Respondeo dicendum quod in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem humani generis, alioquin peccatum hominis fuisset valde necessarium, ex quo tantum bonum consecutum est. Est ergo considerandum quod homo, secundum suam naturam, est constitutus quasi medium quoddam inter creaturas corruptibiles et incorruptibiles, nam anima eius est naturaliter incorruptibilis, corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile. Est autem considerandum quod alio modo intentio naturae fertur ad corruptibiles, et incorruptibiles creaturas. Id enim per se videtur esse de intentione naturae, quod est semper et perpetuum. Quod autem est solum secundum aliquod tempus, non videtur esse principaliter de intentione naturae, sed quasi ad aliud ordinatum, alioquin, eo corrupto, naturae intentio cassaretur. I answer that, In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise man’s sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature’s purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature’s purpose would become void. Quia igitur in rebus corruptibilibus nihil est perpetuum et semper manens nisi species, bonum speciei est de principali intentione naturae, ad cuius conservationem naturalis generatio ordinatur. Substantiae vero incorruptibiles manent semper non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individua, et ideo etiam ipsa individua sunt de principali intentione naturae. Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. Sic igitur homini ex parte corporis, quod corruptibile est secundum naturam suam, competit generatio. Ex parte vero animae, quae incorruptibilis est, competit ei quod multitudo individuorum sit per se intenta a natura, vel potius a naturae auctore, qui solus est humanarum animarum creator. Et ideo, ad multiplicationem humani generis, generationem in humano genere statuit, etiam in statu innocentiae. Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per animam. Et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur corruptibilibus rebus. Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio in statu innocentiae, etsi non fuisset propter conservationem speciei, fuisset tamen propter multiplicationem individuorum. Reply Obj. 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual. Ad tertium dicendum quod in statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros observetur. Reply Obj. 3: In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one’s need, those things of which they were masters—a state of things to be observed even now among many good men. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, primus homo erat in Paradiso terrestri sicut angelus quidam. Sed in futuro resurrectionis statu, quando erunt homines angelis similes, neque nubent neque nubentur, ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Ergo neque in Paradiso fuisset generatio per coitum. Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was like an angel. But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the angels, they shall neither marry nor be married, as is written Matt. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. Praeterea, primi homines in perfecta aetate conditi fuerunt. Si igitur in eis ante peccatum generatio fuisset per coitum, fuissent etiam in Paradiso carnaliter coniuncti. Quod patet esse falsum, secundum Scripturam. Obj. 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture (Gen 4:1). Praeterea, in coniunctione carnali maxime efficitur homo similis bestiis, propter vehementiam delectationis, unde etiam continentia laudatur, per quam homines ab huiusmodi delectationibus abstinent. Sed bestiis homo comparatur propter peccatum, secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis. Ergo ante peccatum non fuisset maris et feminae carnalis coniunctio. Obj. 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence continence is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them. Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. Praeterea, in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset corruptio. Sed per coitum corrumpitur integritas virginalis. Ergo coitus in statu innocentiae non fuisset. Obj. 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. Sed contra est quod Deus ante peccatum masculum et feminam fecit, ut dicitur Gen. I et II. Nihil autem est frustra in operibus Dei. Ergo etiam si homo non peccasset, fuisset coitus, ad quem distinctio sexuum ordinatur. On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin (Gen 1, 2). But nothing is void in God’s works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ordained. Praeterea, Gen. II, dicitur mulier esse facta in adiutorium viri. Sed non ad aliud nisi ad generationem quae fit per coitum, quia ad quodlibet aliud opus, convenientius adiuvari posset vir per virum quam per feminam. Ergo etiam in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man (Gen 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam antiquorum doctorum, considerantes concupiscentiae foeditatem quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu, posuerunt quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit in libro quem fecit de Homine, quod in Paradiso aliter fuisset multiplicatum genus humanum, sicut multiplicati sunt angeli, absque concubitu, per operationem divinae virtutis. Et dicit quod Deus ante peccatum fecit masculum et feminam, respiciens ad modum generationis qui futurus erat post peccatum, cuius Deus praescius erat. Sed hoc non dicitur rationabiliter. Ea enim quae sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod homini, secundum animalem vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, ut supra dictum est, naturale est generare per coitum, sicut et ceteris animalibus perfectis. Et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata. Et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum. I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained (Q. 97, A. 3), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin. Sunt igitur in coitu duo consideranda, secundum praesentem statum. Unum quod naturae est, scilicet coniunctio maris et feminae ad generandum. In omni enim generatione requiritur virtus activa et passiva. Unde, cum in omnibus in quibus est distinctio sexuum, virtus activa sit in mare, virtus vero passiva in femina; naturae ordo exigit ut ad generandum conveniant per coitum mas et femina. Aliud autem quod considerari potest, est quaedam deformitas immoderatae concupiscentiae. Quae in statu innocentiae non fuisset quando inferiores vires omnino rationi subdebantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei : Absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis. Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., ideo primi parentes in Paradiso non coierunt, quia, formata muliere, post modicum propter peccatum de Paradiso eiecti sunt, vel quia expectabatur divina auctoritas ad determinatum tempus commixtionis, a qua acceperunt universale mandatum. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. Ad tertium dicendum quod bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest. Sed in statu innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat; et dico immoderate, praeter mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit. Et hoc sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine. Reply Obj. 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By immoderately I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, in illo statu nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Ita enim potuit utero coniugis, salva integritate feminei genitalis, virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest, eadem integritate salva, ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret; sic ad concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret. Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action. Quaestio 99 Question 99 De conditione prolis generandae quantum ad corpus The Condition of the Offspring as to the Body Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae. Et primo, quantum ad corpus; secundo, quantum ad iustitiam; tertio, quantum ad scientiam. We must now consider the condition of the offspring—first, as regards the body; second, as regards virtue; third, in knowledge. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox geniti habuissent perfectam virtutem corpoream. (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth? Secundo, utrum omnes fuissent nati in sexu masculino. (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum pueri in statu innocentiae, mox nati, virtutem perfectam habuissent ad motum membrorum Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae, mox nati, virtutem perfectam habuissent ad motum membrorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Bapt. Parvul., quod infirmitati mentis congruit haec infirmitas corporis, quae scilicet in pueris apparet. Sed in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset infirmitas mentis. Ergo neque talis infirmitas corporis fuisset in parvulis. Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 38): This weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants. Praeterea, quaedam animalia statim cum nascuntur, habent virtutem sufficientem ad usum membrorum. Sed homo est nobilior aliis animalibus. Ergo multo magis est naturale homini quod statim natus virtutem habeat ad usum membrorum. Et ita videtur esse poena ex peccato consequens. Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength. Praeterea, non posse consequi delectabile propositum, afflictionem inducit. Sed si pueri non habuissent virtutem ad movendum membra, frequenter accidisset quod non possent consequi aliquod delectabile eis propositum. Ergo fuisset in eis afflictio; quae non poterat esse ante peccatum. Non ergo in statu innocentiae defuisset pueris virtus ad movendum membra. Obj. 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs. Praeterea, defectus senectutis videtur correspondere defectui pueritiae. Sed in statu innocentiae non fuisset defectus senectutis. Ergo neque etiam defectus pueritiae. Obj. 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy. Sed contra est quod omne generatum prius est imperfectum quam perficiatur. Sed pueri in statu innocentiae fuissent per generationem producti. Ergo a principio imperfecti fuissent et quantitate et virtute corporis. On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam. Manifestum est autem naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra. Quia homo naturaliter habet cerebrum maius in quantitate, secundum proportionem sui corporis, quam cetera animalia. Unde naturale est quod, propter maximam humiditatem cerebri in pueris, nervi, qui sunt instrumenta motus, non sunt idonei ad movendum membra. Ex alia vero parte nulli Catholico dubium est quin divina virtute fieri possit, ut pueri mox nati perfectam virtutem habeant ad motum membrorum. I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth. Constat autem per auctoritatem Scripturae, quod Deus fecit hominem rectum, et haec rectitudo consistit, ut Augustinus dicit, in perfecta subiectione corporis ad animam. Sicut ergo in primo statu non poterat esse in membris hominis aliquid quod repugnaret ordinatae hominis voluntati, ita membra hominis deficere non poterant humanae voluntati. Voluntas autem hominis ordinata est quae tendit in actus sibi convenientes. Non sunt autem iidem actus convenientes homini secundum quamlibet aetatem. Dicendum est ergo quod pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus; sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi. Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that God made man right (Eccl 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man’s well-ordered will, so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will’s commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de ista infirmitate quae nunc in pueris apparet etiam quantum ad actus eorum pueritiae convenientes; ut patet per ea quae praemittit, quod iuxta se iacentibus mammis, magis possunt esurientes flere quam sugere. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle.