Summa Theologiae
Secunda Secundae Summa Theologica
Second Part of the Second Part De fide Faith Prooemium Prologue Post communem considerationem de virtutibus et vitiis et aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus, necesse est considerare singula in speciali, sermones enim morales universales sunt minus utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt. Potest autem aliquid in speciali considerari circa moralia dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius materiae moralis, puta cum consideratur de hac virtute vel hoc vitio; alio modo, quantum ad speciales status hominum, puta cum consideratur de subditis et praelatis, de activis et contemplativis, vel quibuscumque aliis differentiis hominum. After a general consideration of virtues, vices, and other things pertaining to moral matters, it is necessary to consider each of them in particular. For universal moral discourse is less useful, since actions are singulars. Particular moral matters can be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the moral matter itself, for example, this virtue or that vice; second, with respect to the special states of men, for example, subjects and prelates, people in active or contemplative life, and so on for other differences of men. Primo ergo considerabimus specialiter de his quae pertinent ad omnes hominum status; secundo vero, specialiter de his quae pertinent ad determinatos status. Therefore, first we will consider in particular everything that pertains to people of whatever state, second, what pertains to people in special states of life. Est autem considerandum circa primum quod, si seorsum determinaremus de virtutibus, donis, vitiis et praeceptis, oporteret idem multoties dicere, qui enim sufficienter vult tractare de hoc praecepto, non moechaberis, necesse habet inquirere de adulterio, quod est quoddam peccatum, cuius etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositae virtutis. Erit igitur compendiosior et expeditior considerationis via si simul sub eodem tractatu consideratio procedit de virtute et dono sibi correspondente, et vitiis oppositis, et praeceptis affirmativis vel negativis. Erit autem hic considerationis modus conveniens ipsis vitiis secundum propriam speciem, ostensum est enim supra quod vitia et peccata diversificantur specie secundum materiam vel obiectum, non autem secundum alias differentias peccatorum, puta cordis, oris et operis, vel secundum infirmitatem, ignorantiam et malitiam, et alias huiusmodi differentias; est autem eadem materia circa quam et virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt. Sic igitur tota materia morali ad considerationem virtutum reducta, omnes virtutes sunt ulterius reducendae ad septem, It should first be remarked that, if we were to treat virtues, gifts, vices and commandments separately, we would have to say the same thing many times over. For, if you were adequately to treat the commandment Do not commit adultery, you would have to examine adultery, which is a particular sin, and to understand it you must understand the opposite virtue. Therefore, it will be briefer and quicker to treat together the virtue and the gift corresponding to it, along with the opposite vices and the affirmative and negative commandments. This is the most convenient procedure for treating vices in their proper species, for it was shown above that vices and sins differ in species according to their matter or object, not according to other factors differentiating sins, such as by thought, word and deed, or by way of weakness, ignorance or malice, and other such differentiations. But virtues act correctly with regard to the same matter as the opposite vices deviate from. Therefore, as all moral matters are reduced to the consideration of the virtues, all the virtues are furthermore reduced to seven: quarum tres sunt theologicae, de quibus primo est agendum; aliae vero quatuor sunt cardinales, de quibus posterius agetur. of which three are theological, which will be treated first, and the other four are cardinal, which will be treated afterwards. Virtutum autem intellectualium una quidem est prudentia, quae inter cardinales virtutes continetur et numeratur; ars vero non pertinet ad moralem, quae circa agibilia versatur, cum ars sit recta ratio factibilium, ut supra dictum est; aliae vero tres intellectuales virtutes, scilicet sapientia, intellectus et scientia, communicant etiam in nomine cum donis quibusdam spiritus sancti, unde simul etiam de eis considerabitur in consideratione donorum virtutibus correspondentium. As for intellectual virtues, one is prudence, which is included and numbered among the cardinal virtues. Art, which has to do with making things, does not pertain to morals, as was said above. The other three intellectual virtues, i.e., wisdom, understanding and knowledge, share names with some gifts of the Holy Spirit. So they will be treated along with the gifts corresponding to virtues. Aliae vero virtutes morales omnes aliqualiter reducuntur ad virtutes cardinales, ut ex supradictis patet, unde in consideratione alicuius virtutis cardinalis considerabuntur etiam omnes virtutes ad eam qualitercumque pertinentes et vitia opposita. Et sic nihil moralium erit praetermissum. All the other moral virtues are somehow reducible to the cardinal virtues, as was shown previously. So along with each cardinal virtue we will treat also all the virtues that are in some way related to it, as well as the contrary vices. In this way nothing pertaining to morals will be omitted. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De fide Faith Circa virtutes igitur theologicas primo erit considerandum de fide; secundo, de spe; tertio, de caritate. Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with faith, second we shall speak of hope, and third, of charity. Circa fidem vero quadruplex consideratio occurrit, prima quidem de ipsa fide; secunda de donis intellectus et scientiae sibi correspondentibus; tertia de vitiis oppositis; quarta de praeceptis ad hanc virtutem pertinentibus. The treatise on faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue. Circa fidem vero primo erit considerandum de eius obiecto; secundo, de eius actu; tertio, de ipso habitu fidei. About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3) the habit of faith. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum obiectum fidei sit veritas prima. (1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth? Secundo, utrum obiectum fidei sit aliquid complexum vel incomplexum, idest res aut enuntiabile. (2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e., whether it is a thing or a proposition? Tertio, utrum fidei possit subesse falsum. (3) Whether anything false can come under faith? Quarto, utrum obiectum fidei possit esse aliquid visum. (4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen? Quinto, utrum possit esse aliquid scitum. (5) Whether it can be anything known? Sexto, utrum credibilia debeant distingui per certos articulos. (6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain number of articles? Septimo, utrum iidem articuli subsint fidei secundum omne tempus. (7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times? Octavo, de numero articulorum. (8) Of the number of articles; Nono, de modo tradendi articulos in symbolo. (9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol; Decimo, cuius sit fidei symbolum constituere. (10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum obiectum fidei sit veritas prima Whether the object of faith is the first truth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum fidei non sit veritas prima. Illud enim videtur esse obiectum fidei quod nobis proponitur ad credendum. Sed non solum proponuntur nobis ad credendum ea quae pertinent ad divinitatem, quae est veritas prima; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad humanitatem Christi et Ecclesiae sacramenta et creaturarum conditionem. Ergo non solum veritas prima est fidei obiectum. Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e., the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth. Praeterea, fides et infidelitas sunt circa idem, cum sint opposita. Sed circa omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur potest esse infidelitas, quidquid enim horum homo negaverit, infidelis reputatur. Ergo etiam fides est circa omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur. Sed ibi multa continentur de hominibus et de aliis rebus creatis. Ergo obiectum fidei non solum est veritas prima, sed etiam veritas creata. Obj. 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth. Praeterea, fides caritati condividitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed caritate non solum diligimus Deum, qui est summa bonitas, sed etiam diligimus proximum. Ergo fidei obiectum non est solum veritas prima. Obj. 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the First Truth. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod fides est circa simplicem et semper existentem veritatem. Haec autem est veritas prima. Ergo obiectum fidei est veritas prima. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that faith is about the simple and everlasting truth. Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth. Respondeo dicendum quod cuiuslibet cognoscitivi habitus obiectum duo habet, scilicet id quod materialiter cognoscitur, quod est sicut materiale obiectum; et id per quod cognoscitur, quod est formalis ratio obiecti. Sicut in scientia geometriae materialiter scita sunt conclusiones; formalis vero ratio sciendi sunt media demonstrationis, per quae conclusiones cognoscuntur. I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, second, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known. Sic igitur in fide, si consideremus formalem rationem obiecti, nihil est aliud quam veritas prima, non enim fides de qua loquimur assentit alicui nisi quia est a Deo revelatum; unde ipsi veritati divinae innititur tanquam medio. Si vero consideremus materialiter ea quibus fides assentit, non solum est ipse Deus, sed etiam multa alia. Quae tamen sub assensu fidei non cadunt nisi secundum quod habent aliquem ordinem ad Deum, prout scilicet per aliquos divinitatis effectus homo adiuvatur ad tendendum in divinam fruitionem. Et ideo etiam ex hac parte obiectum fidei est quodammodo veritas prima, inquantum nihil cadit sub fide nisi in ordine ad Deum, sicut etiam obiectum medicinae est sanitas, quia nihil medicina considerat nisi in ordine ad sanitatem. Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, inasmuch as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, inasmuch as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad humanitatem Christi et ad sacramenta Ecclesiae vel ad quascumque creaturas cadunt sub fide inquantum per haec ordinamur ad Deum. Et eis etiam assentimus propter divinam veritatem. Reply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, insofar as by them we are directed to God, and inasmuch as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth. Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum, de omnibus illis quae in sacra Scriptura traduntur. The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained in Holy Writ. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam caritas diligit proximum propter Deum; et sic obiectum eius proprie est ipse Deus, ut infra dicetur. Reply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on (Q. 25, A. 1).