando nihil aberat quod bona voluntas cupere posset, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo homo homini in statu innocentiae non dominabatur. Obj. 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, where nothing was wanting that man’s good-will could desire, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence. Sed contra, conditio hominum in statu innocentiae non erat dignior quam conditio angelorum. Sed inter angelos quidam aliis dominantur, unde et unus ordo dominationum vocatur. Ergo non est contra dignitatem status innocentiae, quod homo homini dominaretur. On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of Dominations. Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another. Respondeo dicendum quod dominium accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod opponitur servituti, et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis subditur ut servus. Alio modo accipitur dominium, secundum quod communiter refertur ad subiectum qualitercumque, et sic etiam ille qui habet officium gubernandi et dirigendi liberos, dominus dici potest. Primo ergo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini non dominaretur, sed secundo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini dominari potuisset. Cuius ratio est, quia servus in hoc differt a libero, quod liber est causa sui, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys.; servus autem ordinatur ad alium. Tunc ergo aliquis dominatur alicui ut servo, quando eum cui dominatur ad propriam utilitatem sui, scilicet dominantis, refert. Et quia unicuique est appetibile proprium bonum, et per consequens contristabile est unicuique quod illud bonum quod deberet esse suum, cedat alteri tantum; ideo tale dominium non potest esse sine poena subiectorum. Propter quod, in statu innocentiae non fuisset tale dominium hominis ad hominem. I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own—namely the master’s use. And since every man’s proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one’s own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man. Tunc vero dominatur aliquis alteri ut libero, quando dirigit ipsum ad proprium bonum eius qui dirigitur, vel ad bonum commune. Et tale dominium hominis, ad hominem in statu innocentiae fuisset, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, unde homines in statu innocentiae socialiter vixissent. Socialis autem vita multorum esse non posset, nisi aliquis praesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet, multi enim per se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad unum. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in principio Politic., quod quandocumque multa ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur unum ut principale et dirigens. Secundo quia, si unus homo habuisset super alium supereminentiam scientiae et iustitiae, inconveniens fuisset nisi hoc exequeretur in utilitatem aliorum; secundum quod dicitur I Petr. IV, unusquisque gratiam quam accepit, in alterutrum illam administrantes. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod iusti non dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi, hoc naturalis ordo praescribit, ita Deus hominem condidit. But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Second, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10, As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel: and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta, quae procedunt de primo modo dominii. From this appear the replies to the objections, which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership. Quaestio 97 Question 97